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Research Abstract 
This thesis considers how Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law may be used to resolve the 
uncertainties in how a balance can be achieved between employee protection and corporate 
rescue laws during corporate insolvency. There exist a significant number of academic theses 
on the role that insolvency law should play in a legal system, and the tension that corporate 
insolvency creates between employment protection and corporate rescue laws during 
corporate insolvency. However, there is also a dearth of academic work on how the tension 
between employee protection and corporate rescue laws may be balanced through 
interpretation.  
The commencement of formal insolvency proceedings by an employer affects employees’ 
rights and interests. Employment laws seek to protect employees’ rights and interests while 
insolvency laws seek to promote corporate rescue which may entail workforce changes. 
Consequently, this creates a tension between whose interest insolvency law should give 
primacy of protection.   
Theoretical perspectives from what has been termed the traditionalist and proceduralist 
theoretical schools that dominate the field of insolvency, arguably, do not provide satisfactory 
avenues through which a balance may be achieved between employment protection and 
corporate rescue. While traditionalists’ perspectives consider the interests of extant 
stakeholders as a whole and support fairness in distributive imperatives in insolvency, they do 
not provide clear answers on how these perspectives may be balanced and applied to 
corporate insolvencies. Proceduralists, however, provide clear answers to the factors to be 
taken into account during corporate insolvency but their perspectives give primacy to 
maximising creditors’ returns rather than an inclusive distributive approach, which may be an 
unsatisfactorily narrow approach to stakeholders as a group. 
This thesis therefore, applies Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law as a remedy that would 
arguably, provide an approach through which a balance may be achieved between 
employment protection and corporate rescue objectives during corporate insolvency. 
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Introduction 
i. Background 
The inequality in the level of protection to employees’ rights and interests during corporate 
rescue is arguably, precipitated by the tension that is created by the divergent policy objectives 
of employment law and insolvency law during corporate insolvency. While insolvency law’s 
main objective is the rehabilitation and rescue of the insolvent but viable businesses, 
employment law’s main objective is the protection and continuity of the employment 
relationship between the debtor employer and employees. Therefore, the divergence in the 
policy objectives sought by both employment law and insolvency law creates a tension 
between the two policy objectives.  
This thesis focuses on the treatment of employees’ rights on the insolvency of their corporate 
employer in the UK and the US. This research project argues that there exists a form of 
legislative protection to employees’ rights and interests during corporate insolvency involving 
their debtor employers in both the UK and the US. However, the level of protection afforded 
to employees is considerably minimal in contrast to other stakeholders, such as secured 
creditors.  
This thesis argues that the level of protection to employees’ interests on their debtor 
employer’s insolvency ought to be commensurable with the employees’ input into the going 
concern value of their debtor employer’s business. Employees provide the human capital in 
the form of labour that is employed alongside financial capital in the production of goods or 
provision of services that the employer sets out to achieve. However, on corporate insolvency, 
employees’ rights and interests are mainly considered as general unsecured debts or claims of 
the debtor company by the insolvency laws in both the UK and US which creates a degree of 
inequality of protection between extant stakeholders. 
 
ii. Research Objectives 
1. By adopting a theoretical analysis, this thesis examines the tension between corporate 
rescue laws and employment protection laws during corporate insolvency in the US and 
the UK and how this tension may be remedied or balanced.  The thesis analyses the 
policy objectives of corporate rescue laws and employment protection laws as set out 
xxi 
 
in the statutes, parliamentary and congressional debates proceedings as reported in 
the Hansard (UK) and the Congressional Record (US), ministerial statements, 
Government consultative documents and case law of both the US and the UK. 
 
2. The thesis also analyses the theoretical perspectives of what has been termed the 
traditionalist and proceduralist theoretical schools that dominate the field of insolvency 
largely in the US, on the role of insolvency law in a legal system.1 This is to examine 
whether both theoretical schools’ perspectives on insolvency law would inform 
approaches that may be adopted to remedy or balance the tension between corporate 
rescue laws and employment protection laws on corporate insolvency in the US and 
the UK. The thesis however establishes that neither the traditionalist nor proceduralist 
theoretical perspectives provide satisfactory approaches on how a balance may be 
achieved between corporate rescue laws and employment protection laws on 
corporate insolvency.2 
3. The thesis adopts and applies Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law as presented in 
the Interpretative Theory of Law3 as a model that would provide approaches through 
which a balance may be achieved between corporate rescue laws and employment 
protection laws on corporate insolvency. The rationale for the adoption of Dworkin’s 
approach is premised on the notion that Dworkin’s ideals of constructiveness and 
integrity in interpretation and the right answer thesis as presented in his Interpretative 
Theory of Law,4 if adopted by judges, law and policy makers, while interpreting and 
applying laws and policies during corporate insolvency proceedings, a balanced 
approach or remedy to the tension between employment protection laws and 
corporate rescue laws may be achieved in both the US and the UK. 5 
                                                          
1 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578. The terms proceduralists 
and traditionalists and their proponents are discussed below in chapter two at 2.1. 
2 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L. J. 
857; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775; D. R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the 
Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554; Paul F. Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and 
Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503, 544.  
3 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986). 
4 Ibid, at 46 – 48. 
5 See also, Hamiisi J. Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ 
(2016) 4(1) NIBLeJ 4; Hamiisi J. Nsubuga, ‘The Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law: Remedying the 
Theoretical Limitations in the Traditionalist and Proceduralist Perspectives on Corporate Insolvency’ (2017) 61(5) 
International Journal of Law and Management (Forthcoming, October 2017). 
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iii. Research Methodology 
This thesis adopts a comparative and doctrinal research methodology which involves the use 
of primary and secondary legal scholarly literature on the subject of corporate insolvency law, 
employment law and legal theory in the UK (with some European Law) and the US. Primary 
sources of law used in this thesis include statutes, judicial decisions, legislative reports, policy 
and consultation documents and reports. Secondary sources include law journals, text books, 
law reports, case reports, legal monographs and electronic data bases, such as HeinOnline, 
Westlaw and LexisNexis accessed via the Nottingham Online Workspace (NOW) electronic data 
base.  
iv. The Rationale for a Comparative Study and the US as a Comparator  
Comparative legal analysis involves the study or examination of the legal structures or systems 
of one jurisdiction with another.6 Comparative legal analysis also involves the examination of 
the relationships, similarities or differences, and the significance of such similarities or 
differences in relation to the specific area of research or study in order to inform a better 
functionality of the law.7  I am using the US as a comparator in this thesis in examining the 
impact of corporate insolvency on the rights of employees in both the UK and the US.8 
The rationale behind my choice for the US as a comparator is predicated on the notion that 
both the UK and the US share a somewhat common heritage in terms of their corporate 
insolvency laws. The US insolvency regime has its roots in English insolvency laws.9 This can be 
traced back to the 15th century.10 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800,11 which was the first bankruptcy 
                                                          
 
6 Mary Glendon and Paolo Carozza, Comparative Legal Traditions, Texts, Materials and Cases, (2nd edn, West 1994) 
6; N. Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge’ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 2008). 
7 E. J. Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, 451, 486. 
8 B. Carruthers and T. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the 
United States, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998); G. McCormack, Corporate Rescue – An Anglo- American 
Perspective, (London: Edward Elgar, 2008) Chapters 3 & 4; C. Mallon and S.Y. Waisman, The Law and Practice of 
Restructuring in the UK and US (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 
9 Charles Tabb, ‘History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United Stated of America’ (1995) 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
5, 6-7. 
10 Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials in Bankruptcy, (2nd edition, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1990), 26-31.  
11 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch.19, 2 Stat. 9 (Repealed 1803). 
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legislation passed by the US Congress, substantially copied the English Bankruptcy law of 
1732.12 
Moreover, both jurisdictions are common law jurisdictions who share a form of similar 
objectives when dealing with the debtor-creditor relationships during corporate insolvencies. 
The similarity in the objectives centres on the provision of collective and inclusive rescue 
processes which financially struggling companies may adopt in pursuit of corporate 
reorganisations and rescue.  
However, there are differences in both jurisdictions’ labour law / employment law provisions 
dealing with extant employees’ rights and those of other stakeholders during corporate 
insolvencies. While UK employment laws offer uniform protection to all employees during 
corporate insolvency, US law offers a non-uniform model of protection as its labour laws mainly 
afford primacy of protection to employees that are members of labour unions and covered by 
collective bargaining agreements. This particular point of discourse is broadly analysed in 
chapter three of this thesis. 
In order to achieve my research objectives, I am using the functional analysis model13 over the 
convergence model14 of the two dominant theses on comparative legal scholarship. The 
functional analysis model will guide me to unravel the disparities in the socio-economic and 
legislative structures of both jurisdictions to avoid a possible transplanting of the legal rules or 
structures of one jurisdiction into the other, bearing in mind the differences in the socio-
economic and entrepreneurial structures in each jurisdiction.  
Through the functional analysis model, I will be able to acknowledge that although legal 
structures of both the UK and the US exhibit different entrepreneurial, cultural, ethical 
principles and practices, especially on the subject of insolvency, both jurisdictions face similar 
challenges in relation to the need to balance extant stakeholder interests on corporate 
insolvency.  
                                                          
12 Statute of Geo. 2, ch. 30, s.10 (1732).  
13 Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism and the Future of Comparative Law’ (2009) (6) Bringham 
Young University L. Rev. 1879, 1906 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596271 (accessed March 2016). 
14 G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’ (1998) 
1 MLR 11, 32.   
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Moreover, substantive legislative provisions regulating the debtor-creditor relationships 
during corporate insolvency in both jurisdictions still exhibit a degree of disproportionality in 
addressing stakeholder interests on corporate insolvency. Although the UK, arguably, provides 
a better structured and uniform legislative protection to all employees on corporate 
insolvency, compared with that of the US, as observed in chapter seven of this thesis, the 
protection is still substantially minimal in contrast to other stakeholders with interests in the 
debtor company.  
Therefore, the functional analysis model will be useful in my analytical evaluation of the 
jurisdictional differences and similarities since both jurisdictions face similar challenges in 
addressing stakeholder interests on corporate insolvency but prescribe different mechanisms 
for dealing with those challenges.  
v.  Research Contribution to Knowledge 
This research project’s contribution to knowledge is the finding that interpretation can be used 
as remedy to the uncertainties on how a balance can be reached between employee protection 
and corporate rescue laws during corporate insolvency. This research project establishes that 
Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law, if adopted by judges, law and policy makers, may 
help to inform an interpretative approach that may fairly balance the policy objectives of 
employment protection and the policy objectives of business rescue to remedy the tension 
that corporate insolvency creates between the two policies’ objectives.   
This research project acknowledges that there are indeed, a significant number of academic 
theses on the tension that corporate insolvency creates between employment protection and 
corporate rescue laws during corporate insolvency. The thesis also acknowledges the 
significant number of academic and research work on the role that insolvency law should play 
in a legal system.  
However, the thesis establishes that there is a dearth of academic research work on how the 
tension between employee protection and corporate rescue laws may be balanced through 
interpretation. My research project therefore considers in a theoretical and comparative 
perspective, how Dworkin’s Interpretative approach to law, as posited in his Interpretative 
Theory of Law, can be used as a remedy to the tension between employment protection and 
corporate rescue through interpretation.   
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However, mention has to be made of some academic writers on the subject of insolvency law’s 
treatment of stakeholder interests on corporate insolvency. For example, Professor Rizwaan 
Jameel Mokal in his Authentic Consent Model (ACM)15 advocates for fairness, equality and 
justice amongst creditors when the company to which they hold rights, interests and 
obligations is faced with corporate insolvency. Through the ACM, Mokal argues that on 
corporate insolvency, all affected parties should be given a choice to select principles that 
should govern their rights, interests, and obligations. 16  
Mokal also argues that affected parties should be given equal weight in the selection process 
of the principles to govern their rights, interests and obligations during corporate insolvency.17 
Factors such as creditors’ wealth, cognitive behaviour, bargaining powers and legal status 
(whether employees, secured or non-secured creditors) are all morally irrelevant in framing 
legal rules of justice.18 
It is therefore, the notion that Mokal’s Authentic Consent Model is premised on the principles 
of equality, fairness and justice which would closely place the ACM in proximity to Dworkin’s 
Interpretative Theory of Law19 which is my choice of theory in this thesis. This is because 
Dworkin’s approach to addressing stakeholder interests on corporate insolvency is also 
premised on the principles of fairness, equality and justice. However, I preferred Dworkin’s 
approach to Mokal’s Authentic Consent Model as the ACM is based on a hypothetical model 
of consent amongst the parties affected by corporate insolvency.20  
According to the ACM, all parties affected by corporate insolvency are deprived of personal 
attributes and must reason rationally in deciding the principles that should govern their rights, 
interests and obligations. Under the ACM, parties are not of ‘real world parties’ and cannot 
                                                          
15 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain and Corporate 
Liquidation’ (2001) 21 (3) Legal Studies, 400 – 413; Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and 
Application (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
16 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005), Chapter 3, at 61. 
17 Ibid, Chapter 3, at 61, 62. 
18 Ibid. 
19 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), pp 46 – 48; R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers 
and True Benality’ in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 
1991). 
20 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005), Chapter 3, at 61 and 69. 
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deploy ‘actual endowment and energy’ in the bargaining process.21  Moreover, Dworkin was 
of the opinion that the term ‘authentic consent’ can be misleading.22 Therefore, I preferred 
Dworkin’s approach as this approach prescribes an interpretative solution by looking at the 
judge as the final arbiter to adopt the principles of constructiveness and Integrity in 
interpreting insolvency law and policies to address stakeholder concerns to achieve fairness, 
equality and justice to all stakeholders on corporate insolvency.  
vi.  Chapter Overview   
This thesis consists of seven chapters as outlined below. 
Chapter One 
Chapter one introduces the thesis to the reader by setting out the concept of corporate rescue 
/ bankruptcy reorganisation in both the UK and the US. The chapter introduces, and analyses 
the tension between corporate rescue and employment protection in both jurisdictions. This 
is by analysing corporate rescue / bankruptcy reorganisation processes in both jurisdictions 
and how these processes affect the policies underlying corporate rescue and employment 
protection in both jurisdictions. The chapter proposes that a balance between corporate 
rescue and employment protection in both jurisdictions may arguably, be achieved through an 
interpretative approach. This is through the adoption of Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of 
Law.  
Chapter Two 
Chapter two analyses corporate insolvency and employment protection through a theoretical 
perspective. The chapter sets out the traditionalist and proceduralist perspectives on the role 
of insolvency law in a legal system and how these perspectives affect or influence the balancing 
of employment protection and corporate rescue during corporate insolvency proceedings in 
the UK and the US. This chapter contends that these theoretical schools do not offer a 
satisfactory solution to the tension between corporate rescue objectives and employment 
protection objectives. The chapter therefore introduces Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of 
Law. The chapter then argues that, if Dworkin’s ideals, such as constructiveness in 
interpretation, integrity of law and the right answer thesis are adopted by judges, law and 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 R. Dworkin, ‘Why Efficiency?’ (1980) 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563, 575. 
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policy makers in both jurisdictions, these ideals may arguably, inform an approach that would 
balance the needs of employment protection with those of corporate rescue during corporate 
insolvency proceedings in both jurisdictions.    
Chapter Three 
Chapter three discusses the rights and interests of employees in the US during Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. The chapter analyses the interaction between 
employment protection and bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings under Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code. The chapter examines the US social policy and governance structures and 
how these affect employment protection and bankruptcy reorganisations. The chapter 
discusses the diffusion of power between federal and state law structures, the interplay 
between federal laws and state laws that affect the policies underlying the drive for 
employment protection and successful business reorganisations.  
Chapter Four 
Chapter four applies Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of Law to the US bankruptcy courts’ 
interpretative approaches during bankruptcy reorganiation proceedings. This chapter applies 
Dworkin’s interpretative approach to the judicial interpretation and application of s.1113 to 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings as an approach that would arguably, provide the 
balance needed to simultaneously pursue the policy objectives of successful business 
reorganisations, and those of employment protection fairly, without compromising the other. 
Particularly, the chapter examines the interpretative approaches adopted by the Second and 
the Third Circuit Courts of Appeal in addressing s.1113 rejection motions by debtor employers 
during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. 
Chapter Five 
Chapter five introduces the subject of business sales and relevant transfers in the UK. The 
chapter introduces the subject of the Acquired Rights Directives (ARD) and their transposition 
into UK law in the form of TUPE Regulations.  The chapter then analyses the tension that TUPE 
Regulations create between business rescue policies and employment protection policies 
during insolvency proceeding in the UK. The chapter analyses the position of employment 
protection in light of the changes brought by The Collective Redundancies and the Transfers of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that in order to achieve a balanced approach to pursuing employment 
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protection and business rescue simultaneously and avoid the tension between the two 
policies’ objectives during TUPE transfers, Dworkin’s interpretative approach may be the 
solution.  
Chapter Six 
Chapter six applies theory to TUPE transfers. The chapter analyses how the interpretative 
approaches adopted by UK courts and tribunals in interpreting and applying TUPE Regulations 
to legal scenarios during relevant transfers have led to inconsistent judgments. The chapter 
argues that the inconsistencies in the judicial judgments do not help to balance the policy 
objectives of employment protection and the policy objectives of corporate rescue during 
TUPE transfers. Rather, the judicial inconsistencies further exacerbate the tension between the 
two policies’ objectives. The chapter therefore uses Dworkin’s interpretative approach through 
case analyses to highlight the ‘missing parts of the puzzle’ in the quest for a remedy to the 
tension between employment protection and corporate rescue policy objectives.  
Chapter Seven 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis. It highlights the fundamental points of discourse in every 
chapter of this thesis. The chapter also highlights some comparative research observations on 
a jurisdictional point of view. The chapter then offers some normative justification as to why a 
Dworkinian interpretative approach to law would provide the solution to balancing employees’ 
rights and employers’ interests during corporate insolvency in the UK and the US.  
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Chapter One 
The Concept of Corporate Rescue: The Tension between Corporate 
Rescue and Employment Protection in the US and the UK 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In modern market economies, a company is a place of social relationships from which 
members, such as employees derive their livelihood.1 Capital and labour are the two most 
important factors of production in a company. Employees provide human capital in the form 
of labour that facilitates the day-to-day running of the company that enables the company to 
enhance its going concern value.2  Therefore, human labour is a strategic asset 24F3 without which 
a company may struggle to achieve its economic goals.25F4 
Shareholders invest money in companies in anticipation that such companies will prosper and 
generate profits that will enhance their economic well-being. Likewise, employees seek 
employment in these companies in order to gain a source of income. This income would 
arguably, facilitate and enhance their economic well-being, provide for their relations and 
meet their living costs.5 Job satisfaction and job security are regarded as important aspects of 
quality of life.6  
However, on the insolvency of their employer, employees not only face the prospect of having 
their economic well-being in terms of job security and income interrupted, but also face the 
                                                          
1 J. E Stiglitz, ‘Employment, Social Justice and Societal Well-being’ (2002) 141 Int’l Labour Rev. 9 -29. 
2The term ‘going concern value’ is used in this context and thesis in general to refer to the value of the company 
as a going entity for the foreseeable future as opposed to being liquidated. See also, Edith Penrose, The Theory of 
the Growth of the Firm (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1959). 
3 Peter Drucker, Managing in Turbulent Times, (Harper and Row, New York 1980); Michael Armstrong, A Handbook 
of Personnel Practice (4th edn., Kogan Page, London 1991). 
4 Lester C. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, (W. Morrow & Co, New York 1996). 
5 The term economic well-being in the context of employees relates to remunerative employment through which 
they are paid wages or salaries for services rendered. To shareholders, economic well-being relates to the interest 
or return on their investment in the company. See, John D. Rockefeller, ‘On Labour and Capital’ New York Times, 
(January 9, 1916); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 
Virginia Law Rev. 247. 
6 For example, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Policy Report, ‘Measuring 
Well-being and Progress’ (2013) at, <http://www.oecd.org/std/Measuring%20Well-
Being%20and%20Progress%20Brochure.pdf> (accessed May 2017). 
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possibility of having their jobs permanently ended where their employer is liquidated.7 In 
addition to losing their job security and income, employees may also suffer social disruptions 
to their well-being.8 Social effects, such as marriage and family breakdown, increase in crime 
and other anti-social practices, such as alcoholism and neighbourhood nuisance have been to 
some extent, attributed to job losses.9 Therefore, job security is an important aspect of an 
employee’s economic security.10 
However, following the economic recession in 2007/2008 that economically affected 
companies both in the US and the UK,11 most companies have become more risk-averse12 to 
financial investments and business activities that may potentially affect their companies’ 
business productivity, or risk the companies’ economic and financial stability. Therefore, some 
companies in these jurisdictions have continued to engage in corporate restructuring13 as a 
measure of either improving their business productivity or protecting the financial stability of 
their companies’ businesses.  
                                                          
7 M. Stephens, ‘The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earning Shocks’ (2001) 83 The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 28 -38. 
8 Richard H. Price, ‘Psychological Impact of Job Loss on Individuals and Families’ (1992) 1 (1) Current Directions in 
Psychology Science 9 – 11; Rheyanne Weaver, ‘Emotional Effects of Job Losses’ (2010) available online at  
<http://www.empowher.com/depression/content/emotional-effects-job-loss> (accessed November 2016). 
9 C. Ruhm, ‘Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Placements?’ (1991) 81 American Economic Review, 319-
23; M. Stephens, ‘The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earning Shocks’ (2001) 83 The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 28 -38; J. Gruber, ‘The Wealth of the Unemployed’ (2001) 55 Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 
79, 94. 
10 Simon Deakin & G. Morris, Labour Law (3rd edn., Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 569. 
11 See for example, ‘The Global Impact of the 2008 – 2009 Recession’, A San Jose University, Department of 
Economics research publication at, <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/globalrec.htm> (accessed November 
2016). 
12 The term ‘risk-averse’ is used in this context to relate to a practice that companies or businesses are more 
reluctant to engage into business activities which may be deemed as being ‘risky’ post-recession than was the 
position pre-economic recession in 2008. A ‘risk-averse’ company is one which chooses to invest in business 
transactions with known risks that may provide low returns than unknown risks with higher predictable returns. 
This may include for example, companies entering into business transactions merely basing on untested and 
speculative market predictions. See also, Glynn Lowth, Malcolm Prowle and Michael Zhang, ‘The Impact of 
Economic Recession on Business Strategy Planning in UK Companies’ (2010) 6 Research Executive Summary 
Series, online. 
<http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/Thought_leadership_docs/Research%20Funding/R268%20Economic
%20recession%20final%20V2.pdf> (accessed November 2016).  
13 The term corporate restructuring is used in this context and thesis in general to refer to the approaches a 
company may take to review its organisational, operational or capital structures. This may be done to increase 
productivity, reduction in production costs or improvement in product or service quality. See, P. A. Gibbs, 
‘Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: The Relative Importance of Corporate Governance, Takeover Threat 
and Free Cash Flow’ (1993) 14 Strategic Management Journal 51 – 68; Oliver Hyams, Employment Aspects of 
Business Reorganisation (OUP, Oxford 2006). 
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However, the forms of corporate restructuring that these companies adopt often involve 
cutting or lowering production costs which often point toward labour costs reduction. Labour 
costs reduction may involve cutting jobs or introducing new working practices, such as ‘zero-
hours’ contracts14 or implementing changes to the terms and conditions of employment. Some 
companies may consider moving production and service centres to locations where labour and 
service costs are relatively cheaper both locally and internationally.15 All these practices by the 
employers threaten employment security. Therefore, a need to balance the interests of 
employees and employers during corporate insolvency.  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce to the reader the concepts of corporate rescue and 
employment protection in both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America 
(US). The chapter then highlights the tension (discussed below at 1.5) that arises between 
corporate rescue policy objectives and employment protection policy objectives on corporate 
insolvency in both jurisdictions. This tension is explored by analysing the laws, policies and 
corporate rescue processes that both jurisdictions prescribe to regulate the debtor-creditor 
relationships during corporate insolvency and reorganisation proceedings. 
In the UK, many of the policies underlying social employment protection during corporate 
insolvency derive from the European Union (EU) Social Policy influenced by the socio-political 
and economic culture. The social employment protection policies that are influenced by the 
EU are codified in three main EU social policy directives that set out to preserve and protect 
workers’ rights in the event of the employers’ insolvency. 
Firstly, Council Directive 2001/23/EC16 provides for specific provisions for the protection of 
employees by providing for prohibition on unfair dismissal of employees and variations to 
                                                          
14 Ian Brinkley, ‘Flexibility or Insecurity? Exploring the Rise in Zero-hours Contracts’ (2013) The Work Foundation, 
available online at; http://www.theworkfoundation.com/Reports/339/Flexibility-or-insecurity-Exploring-the-rise-
in-zero-hours-contracts> (accessed November 2016); see also, the Trades Unions Congress (TUC) response to the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills Consultation on zero-hours contracts titled: TUC, ‘Ending the Abuse 
of Zero-hours Contracts’ (2014) available online at; 
<https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/TUC%20final%20response%20to%20BIS%20consultation%20on%20
zero-hours%20contracts.pdf> (accessed November 2016). 
15 Mari Sako, ‘Outsourcing and Offshoring: Key Trends and Issues’ (2005) Said Business School Oxford, available 
online at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463480> (accessed November 2016); Nora 
Palugod and Paul A. Palugod, ‘Global Trends in Offshoring and Outsourcing’ (2011) 2 International Journal of 
Business and Social Science 13 -19. 
16 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246). (hereafter TUPE 2006). 
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employees’ terms and conditions of employment because of the business sale or transfer of 
the undertaking. The Directive also provides for the continuity of employment by requiring 
automatic transfer of employees’ employment contracts on a business sale or relevant transfer 
subject to specific insolvency exceptions. This Directive was transposed into UK law via the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006.17 TUPE Regulations 
and their impact on corporate rescue and employment protection in the UK are broadly 
discussed and analysed in chapters five at 5.1 and six at 6.1.  
In addition to the above, the Collective Redundancy Directive – Council Directive 98/59/EC18 
sets out provision for standards to be followed by employers for consultations with employees’ 
representatives when employers are contemplating collective redundancies and dismissals. 
Where an employer intends to lay off twenty employees over a period of ninety days or the 
lesser of ten percent or thirty employees over thirty days, that employer must provide relevant 
information to employees’ representatives and to also consult with employees’ 
representatives to reach agreements over ways and means of avoiding projected collective 
redundancies or reducing the number of employees to be affected among other mitigating 
circumstances.19  
This is to afford employees in Member States a certain level of protection against collective 
dismissals while taking into account the need for balanced economic and social development 
within the European Community. The provisions in this Directive were implemented in the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 199220 especially ss. 181 – 189 that deal 
with information and consultation requirements for employers during collective redundancies.  
Lastly, the Employers in Insolvency Directive, Council Directive 80/987/EEC21 offers additional 
protection to employees in the event of their employer’s insolvency in the form of a guarantee 
for payment of outstanding claims arising from contracts of employment and other 
                                                          
16 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses [2001 OJ L 82 P 0016 – 0020]. 
17 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246). (hereafter TUPE 2006). 
18 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, OJ L 255. 
19 Ibid, Section II, Art. 2(1) and (2). 
20 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, c.52 (Hereafter (TULRCA) 1992). 
21 Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L283. 
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employment related interests. This Directive provides for Member States to apply or introduce 
measures favourable to employees in the pursuance of these protective measures. The 
provisions in this Directive are implemented in the Insolvency Act 1986, particularly Schedule 
6 under the title of preferential debts.  
In the UK, employees’ unpaid wages and accrued holiday pay are given preferential priority in 
distribution ahead of unsecured claims out of the assets of the company on the insolvency of 
their employer. However, this is subject to a statutory limit as set out in IA 1986, Schedule 6. 
In addition, as a matter of adhering to the Directive 80/987/EEC, the UK government 
established a state National Insurance Fund from which employees affected by their 
employer’s insolvency may claim certain unpaid debts arising out of their employment. In 
addition to EU-derived social employment protection legislation,  other UK statutes such as the 
Employment Rights Act (ERA) 199622 have provisions that govern the employee – employer 
concerns during corporate insolvency in the UK.23  
On the other hand, insolvency law policies in the UK were first influenced by the Cork 
Committee Report24 and later by the consultation documents25 that led to the Enterprise Act.26 
This was following the UK government’s appointment of the Cork Committee to review both 
corporate and personal insolvency laws of the UK and to make recommendations for reform.  
The Cork Committee’s report advised the provision of ‘means for the preservation of viable 
commercial enterprises capable of making a useful contribution to the economic life of the 
country’.27 The Cork Committee recommended two new procedures: the company voluntary 
                                                          
22 Employment Rights Act (1996) c18. 
23 ERA (1996), Part XII on Insolvency of employers and rights of employees on insolvency of employers. 
24 Report of the Review Committee, Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice Cmnd 8558 (London: 
HMSO, 1982). 
25 For example, see, Insolvency Service, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms, 
Report by the Review Group (DTI, 2000) (IS 2000); Insolvency Service, A Review of Company Rescue and Business 
Reconstruction Mechanisms, Interim Report (DTI, September 1999); DTI/Insolvency Service, Productivity and 
Enterprise: Insolvency - A Second Chance (2001), Cm 5234. See also, I. Fletcher, “UK Corporate Rescue: Recent 
Developments - Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements - 
the Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001 and the Enterprise Act 2002” (2004) 5 E.B.O.R. 119; S. Frisby, “In 
Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002” (2004) 67.  
M.L.R. 247.   
26 Enterprise Act 2002, c40. Among the changes that the EA 2002 made to UK insolvency laws was the insertion 
of schedule B1 (that deals with the administration process) into the IA 1986 by replacing part II of IA 1986. See 
part 10, EA 2002. See also, R. Parry, Corporate Rescue (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) Introductory Chapter. 
27 Report of the Review Committee, Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice Cmnd 8558 (London: 
HMSO, 1982), p. 55, para. 198(j). 
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arrangement (CVA) and the Administration procedure to supplement the existing 
administrative receivership,28 reconstruction,29 scheme of arrangement procedures30 and the 
informal ‘London Approach’.31 
The Cork Committee’s recommendations for the provisions of the administration process and 
CVA were first introduced under the Insolvency Act 1985,32 which was consolidated as the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986).33 The policies underlying corporate rescue in the UK derive from 
the IA 1986, Schedule B1, Paragraph 3(1) that governs the administration process in the UK 
during corporate insolvency. Schedule B1, Paragraph 3(1) sets out the three hierarchical 
objectives to be pursued by the insolvency practitioner (administrator) during administration 
proceedings with the main objective being the rescue of the company as a going concern.34 
The second objective is achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up,35 while the third objective is realising property 
in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.36 The 
administration process and other formal rescue processes adopted by UK companies on 
corporate insolvency are broadly analysed below at 1.4. 
In the US, as discussed at 3.2 (under the US Social Policy) and 3.2.4 (on the factors that 
influenced Congressional enactment of s.1113) the policies underlying social employment 
protection under the US social policy derive from both federal and state legislation37 
mandating employment protection policies during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings due 
to a federal system of government.38 Therefore, the policies underlying employment 
                                                          
28 IA 1986, s.29. 
29 IA 1986, s.110. 
30 Companies Act 2006, Part 26. 
31 The ‘London Approach’ is a set of informal restructuring processes aimed at supporting financially struggling 
companies to restructure their debts regulated by the Bank of England. For more on this discourse, see, J. Armour 
& S. Deakin, “Norms in Private Bankruptcy: The ‘London Approach’ to the Resolution of Financial Distress” 
University of Cambridge ESRC Working Paper No. 173, at < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258615&download=yes > (accessed October 2017). 
32 IA 1985, c65. 
33 IA 1986, c45. 
34 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para.3 (1) (a). 
35 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para.3 (1) (b). 
36 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para.3 (1) (c). 
37 The impact of the federal v state division in the US and its impact on bankruptcy reorganisation policies and 
employment protection policies is discussed in chapter three at 3.1 and 3.4 respectively. 
38 M H. Redish, “Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. US and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require 
State Law Legislation” (1993) 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 593, 604. 
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protection are mainly set out in the National Labor Relations Act 1935 (NLRA 1935).39 For 
example, under section 7, the NLRA (1935) mandates collective bargaining rights on employees 
through forming, joining or assisting a labour organisation to bargain collectively on matters 
relating to their employment through labour union representation.40 The NLRA 1935 makes it 
an unfair labour practice where an employer interferes with, coerces or restrains employees 
from exercising these rights.41  
However, corporate rescue or bankruptcy reorganisation policies in the US derive from Title 
11 of the US Code which is known as the US Bankruptcy Code42 that governs bankruptcy 
reorganisation proceedings in the US (discussed below at 1.2). Bankruptcy Code provisions 
such as s. 36243 – mandating moratoria on creditor actions against the debtor after filing for 
bankruptcy, s.36544 – allowing a debtor to assume or reject executory contracts upon 
bankruptcy filing and s.111345– allowing a debtor to assume or reject collectively bargained 
agreements are some of the provisions that set out the policy objectives of the US Bankruptcy 
Code which is to augment the reorganisation and rescue prospects of the financially struggling 
company. This point of discourse is further analysed in chapter three at 3.3. 
The chapter establishes that the tension that exists between the two policies’ objectives ought 
to be remedied if a balanced model or approach to achieving both policies’ objectives is to be 
achieved. The chapter proposes that this tension may arguably, be remedied through 
interpretation, that is, by adopting an interpretative approach that is built on the ideals of 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation as posited by Dworkin in his Interpretative 
Theory of Law,46 as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                          
39 29 U.S.C. ss.151 – 169 (2017). Enacted by the 74th United States Congress on July 6 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 
Stat. 449 to create a National Labor Relations Board and to regulate labour disputes between employers and 
employees that may burden or obstruct interstate and foreign commerce. This statute is also known as the 
Wagner Act. 
40 See 29 U.S.C. s.8 (a) (5). 
41 29 U.S.C. s.158. 
42 11 U.S.C. ss. 101 – 1330 (2012) Enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 (Pub. L. No.95 – 598, 92 Stat. 2549). 
43 11 U.S.C. s. 362. 
44 11 U.S.C s.365. 
45 11 U.S.C. s.1113. 
46 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977).  
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1.2 Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection in the US 
In the US, bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings are governed by Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code which was enacted in 1978 as Title 11 of the US Code.47 The US Bankruptcy 
Code prescribes a traditional Chapter 11 filing process through which outcomes, such as,  s.363 
business sale or a prepack plan may be achieved by a US debtor company during bankruptcy 
reorganisation proceedings.48   
In a traditional Chapter 11 route, the debtor negotiates with the affected stakeholders to agree 
a reorganisation plan. The debtor will solicit for votes to approve the plan, and then the 
reorganisation plan, together with a disclosure statement, are presented to the court for 
confirmation.49 This route is however, initiated without a defined exit plan, unlike in a pre-
packaged or pre-arranged Chapter 11 Plan. 
In a pre-packaged route, a lot is done in advance of the filing for bankruptcy. The debtor 
company negotiates a reorganisation plan with the affected stakeholders, distributes 
disclosure statements to the stakeholders and solicits for votes for the approval of the plan. 
The adequacy and viability of the proposed plan and the disclosure statement are scrutinised 
at a joint hearing. If well presented, and therefore holding good prospects, together with a 
defined exit plan, a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan is commenced, which is usually shorter in 
duration than the traditional route above.50 
Alternatively, a debtor company may choose to utilise a s.363 business sale51 to end the 
uncertainty of bankruptcy. The provisions in s.363 afford the trustee or the Debtor-in-
Possession (DIP)52 power to use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, 
                                                          
47 11 U.S.C. ss. 101 – 1330 (2012) Enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 (Pub. L. No.95 – 598, 92 Stat. 2549). 
48 C. Mallon and S.Y. Waisman, The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and US (OUP, Oxford 2011) Ch.8; 
Jennifer Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the United States and the Need for Reform’ 
(2014) 130 LQR 282. 
4911 U.S.C. s.1129. 
50 Craig A. Sloane, ‘The Sub Rosa Plan or Reorganization: Side-stepping Creditors’ Protections in Chapter 11’ (1999) 
16 Bankr. Dev. J. 37; Jennifer Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the United States and the 
Need for Reform’ (2014) 130 LQR 282. 
5111 U.S.C. s.363. 
52 The term Debtor-in-possession is used in the US to refer to pre-petition management of the company that is 
undergoing bankruptcy reorganisation. Unless a trustee is appointed by the bankruptcy court to oversee the 
reorganisation process, which is rarely the case, pre-petition management remain in control, assume the powers 
and rights to run the business affairs of the debtor company, with a fiduciary obligation to maximise the going 
concern value of the established bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. See, 11 U.S.C. ss.1106 – 
1107. However, see David A. Skeel Jr, ‘Creditors’ Ball: The New New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003) 
152 (2) U Pa L Rev. 917 regarding the influence of creditors on the debtor-in-possession. 
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the assets of the debtor company’s estate, following a notice and hearing processes. Although 
this has been the subject of varied debates,53 it is a route that can enable a quick sale of the 
struggling business, sidestepping liabilities that were incurred by the debtor company pre-
petition.54 
However, unlike a s.363 business sale, the ultimate aim of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan is 
to afford a financially struggling company, a second chance to regain solvency. This is inherent 
in the contention that a business is more profitable and beneficial to its stakeholders, as a going 
concern than when liquidated piecemeal.55 Moreover, the US Supreme Court, in US v. Whiting 
Pools Inc.,56 described the objective of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, by referring to the 
intentions of the US Congress in drafting Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. This was the 
anticipation that, where a company adopts a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, its business 
would continue to enhance its going concern value,57 save jobs, satisfy creditors’ claims, and 
produce a return to its owners.58  
Therefore, to an employee, a successful Chapter 11 reorganisation plan would potentially be a 
lifeline as jobs could arguably, be saved. For the management DIP, a successfully executed 
Chapter 11 reorganisation plan would not only potentially save their jobs, but would also 
restore their reputation, as the stigma of failure in the first instance, may be remedied.59   
1.2.1 Employment Protection during Bankruptcy Reorganisations in the US  
As will be broadly discussed and analysed in chapter three, the US has a federal system of 
government.60 The US constitution has seven original articles and twenty seven amendments 
that govern the political, social and economic structures, such as bankruptcy and other 
                                                          
53G. Moss, ‘Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law – 
England’ (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 115; B. Carruthers and T. Halliday, Rescuing Business: 
The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998); R. 
M. Hynes, ‘Reorganizations as Redemption’ (2011) 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 183.  
54 This route was famously used in Re Eastman Kodak Co. Et al, Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Case 
No 12-10202, So, Dist. NY (2012) available at <http://bankrupt.com/misc/Kodak_StipSpectra073013.pdf> 
(accessed November 2016). 
55 M. Herbert, Understanding Bankruptcy, (LexisNexis Legal Text Series, 2005) 303. 
56 US v. Whiting Pools Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 198, 203. 
57 The term ‘going concern value’ is used in this context and thesis in general to refer to the value of the company 
as a going entity for the foreseeable future as opposed to being liquidated.  
58 See, H.R Report No. 595, 95th Congress, 1st session, 220 (1977); E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy Making in an 
Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 354. 
59 B. A. Henoch, ‘Post Petition Financing: Is There Life After Debt?’ (1991) 8 Bankr. Dev. J. 575, 577 
60 M H. Redish, “Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. US and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require 
State Law Legislation” (1993) 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 593, 604. 
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institutions. Bankruptcy law is expressly under the control of the federal government.61  
However, while bankruptcy law and its structures is a matter of federal concern and therefore 
guided by federal law, other areas of law, such as labour law that seek to protect employees 
during bankruptcy reorganisations are not.62 They are covered by state law.  
 
As a consequence, bankruptcy potentially creates tensions between state laws’ and federal 
laws’ policy objectives on bankruptcy reorganisations and employment protection that arises 
out of the federal - state law division. Although the Bankruptcy Code regulates the employer-
employee relationship during bankruptcy proceedings, it does not create this relation. It is the 
non-bankruptcy laws, at state level, such as labour law that create this relationship.63   
 
This division creates a lack of uniform protection to all employees in the US private sector 
workforce as the federal laws that govern the treatment of stakeholder interests during 
bankruptcy reorganisations, such as Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and the National 
Labour Relations Act (1935), give primacy of protection to employees who are members of 
labour unions and party to collective bargaining agreements (discussed below). Apart from 
employees in the Civil Service64 and those that are members of labour unions, statutory 
protection against employee discharge is limited significantly and the employment-at-will 
practice largely prevails.65  
The ability of an employer to easily dismiss an employee is a largely accepted norm within the 
US labour industry, yet it places employees in a particularly difficult position. Employees 
depend on these employment relationships for their livelihood, but typically have few 
bargaining powers to negotiate favourable contractual terms. The exception are only a few 
exceptionally talented and skilled employees who may be able to negotiate certain provisions 
                                                          
61 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the US Constitution. 
62 Although some Labour law statutes such as the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) 1935 are federal law, 
labour law in the US is not the subject of federal jurisdiction. It is the subject of state jurisdiction. 
63 Daniel A. Austin, ‘Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Law”’ (2012) 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1081, 1168. 
64 Civil Service employees may include federal government employees, state employees and local government 
employees, who are protected by the Government Organization and Employees Act (1979), which permits only 
dismissals for....‘such causes that will promote the efficiency of the service’ – 5 U.S.C. s.7512(a). 
65 Jennifer L. L. Gant, ‘Studies in Convergence? Post-Crisis Effects on Corporate Rescue and the Influence of Social 
Policy: The EU and the US’ (2006) 25 Int. Insolv. Rev.72 – 96. 
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of their employment contracts with their employers and employees who are members of 
labour unions who can get union representation.66  
There is a misplaced emphasis on the mutuality of obligations between the employer and 
employee that disguises a level of inequality in the employment relationship. This inequality 
consequently encourages employers’ actions of arbitrary dismissals, which derives from the 
contemporary argument that, since employees can terminate their employment relationship 
at any time, employers should also have a similar right to terminate an employment 
relationship at any time, for any or no reason.67 
1.2.2 Collective Bargaining and Labour Union Movement 
In the US, employer power plays a significant role in the way the employment relationships are 
handled. The main form of protection to employees in the private sector workforce is through 
collective bargaining and labour union movement between the employer and the employees 
through their respective labour unions.  
The National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) 193568 grants employees the right to bargain 
collectively over wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.69 
Collective bargaining is a means of ensuring that employee participation centres on the duty 
to consult in good faith and in the performance of mutual obligations.70 However, the most 
significant role of a Collective Bargaining Agreement ‘CBA’ is the provision that an employee, 
who is part of a CBA, may not be discharged by the employer, except for ‘just cause’.  A ‘Just 
cause’ dismissal enables an employer to dismiss an employee without fulfilling the statutory 
dismissal requirements, such as providing reasonable notice of termination or payment in lieu 
of notice to the employee.    
                                                          
66 Stephen F. Befort, ‘Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment’ 
(2001) 43 B C L Rev 351, 460; J Berry, “Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Have on 
Employees of the Debtor and Why do, these Affects Drive Companies to Bankruptcy?” (2012) Social Sciences 
Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139062> (accessed 10 February 
2016). 
67 See L E. Blades, ‘Employment – at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer 
Power’ (1967) 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404; Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P. 2d 25 (Cal. 
App. 1959). 
68 29 U.S.C. ss.151 – 169 (2016). 
69 29 U.S.C. s.158 (d). 
70 Clyde W. Summers, ‘The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual 
Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1082, 1085. 
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For a ‘just cause’ dismissal, the employer has to prove that an employee has done something 
contrary to his or her employment contract capable of undermining the employment 
relationship between the employer and the employee. This may include for example, an 
employee breaching a key term of an employment contract, insolence or insubordination, 
conflict of interest, et cetera.71  
However, in the US, employees may be categorised as either employees at-will, or Just cause 
employees. Employees-at-will may be dismissed at any time, for any reason or no reason 
without an employer facing liability for unfair dismissal. A ‘just cause’ employee can only be 
dismissed for legal reasons, such as breaching their contract of employment or work policy. 
Employee protection in the US is broadly discussed in chapter three below. 
Failure by the employer to engage in collective bargaining arrangements with respective 
unions or representatives of its employees in good faith is considered an unfair labour 
practice.72  Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code further reinforces this protection by making it 
difficult for the employer to modify or reject agreed CBAs in s.111373 without obtaining court 
approval.74 
This provision imposes both procedural and substantive conditions that a debtor has to 
navigate, before rejecting or modifying a CBA. The provision requires the debtor to make 
proposals to the union that provides for necessary modifications before initiating negotiations. 
The employer also has to ensure that all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are 
treated fairly and equitably.75 These points of analysis on collective bargaining and labour 
union movement in the US are broadly analysed in chapter three under the section on US social 
policy at 3.2. 
1.2.3 Employee Protection during Bankruptcy Reorganisation Proceedings 
The commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate76 from 
which stakeholder claims such as employee claims will be settled in accordance with legislative 
                                                          
71 Ibid.  
72 29 U.S.C. ss.8 (a) (5) and 158(a) (5). 
73 11 U.S.C s.1113.  
74 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (e). This point is the subject of a detailed analysis in chapter four on the way bankruptcy judges 
apply rejection standards to debtor companies’ collective bargaining agreement rejection motions. 
75 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (I) (A). However, see, Christopher D. Cameron, ‘How “Necessary” Became the Mother of 
Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate of Collective Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of 
Bankruptcy Code Section 1113’ (1994) 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 841, 869. 
76 11 U.S.C. s.541 (a). 
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priorities. However, formal bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings are predominantly 
controlled by the DIP and secured creditors. Employees are less involved in the reorganisation 
process and their main level of representation is through labour union membership.  
However, few employees in the private sector workforce are members of labour unions. 
Rather, a majority of employees in the private sector workforce in the US are non-unionised. 
For example, a 2017 Economic News Release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States 
Department of Labor, on 26 January 2017 reported that the percentage of wage and salary 
workers that were members of unions in 2016 was at 10.7 percent down 0.4 percent from the 
overall membership in 2016.77  This represents a proportionately low level of union 
representation which leaves a significant majority of employees lacking protection as they fall 
outside of the scope of labour union protection.78  
However, in contrast to the percentage of labour union membership in the UK reported for 
the year 2016 / 2017, the reports released by the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy on 31 May 201779 and the Office for National Statistics on 13 September 
201780 reported that 6.2 million employees were members of labour unions. However, the UK 
has a workforce of around 32 million making union membership at around 19 percent. 
Moreover, the report highlighted a massive decline of around 4.2 percent in trade union 
membership compared to the trade union membership in 2015. The decline was reported as 
the largest since 1995 when the official recording of trade union membership started.81  The 
report highlighted a steady decline in trade union membership since the highest membership 
of 13 million members reported in 1979.82  
Notwithstanding the low levels of labour union memberships in the US, the main area of 
concern to a few employees that are covered by CBAs centres on job security, which in turn, 
                                                          
77See an Economic News Release by the Bureau of Labor Statics, United States Department of Labour, on this 
aspect available online at, <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm> (accessed November 2016). 
78David A. Skeel Jr, ‘What is So Bad About Delaware?’ (2001) 54 Vand. L. Rev. 309; Lynn. M. LoPucki & J W. Doherty, 
‘Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendancy’ (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1387.     
79 See, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Trade Union Membership 2016: Statistical 
Bulletin’ available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-union-statistics-2016> (accessed August 
2017). 
80 Office for National Statistics (ONS), ‘Statistical Bulletin: UK Labour Market September 2017’ at 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletin
s/uklabourmarket/september2017> (accessed September 2017).  
81 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Trade Union Membership 2016: Statistical Bulletin’ 
at pg [6]. 
82 Ibid, at [6] - [7]. 
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depends on their employer’s ability, subject to court approval, to either adopt or reject 
executory contracts,83 such as collectively bargained agreements, and whether, they will be 
paid what they are owed.84 This is because, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a debtor 
company power to free itself from pre-petition executory contractual agreements and 
liabilities by either amending or rejecting executory contracts,85 as will be broadly analysed at 
3.2.2. 
Where the debtor employer adopts employee contracts, employees are given a protective 
cushion. The debtor employer, as a requirement for the formal adoption of contracts, is 
required to cure outstanding pre-petition defaults and payment of outstanding damages. As 
part of confirming a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, it is a requirement that such a plan 
provides for payment of priority claims as a pre-condition for a reorganisation plan 
confirmation.86  
However, where employee contracts are rejected the debtor employer is under no obligation 
to honour employee claims for damages and other related claims immediately. These claims 
would be categorised as general unsecured claims which may not be paid until at the time of 
formal distribution,87 which has no definitive timescale. Therefore, unlike large commercial 
creditors, who might have other sources of income for their livelihood, to ordinary employees, 
this would present a huge burden and inconvenience to their livelihood as a period of unpaid 
wages, however short, may greatly affect them. 
The rationale for protecting employees with some priority during insolvency or bankruptcy 
proceedings may be drawn from a number of justifications. For example, the commencement 
of Chapter 11 reorganisation plan gives employees hope that the business may continue and 
that a number of future constituent interests, such as future employment may be attained.88 
Employees are arguably unable to diversify risks of losing their jobs in comparison to other 
stakeholders with interests in the debtor company such as secured creditors who may diversify 
                                                          
83 11 U.S.C. s. 365 and 11 U.S.C. s.1113 respectively. 
84 Via provisions such as 11 U.S.C s.507 (a). 
85 Via provisions such as 11 U.S.C. s.365 and 11 U.S.C. s.1113. 
86 11 U.S.C. s.1129 (a) (9). 
87 11 U.S.C s.549 (a). 
88 D R Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 4 Am Bankr. Inst. L. Rev 5, 6. 
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their risks by investing in other business transactions. Employees can only normally hold one 
full-time job at once. 
However, the protection that is inherent in the legislation that ought to safeguard such 
expectations is not uniformly available to all employees, as most are not members of certain 
labour unions or collective groups. There is a lot of lobbying between labour unions with the 
government in the US. However, lobbying has only led to unionised employee protection as 
non-unionised employees lack a significant voice to influence the government which defeats 
the policies underlying the need for employment protection. This creates an imbalance 
between the policies underlying the need for employment protection and the policies 
underlying the need for encouraging bankruptcy reorganisation to avoid unnecessary 
liquidations. This imbalance between employment protection and corporate rescue policy 
objectives is the subject of my analytical evaluation in chapter three. 
1.3 Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection in the UK 
In the UK, outside of insolvency settings, that is, before a debtor employer files for formal 
insolvency proceedings, employees are generally protected against unfair employer 
prerogatives, such as employer decisions to dismiss employees without ‘just cause’ or, changes 
to employees’ terms and conditions of employment. The Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 
protects employees from unfair dismissals from their employers,89 The Act gives employees a 
right to compensation where an employee is made redundant by the employer,90 a right to a 
written statement of employment setting out the terms and conditions of employment,91 a 
right to continuity of employment where the employer’s business is the subject of a transfer 
to a new buyer as a going concern,92 among other protection.  
In addition to the above, employees are further protected by the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations (2006)93 and The Collective Redundancies and 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 201494 as 
broadly discussed in chapter five, where their employer is the subject of a relevant business 
                                                          
89 ERA 1996, s.94. 
90 ERA 1996, s.218. 
91 ERA 1996, s.86 (2). 
92 ERA 1996, s.218. 
93 Hereafter referred to as TUPE (2006). 
94 Hereafter referred to as TUPE (2014). 
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sale or transfer as a going concern.95 However, inside formal and quasi-formal insolvency 
proceedings, the level of employee protection is dictated by the procedural and legal 
framework within which each particular corporate rescue process operates, as analysed below.  
1.4 Formal and Quasi- Formal Corporate Rescue Processes in the UK 
Formal corporate rescue processes in the UK are the administration procedure96 and the 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA).97 Administrative receivership can also be used to 
rescue companies in limited circumstances98 and the scheme of arrangement has also been 
used for this purpose and has gained in popularity in this regard in recent years, in particular 
with larger companies with complex financial arrangements.99 Pre-pack business sales are also 
a common approach to financial distress, recognised through case law100 and guidance 
statements101 from professional bodies but they are not legislatively established by the UK 
insolvency laws. The UK Insolvency Service plays a major role by maintaining a monitoring and 
regulatory role in the prepack process. 
1.4.1 Administration 
The administration procedure102 is a corporate rescue process used by companies in the UK 
seeking to reorganise or restructure their company businesses during corporate insolvency. 
This procedure was introduced in 1985 by the Insolvency Act 1985, consolidated as the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) and recently streamlined by the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 
2002).103 This was through the introduction of the out of court route for administration orders 
to be obtained by the company or its directors or a qualifying floating charge holder, upon the 
giving of notice and the filing of documentation with the court.104 Administration is one of the 
                                                          
95 TUPE Regulations protection to employees and their impact on UK business sales and transfers are broadly 
discussed in chapters five and six. 
96 The administration procedure is covered under IA 1986, Schedule B1. 
97 See, IA 1986, Part 1, and the Insolvency Rules 1986, Part 1. 
98 See generally, IA 1986, s.29. 
99 See, CA 2006, Part 26, ss.895 – 901 and Part 27 (special rules for public companies). 
100 See cases such as Re T & D Industries Plc [2000] B.C.C 956 Ch.; Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 
550. 
101 See for example, Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3), Statement of Insolvency Practice 16: Pre-
packaged Sales in Administrations (London: R3, 2009); See, Insolvency Service (IS), Report on the Operation of SIP 
16: 1 January to 31 December 2010 (London: IS 2011). 
102 The administration procedure is covered under IA 1986, Schedule B1. 
103 Enterprise Act 2002, c40. 
104 S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) MLR 247. 
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most commonly used insolvency procedures in the UK.105 It is designed to help in the rescue 
of financially struggling but viable companies in the UK.  
Administration allows for the reorganisation of a company or the realisation of a company’s 
assets whilst it is under the protection of a statutory moratorium.106  The moratorium is a 
useful mechanism as not only does it freeze the enforcement of security by creditors seeking 
to recover their debts, but it also stays creditors from presenting petitions for the winding-up 
of the struggling company.107 Thus, the moratorium that comes with the administration 
procedure, at least as it was originally intended to operate affords the company time to 
negotiate with its creditors to find a way in which the business can be saved without it being 
wound-up.  
Administration lasts for up to twelve months from the date at which the administrator’s 
appointment took effect,108 unless extended by the court or by the consent of  creditors but 
the extension of the administrator’s term of office (with the consent of creditors) cannot 
exceed six months.109 The provisions governing the administration process in the IA 1986110 
place a hierarchy of three objectives to be pursued by the administrator with the main 
objective being the rescue of the company as a going concern.111  
This objective of the administration process is aimed at the rescue of the company as a going 
concern as opposed to liquidation but this is rarely achievable. It is only where the 
administrator thinks that this main objective is not reasonably practicable to achieve112 that 
the administrator may consider the second objective of ‘achieving a better result for the 
company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up.’113  
The administrator is only required to pursue this objective if it would achieve a better result 
for the company’s creditors as a whole,114 which may include for example, saving jobs for 
                                                          
105 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves, (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies, 302 – 324. 
106 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 42(1). 
107 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 42(2). 
108 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 76(1). 
109 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 76(2)(a) and (b). 
110 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 3(1). 
111 IA 1986 Sch. B1, para 3(1)(a). 
112 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3(3) (a). 
113 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3(1) (b). 
114 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3 (3) (b). 
18 
 
employees and maintaining the continuity of the chain of employment, as well as optimising 
the amounts available for creditors.  However, where the administrator thinks that neither the 
first, nor the second objectives, are reasonably practicable to achieve,115 the administrator 
may consider pursuing the third objective116 of ‘realising property in order to make a 
distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.117 
1.4.1.1 Impact of Administration on Employment Protection 
The appointment of an administrator does not necessarily terminate the employment 
contracts of the employees or trigger the operation of TUPE Regulations obligations on the 
transferor or transferee. TUPE Regulations obligations on the transferor and transferee are 
triggered where there is a business transfer or changes in employer.  
As is broadly analysed in chapter five at 5.2 (under the section considering the scope of 
employee protection under TUPE Regulations), the TUPE Regulations’ automatic transfer 
provision in regulation 4(1), the protection from variations to contract terms and condition in 
regulation 4(4) and employee protection from dismissals because of the business sale or 
transfer will be invoked upon a relevant transfer of a business or an undertaking in the UK. 
With this protection in operation, the employees remain employed by the insolvent but viable 
company as it attempts to trade out of its financial difficulties. The administrator has fourteen 
days in which to decide whether or not to adopt employees’ contracts of employment.118 
Where the contracts of employment are adopted by the administrator after the fourteen day 
period, accrued sums due to unpaid wages, salaries, holiday payments et cetera, in the 
adopted contracts are given a super priority status119 and therefore, treated as expenses in 
administration.120  However, where the administrator decides not to adopt the contracts of 
employment after the fourteen days’ period, consultations on redundancy with affected 
                                                          
115 IA 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(4)(a). 
116 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3(1)(c). 
117 The administrator can only pursue this duty in a way that does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the 
company’s creditors as whole. IA 1986 Sch. B1 para 3 (4) (b). 
118As per the reasoning in Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 A.C. 394. 
119 See, generally, IA 1986, Sch. B1 para 99 (6); Krasner v McMath [2006] I.C.R 205. 
120 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Paragraph 99(6). For judicial authority on the nature of employee claims that may have super 
priority payment, see, Re Allders Department Stores Ltd (in administration) [2005] EWHC 172; Re Leeds United 
Association Football Club Ltd [2007] EWHC 1761 (Ch.). See also, F. Toube and G. Todd, ‘The Proper Treatment of 
Employees’ Claims in Administration’ (2005) 18 Insolvency Intelligence 109; D. Pollard, “Personal Liabilities of an 
Insolvency Practitioner for Employee Discrimination Claims: Part 1” (2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 145. 
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employees may be initiated where certain thresholds under s.188 of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULCRA) 1992 are met.121   
The threshold under s.188 of the TULCRA 1992 places a duty on the employer to consult with 
employees’ appropriate representatives where the employer proposes to dismiss as redundant 
twenty or more employees at one establishment within a period of ninety days or less. The 
employer must also consult with employees’ appropriate representative for at least forty-five 
days where proposals are to dismiss as redundant one hundred or more employees before the 
first of the dismissal takes effect.122 
However, it is worth noting that where the administrator chooses to pursue the second and 
third objectives of administration123 because the main objective of ‘rescuing the company as a 
going concern’ is not reasonably practicable to achieve, employee protection especially the 
automatic transfer of employment following the sale or transfer of their employer’s business 
to a new owner, may be compromised. The second objective of ‘achieving a better result for 
the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were immediately 
wound up’124 may take different forms other than keeping the company operating on a going 
concern basis. For instance, the administrator may decide that dismissing some of the 
employees or making changes to employees’ terms and conditions of employment may help 
to achieve a better result for the company creditors as a whole125 which may benefit creditors 
at the expense of employee protection.  
Moreover, the third objective126 of ‘realising property in order to make a distribution to one or 
more secured or preferential creditors does not give primacy to employment protection. This 
therefore, creates tensions between corporate rescue objectives and employment protection 
objectives since rescuing the company as a going concern may entail changes in the workforce, 
among other factors. This tension is in need of remedy if both the objectives of corporate 
rescue and of employment protection are to be pursued simultaneously. This tension is broadly 
                                                          
121 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, C 52, (Hereafer TULCRA 1992). 
122 See, TULCRA, 1992, s. 188 (1) – s.188 (1) (A). 
123 See, IA 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(1) (b) and (c).  
124  IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3(1) (b). 
125 This was one of factors in Crystal Palace F.C Ltd and Another v Kavanagh and Others [2014] IRLR 139, CA. This 
case is broadly discussed in chapters five and six of this thesis. 
126 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3 (4) (a). 
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analysed below at 1.5 and further, in chapter five of this thesis. In chapter six, a broad analytical 
discussion is carried out on how this tension may be remedied through interpretation. 
1.4.2 Pre-pack Administration 
A pre-pack process is an arrangement which involves negotiations between the struggling 
company’s management or directors and secured creditors to agree to a sale of all or some of 
the company’s assets informally in advance of the appointment of an insolvency practitioner. 
It is a quasi-legal rescue process as it starts out informally, turning into the formal 
administration process following the appointment of an administrator to oversee the 
implementation of the agreed sale.127  
The insolvency practitioner plays a central role in the pre-pack business sale process as he or 
she is often involved as an advisor to the management or directors of the company before the 
commencement of full administration and, later, more formally as the administrator when the 
company is properly in administration. Upon appointment, the insolvency practitioner, who is 
now the administrator, quickly implements the pre-agreed sale of the business via a formal 
administration process, often to the existing owners or the directors of the business.  In other 
words, in a pre-pack sale of a business, all of the preparatory work in relation to the sale in 
question is usually carried out in advance of formal administration commencing and prior to 
the creditors of the company being told about the failure of the business.128 
Although prepacks are commonly used alongside administration proceedings, drawing them 
closer to within the boundaries of formal processes, such as company voluntary arrangements 
(CVAs) and administration proceedings, a pre-pack business sale is nonetheless, seen as a 
hybrid procedure due to the fact that the process is neither statutorily defined by the 
Insolvency Act 1986, nor by the Enterprise Act 2002129 but rotates between the borders of 
formal and informal insolvency procedures.130 However, despite pre-pack business sales not 
                                                          
127 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’ (2008) 29(9) 
Company Lawyer 259, 263; V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves, (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies, 302 
– 324. 
128 P. Walton, “Pre-packin’ in the UK” (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 85,104. 
129 However, various interpretations of how and when a pre-pack comes into play have been published by 
statutory bodies such as the insolvency service and various practitioners. See, Insolvency Service (IS), Report on 
the Operation of SIP 16: 1 January to 31 December 2010 (London: IS 2011). 
130 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves’ (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies, 302 – 324. 
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being legally established by the UK statutes, their status as a corporate rescue process has 
been established by caselaw.131 
The inherent advantage of a pre-pack business sale from the perspective of employees is that 
a successful pre-pack business sale would trigger the operation of the automatic transfer of 
employees via regulation 4 of TUPE 2006 Regulations. A pre-pack is not a case of irretrievable 
insolvency and cessation of business. Rather, in a pre-pack process, goodwill is maintained and 
the business is transferred as a going concern to a buyer.132 Therefore, a pre-pack business 
sale may lead to the preservation and the continuity of employment, which is beneficial for 
employees.  
However, the underlying policy objectives of pre-pack business sales have attracted criticisms 
and continue to be the subject of varied debates.133 The key issues in the debates from the 
perspective of employees are the limited involvement of employees in the activities leading 
to the sale of their employer’s business, and the lack of transparency and open marketing 
of the business. The quick and speedy sale of the business raises questions whether other 
alternatives to the pre-pack sale are considered by the insolvency practitioner.  Moreover, 
creditors have no say in the pre-pack process.134  
Employees are often considered as the most important asset of a company when the human 
capital contributions they make in a company are taken into account.135 It has been opined 
that when employees make firm-specific human capital investment in a company or business, 
their contributions rank in importance as, or even more important than, the shareholders' 
investment of finance capital.136 However, in a pre-pack business sale process, employees are 
not involved in the matters relevant to the business sale process, yet they have interests, such 
as their job security and unpaid wages that may be compromised, if not ended. 
                                                          
131 See Re T & D Industries Plc [2000] B.C.C 956 Ch; Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch.). 
132 See Jules Dethier Equipement SA v Dassy & Another (1998) ICR 541 ECJ. See also Perth and Kinross Council v 
Donaldson & Ors (2004) IRLR 121 EAT. 
133 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’ (2008) 29(9) 
Company Lawyer 259, 263; P. Walton, “Pre-packin’ in the UK” (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 85,104; Jessica Klein, 
“Pre-Pack Administrations: A Comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom: Part 1” (2012) 33(9) 
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– 324. 
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135 Michael Armstrong, A Handbook of Personnel Practice (4th edn., Kogan Page, London 1991). 
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All the above factors combined, make the pre-pack business sale process a less inclusive rescue 
process, as the process is driven by the company’s management or directors and secured 
creditors with little or no say for other parties with interest in the company, such as 
employees.137 The lack of a transparent and open marketing approach of the insolvent but 
viable business may fare negatively to the protection of employment and continuity.  
There was hope that the transparency requirement on insolvency practitioners in the 
Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16)138 would provide details to unsecured creditors 
on how the valuations of the business and the details of the entire pre-pack process would 
serve to improve transparency in the pre-pack process. However, full compliance from 
insolvency practitioners in relation to this requirement is yet to be achieved.139  
The information that is usually provided to unsecured creditors, such as employees is provided 
after a pre-pack business sale is agreed. At this point, the provision of information to unsecured 
creditors may be seen as effectively a filing obligation to provide assurance as to the 
appropriateness of the pre-pack process, not a procedural requirement prior to a decision 
being taken to agree to a pre-pack business sale.140 From the perspective of employees, pre-
pack business sales often leave them under represented and less involved in comparison to 
other stakeholders, such as secured creditors. 
1.4.3 Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVA)  
A Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) is a formal corporate rescue process which is used 
by companies in the UK attempting to respond to their corporate financial difficulties.  The aim 
is to either attempt to save the company from liquidation or to save the company’s business 
as a going concern through a compromise agreement with creditors. 
                                                          
137 P. Walton, “Pre-packin’ in the UK” (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 85,104; Jessica Klein, “Pre-Pack Administrations: 
A Comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom: Part 1” (2012) 33(9) Company Lawyer 261, 268.  
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describe could compromise the practitioner’s status.  This could be considered by the licensing body a disciplinary 
matter. See, Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3), Statement of Insolvency Practice16: Pre-
packaged Sales in Administrations (London: R3, 2009). 
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Insolvency Service, “Report on the Operation of the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16: 1 January to 31 December 
2010 (London: Insolvency Service, undated) at page 3. 
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The procedure was introduced by the Insolvency Act 1985 which was consolidated as 
Insolvency Act 1986.141 The process had been recommended by the Cork Committee, under 
the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork, who sought to make companies in England and Wales 
able to enter into contractually binding agreements with their creditors in satisfaction of their 
debts. This was after establishing that the insolvency procedures that existed at the time were 
too cumbersome.142 Therefore, if a company decides to use a CVA for its business restructuring 
or reorganisation processes, the company directors, the liqudator or the administrator (were 
the company is undergoing administration or liquidation proceedings) submits a proposal to 
the nominee.143 
A nominee is the person designated by the IA 1986 to supervise the implementation of the 
CVA process and must be a qualified insolvency practitioner.144 Upon accepting the proposal, 
the nominee files a copy of the proposals with the court, followed by summoning a 
shareholders’ and creditors’ meeting to approve the proposals. If approved by the creditors’ 
meeting with a majority of over 75 percent in value of creditors voting in person or by proxy, 
the CVA would bind all persons who had notice of the meeting and were entiltled to vote145 
except secured creditors.146 Once implemented, the nominee becomes the supervisor147 of 
the CVA and would be answerable as an officer of the court in relation to the monitoring and 
implementation of the CVA.148 
Procedural and substantive requirements above put aside, the overall aim of a company 
adopting a CVA is to facilitate the reorganisation and continuation of the company’s business 
as a going concern, as opposed to liquidation. For the employees, continued trading on a going 
concern basis would create employment continuity.   
However, a CVA does not bind secured creditors.149 This would have the effect that where the 
CVA proposal leads to a diminution in the secured creditor’s entitlement, it may be vetoed by 
                                                          
141 See, IA 1986, Part 1, and the Insolvency Rules 1986, Part 1. 
142 Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) Chapter 9 paras. 400, 418. 
143 Insolvency Rules 1986, Rule 1.12. 
144 IA 1986, Part 1, s.1 (2). 
145 IA 1986, s.5 (2). 
146 IA 1986, s.4(3). 
147 IA 1986, Part 1, paras 1(2) & 7(2) (b). 
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of the CVA. See also, the rule in Re Condon, Ex parte James (1874) LR 9 Ch. App 609. 
149 IA 1986, s.4 (3). 
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the secured creditor.150 Where a secured creditor vetoes the agreement, a CVA may fail in its 
implementation. Where this is the case, employment protection and continuity predicated on 
the successful implementation of the CVA may be compromised.   
Under a CVA, employees do not form a specific class of creditors with specific voting and 
approval rights in respect of proposals put forward by insolvency practitioners. Rather, they 
form a subset of unsecured creditors. This would imply that when a CVA proposal is put 
forward to the nominee, it is not a requirement on the director or the administrator to make 
provisions for the equal treatment of employees as non–preferential unsecured creditors in 
comparison to secured and preferential creditors.151  
Although aggrieved parties may bring unfair prejudicial claims against the company where they 
feel the terms of the CVA were prejudicial to their interests,152 to the employees, it would 
require time and costs to initiate the claims and employees may lack the procedural knowledge 
of how to initiate such claims which may dissuade them from pursuing such actions. 
All these factors create tensions precipitated by the imbalances in corporate rescue laws and 
processes which further, impact on employment protection policy objectives and corporate 
rescue policy objectives that ought to be addressed to achieve a fair representation of 
employees’ and employers’ interests during corporate insolvency. These imbalances and 
tensions are discussed below at 1.5. 
1.4.4 Administrative Receivership 
Adminstrative receivership is a procedure that arises under the terms of the charge between 
a floating charge holder and the company, giving the holder of the charge power to appoint an 
administrative receiver to take over the control of the business of the company in pursuit of 
the floating charge holder’s interest.   
An administrative receiver may be defined as either; 
 (a) a receiver or manager of the whole (or substantially) the whole of the company’s 
property appointed by or on behalf of the holders of any debentures of the company 
                                                          
150 IRC v Wimbledon Football Club Ltd. [2004] BCC 638. 
151 See the reasoning in IRC v Wimbledon Football Club Ltd [2004] BCC 638, at para.18. 
152 See the reasoning of the House of Lords in SISU Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] BCC 463, at 68. 
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secured by a charge which, as created is a floating charge and one or more other 
securities; or 
(b) a person who would be such a receiver or manager but for the appointment of 
some other as the receiver of part of the company’s property”.153  
Administrative receivership is a procedure that was in common usage formerly, having been 
recognised by the courts since the late nineteenth century in the United Kingdom.154 However, 
it has been virtually abolished due to the impact of the EA 2002.  One of the most notable 
changes that the EA 2002 made to administrative receivership was the restriction on the 
floating charge holder’s ability to appoint administrative receivers on floating charges created 
after the coming into effect, of the EA 2002 on 15 September 2003. However, the restriction 
is subject to the narrow exceptions under s.72A – G of the IA 1986. This restriction is not 
retrospective in effect as holders of floating charges created before 15 September 2003 are 
able to exercise their rights to appoint an administrative receiver.155 
Therefore, once appointed, the administrative receiver may facilitate a going concern sale of 
the business to achieve a better result for his appointor than would be possible on a piecemeal 
sale of the business assets of the company.156 The main objective of administrative 
receivership is neither to liquidate nor to save the company but rather to enforce the floating 
charge holder’s interest. This may be achieved through the sale of the whole or part of the 
company’s business to a new buyer as a going concern. Where this is the case, employee jobs 
would be saved due to the continuity of employment chain. 
Moreover, where the whole or part of the business is sold on a going concern basis, the 
automatic transfer of employment provisions of TUPE Regulations (2006) would be triggered, 
which would further protect employees from job terminations and changes to their terms and 
conditions of employment, courtsey of regulation 4 of TUPE (2006). However, administrative 
receivership does not provide employees with the same level of protection and involvement 
that it does to the floating charge holder.  
                                                          
153 IA 1986, s.29. 
154 See for example, Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company (1870) LR 5 Ch. App. 318. 
155 IA 1986, s.72A (4)(a). 
156 See, R. Mokal, ‘Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis’ (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 
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In addition to the above, employee participation in administrative receivership is considerably 
minimal. There is a lack of collectivity in the procedure as a whole. The main point of concern 
for the administrative receiver is the interest of his appointer, the floating charge holder. 
Although the administrative receiver once appointed is deemed an agent of the company, and 
therefore, required to act in good faith,157 the administrative receiver is able to dispose of 
business assets without regard to the interests of employees. Employees may have valuable 
skills and knowledge that may greatly contribute to rescue of their employer’s business but 
their views may not be considered the main concern for the administrative receiver. 
Moreover, administrative receivership restricts the use of other procedures like 
administration. While other corporate rescue processes, such as a CVA may use administration 
process alongside it to improve the prospect of achieving the intended rescue objectives, the 
appointment of an administrative receiver blocks the appointment of an administrator.158 
Therefore, if the business is not sold piecemeal by the administrative receiver, administrative 
receivership would have the effect that although the debts of a floating charge holder would 
be reduced or discharged, debts to other creditors would remain outstanding. Such debts may 
affect the prospects of an insolvent but viable business to trade out of its financial difficulties159 
which would lead to liquidation of the business assets which may also lead to job losses. 
Administrative receivership is presently not of great significance in comparison to other rescue 
processes, such as administration. However, where used by holders of floating charges created 
prior to the coming into effect of the EA 2002, the lack of an inclusive and a collective approach 
in the process may affect corporate rescue prospects of insolvent but viable businesses. In 
addition, the drive for increased enterprise growth and productivity may also be affected. 
Administrative receivership gives primacy of protection to the floating charge holder. Likewise, 
employment protection and continuity may be compromised as employment protection is not 
the main concern for the appointed administrative receiver. 
1.5 The Tension between Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection Objectives 
Much as employment protection is the main policy objective of both the UK general 
employment legislation and the European Union (EU) social employment legislation in the form 
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159 J. Armour and S. Frisby, ’Rethinking Receivership’ (2001) 21 OJLS 73-90. 
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of the TUPE Regulations and other measures on the one hand, corporate rescue is the main 
policy objective of the UK insolvency law on the other hand. Corporate rescue as the main 
objective of the UK insolvency law’s administration process is enshrined in (IA 1986) Schedule 
B1, Paragraph 3(1) (a). The objective is to afford insolvent but viable businesses in the UK a 
chance at corporate rescue through the sale or transfer of their businesses or part of the 
businesses to the available buyers as going concerns.160  
However, sometimes business rescue is more achievable in reality as opposed to corporate 
rescue despite the apparent objectives of the IA 1986.161 This is because corporate rescue is 
about saving the company, that is, the legal entity that was incorporated to carry forward the 
business of the company.162 Business rescue, however, would involve either selling or 
transferring the business assets that are more cohesive as a productive unit to a new owner 
and the business may continue to operate under the new ownership as a going concern rather 
than saving the company as a whole.163  
This may be supported by the fact that it is the business of the company that progressively 
enhances its going concern value, thereby generating revenue, and perhaps, creating new jobs 
due to growth and expansion. Therefore, on corporate insolvency, a sale of a viable business 
would easily appeal to potential buyers in contrast to a sale of the company as a whole. 
However, irrespective of which of the two is achieved first, the overall advantage that may be 
born out of corporate rescue is the avoidance of corporate liquidations and the opportunity 
for the continuity of the business. This arguably, protects employee jobs and maintains the 
chain of continuity of employment. 
However, the ‘road’ to a successful rescue of an insolvent but viable business is quite 
treacherous. This is because during proceedings for the sale or the transfer of an insolvent but 
viable business, the policy objectives of employment protection, especially, under the TUPE 
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Regulations, and the policy objectives of corporate rescue enshrined in the IA 1986 potentially 
conflict with each other, as elaborated in the next section. 
In other words, TUPE provisions, such as regulation 4(1) on the automatic transfer of 
employees on the same terms and conditions of employment, the prohibition on the employer 
from varying employee terms and conditions of employment during business sales and transfer 
of undertakings in regulation 4(4) together with the protection to employees from being 
dismissed by their employers where the sole or principal reason for the dismissal is the 
business sale or transfer may restrict the employer’s flexibility to execute business and 
entrepreneurial decisions for fear of breaching these TUPE provisions.164  
On the other hand, a potential or prospective buyer may be disincentivised from buying an 
insolvent but viable business due to fear of inheriting contingent and non-contingent liabilities 
born out of TUPE Regulations obligation on the transferor and the transferee. This point is 
further analysed below at 1.6. This therefore, may negatively impact on the employer’s 
flexibility to sell the business as a going concern. This may not only affect the policy objectives 
underlying the drive for corporate rescue but might also, grossly affect the entrepreneurship 
and enterprise norms that would otherwise boost going concern business sales, a catalyst for 
economic growth and stability.165  
1.6 Balancing the Tension between Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection  
Managerial decisions to restructure their businesses may involve sacrificing some of the 
employees’ jobs, making changes to terms and conditions of employment or a reduction in the 
employees’ working hours as measures to lower labour costs.166 Besides labour being key to 
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converting capital into goods and services that enhance the going concern value of the 
business, labour is also one of the biggest costs of production and service delivery.167  
Therefore, an employer seeking to restructure operational and production costs may 
unavoidably, look at reducing labour costs. However, this freedom and flexibility is constricted 
by employment protection laws which prohibit employers from making business decisions that 
would potentially enable successful reorganisation and rescue for fear of burdensome 
liabilities or consequences for breaching these employment protection laws. 
Employees benefit from the protection afforded them by the employment protection 
legislation especially TUPE Regulations during business sales and relevant transfers. However, 
the inability by insolvent employers to effect managerial business decisions that would enable 
them to achieve their reorganisation or corporate rescue objectives may potentially lead 
companies to liquidation. This will unavoidably, lead to job losses which may fail both the policy 
objectives of employment protection and corporate rescue.  
From this point of view, the tension between the policy objectives of social employment 
protection and those of corporate rescue is in need of reconciliation. The need for greater 
employer or managerial flexibility to make business decisions that would enable them to 
enhance corporate rescue prospects ought to be balanced with the employment protection 
objectives if both employment protections objectives and corporate rescue objectives are to 
be pursued simultaneously without unfairly compromising one or the other.168  
It has been argued that The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection 
of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (as discussed in chapter five at 5.7) have 
introduced changes that have somewhat widened the scope of employer flexibility to effect 
business decisions that would enhance corporate rescue prospects during corporate 
insolvency.169 This is because under TUPE (2006), regulation 7(1) (b) rendered an employee’s 
                                                          
167 P. A. Gibbs, ‘Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: The Relative Importance of Corporate Governance, 
Takeover Threat and Free Cash Flow’ (1993) 14 Strategic Management Journal 51 – 68; A. Garde, ‘Recent 
Developments in the Law of Transfers of Undertakings’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Rev. 523. 
168 P. Davies and M. Freedland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market (OUP, Oxford, 2007). 
169 J. McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 ILJ 364; J. McMullen, 
‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 ILJ 149; Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘TUPE and Mothballs: 
Crystal Palace and Another v Kavanagh and Others’ (2014) 43 ILJ 185.  
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dismissal automatically unfair where the sole or principal reason for the dismissal was 
‘connected’ with the transfer.  
However, the requirement for a dismissal to be ‘connected’ with the transfer to render it 
automatically unfair has now been repealed by the new TUPE (2014) Regulations. The effect 
of this change to regulation 7(b) of TUPE 2016 by the TUPE 2014 has meant that employer 
decisions to dismiss employees that would be ‘deemed’ to be ‘connected with’ the relevant 
transfer would no longer apply. This point of discourse is broadly analysed at 5.7. 
Likewise, variations to employee contract terms and conditions are no longer invalid where the 
sole or principal reason for the variation is ‘connected’ with the transfer courtesy of regulation 
4(4) of TUPE (2014) Regulations. This has somehow widened the scope of managerial flexibility 
in that, a great number of cases involving employee dismissals and employment terms and 
conditions variations that were deemed to be ‘connected’ with the transfer courtesy of TUPE 
(2006) Regulations would no longer apply under the new TUPE (2014) Regulations. The 
changes brought about by the TUPE 2014 Regulations and their impact on employment 
protection and corporate rescue are broadly analysed in chapter five of this thesis at 5.7 and 
5.8.3 respectively.  
Nonetheless, although the above changes may have widened the scope within which an 
employer may effect reorganisation and corporate rescue decisions without fear that such 
decisions would be ‘connected’ with the business sale or transfer, it is still the contention that 
the tension between corporate rescue policy objectives and employment protection policy 
objectives remains unbalanced. As is broadly discussed in chapters five and six, the divergent 
objectives pursued by insolvency laws and employment laws during corporate insolvencies, 
coupled with interpretational challenges, especially around TUPE Regulations’ intersection 
with Insolvency laws have further contributed to these imbalances. A compromise ought to be 
reached on how both policies’ objectives would be balanced and pursued simultaneously to 
achieve a fair representation of both policies’ goals during corporate insolvency. 
It is therefore, the argument in this chapter and central to this thesis in general, that this 
balance or reconciliation may arguably, be achieved through interpretation. This would be, by 
adopting a novel interpretative approach built on the principles of constructiveness and 
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integrity as posited by Professor Ronald Dworkin in his Interpretative Theory of Law170 which 
is introduced in the next chapter and subsequently applied to US law in chapter four and to 
the UK law in chapter six respectively.  
 
                                                          
170 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977); R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA, 
HUP, 1986). 
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Chapter Two 
Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection through a 
Theoretical Perspective: The Traditionalist and Proceduralist 
Theoretical Models1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There have long been debates from insolvency scholars, academics and practitioners on what 
the legitimate goal of insolvency law is or ought to be in a legal system.2 One of the leading 
scholars of insolvency, Professor Douglas Baird is of the view that engaging debates on 
insolvency law’s legitimate goal are mainly contested between two theoretical schools; the 
traditionalists and the proceduralists.3  
As termed by Prof. Baird, traditional bankruptcy lawyers and scholars are proponents of the 
traditionalist theoretical school whose main focus is on the rich store of bankruptcy cases that 
have developed over time.4 Their approaches are built on the conviction that bankruptcy law 
plays a special role in a legal system and advances substantive goals that are distinct and 
important.5 Traditional bankruptcy lawyers and scholars include for example, Karen Gross,6 
Donald Korobkin,7 Elizabeth Warren,8 Samuel L. Bufford9 and Harvey R. Miller10 among others. 
                                                          
1 Part of this chapter is part of my forthcoming journal article in the International Journal of Law and Management 
titled: Hamiisi J. Nsubuga ‘The Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law: Remedying the Theoretical Limitations 
in the Traditionalist and Proceduralist Perspectives on Corporate Insolvency’ (0000) Vol.61 Issue (5) International 
Journal of Law and Management (Forthcoming, December 2017). 
2 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 775; E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387; D Baird & T H Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago L. Rev. 97; D. R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554. 
3 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578. 
4 Ibid, at [576]. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997). 
7 D. R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554. 
8 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775; E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387. 
9 Samuel L. Bufford, ‘What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 
829. 
10 Harvey R. Miller, ‘The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Re-emergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as the Producer, 
Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play’ (1995) 69 Am. Bankr. L. J. 431.  
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On the other hand, Prof. Baird describes proceduralists as entirely academics whose distinct 
characteristic is the focus on procedures.11 They believe that a coherent bankruptcy law must 
recognise how it fits into the rest of the legal system and a vibrant market economy.12 
Proceduralist bankruptcy scholars include for example, Douglas G. Baird,13 Thomas H. 
Jackson,14 Alan Schwartz,15 Barry E. Adler16 among others. Prof. Baird’s categorisation of the 
traditionalist and proceduralist theoretical schools has also been expounded by other 
academic writers on the subject of corporate bankruptcy and insolvency such as Prof. Roy 
Goode,17 Ziad R. Anzari,18 Charles W. Mooney Jr19 and Edward J. Janger.20 
These two theoretical schools offer differing conceptual perspectives on the role that 
insolvency law should, or ought to play in the reorganisation and rescue of insolvent but viable 
businesses, the substantive law that is, or ought to be, applied in a bankruptcy process, the 
role of judges in interpreting insolvency laws and whether judges should be afforded a certain 
degree of judicial discretion during  insolvency proceedings where the subject matter of 
adjudication is not covered by relevant judicial precedents.21 
                                                          
11 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578, at [577]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Douglas G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’ (1986) 15 J. Legal Stud. 127; D Baird & T H 
Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago L. Rev. 97  
14 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 857, 860; Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725; D. Baird & T. 
H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chi. L. Rev. 97. 
15 Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851. 
16 Barry E. Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311; 
Barry E. Adler, ‘Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules’ (1994) 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1107. 
17 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 41, 42. 
18 Ziad R. Anzari, ‘Bankruptcy Policy, Legal Heritage and Financial Development: An Agenda for Further Research’ 
(2008) 24 (2) Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 382. 
19 Charles W. Mooney Jr, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure’ (2004) 61 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 931. 
20 Edaward J. Janger, ‘Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design’ (2001) 43 
Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 566. 
21 See for example, Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain’ 
(1982) 91 Yale L. J. 857; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775; D. R Korobkin, 
‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554; E Warren, 
‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387; Paul F. Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, 
Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503, 544. 
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For example, proceduralists look at insolvency law’s main objective as a means of maximisation 
of value for creditors and therefore, this can be seen to be creditor biased.22 Proceduralists 
contend that insolvency law should focus on addressing issues that only arise within 
bankruptcy.23 They believe that non-insolvency creditor claims or entitlements should not be 
protected by insolvency law unless doing so maximises value for creditors.24 They prefer using 
economic models as a basis for analysing corporate insolvency and market solutions, as 
opposed to seeking judicial intervention for resolving issues arising on corporate insolvency.25  
 
Traditionalists however take a stand that is opposite to that of the proceduralists in that they 
advocate for a more inclusive approach to stakeholder interest consideration during corporate 
insolvency. They believe that all stakeholder interests should be given equal weight of 
consideration on corporate insolvency.26 They are against the notion that insolvency law exists 
to only serve the interests of creditors.27 In light of these varying views and perspectives and 
the theoretical divide and limitations discussed below at 2.2 and 2.3, it may be argued that 
there is a theoretical deadlock between the two theoretical schools on the proper approach to 
be adopted in addressing the debtor-creditor concerns during corporate insolvency in a 
balanced manner. Moreover, employment protection concerns, such as the proper treatment 
of employees’ interests during their employer’s insolvency is an area where these theories 
would lead to conflicting views.28 
Corporate strategies to rehabilitate financially struggling companies often involve terminations 
or modifications to employment contract terms and conditions or collective bargaining 
                                                          
22 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 857, 860; Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725; D. Baird & T. 
H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chi. L. Rev. 97. 
23 The term bankruptcy is used differently in the US and the UK. In the UK, the term bankruptcy is used to refer to 
a situation where a person is unable to pay his debts and therefore faced with bankruptcy. The term insolvency 
is used to refer to a company that is unable to pay its debts. However, in the US bankruptcy is used to refer to 
both a person and a company being unable to pay their debts. Where used in this chapter and thesis in general, 
both terms are used to refer to corporate insolvency not personal insolvency. 
24 Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851. 
25 See for instance, R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1983) pp 60 – 87 on his account on 
wealth maximisation as an ethical principle, a typical law and economics perspective. 
26 D. R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554. 
27 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387. 
28 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578; Giles Saint-Paul, ‘The 
Political Economy of Employment Protection’ (2002) 110 J. Pol. Econ. 672, 673. 
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agreements (CBA) as a mode of cutting labour costs.29 However, there is an apparent tension 
as labour law seeks to keep employment protection laws intact during corporate insolvency, 
even if doing so would defeat the reorganisation prospects of struggling companies.30  
Employment law protection pre-insolvency protects employees from unfair labour practices 
from their employers. This protection further enhances job security and mutuality of 
obligation.31 However, when an employer experiences financial difficulties and therefore 
needs to effect reorganisational changes, such as cutting labour costs, employment law 
protection to employees potentially constrains that employer from effecting such changes, 
which may potentially drive the employer into liquidation. Where the employer company is 
liquidated, employees as a whole may lose their jobs and employment protection laws in such 
circumstances can be regarded as counterproductive.32  
Insolvency law on the other hand, may support corporate rehabilitation and reorganisation by 
effecting insolvency specific changes to employment contracts. This raises questions as to 
whether and to what extent labour law policies and protection to employees should potentially 
be moderated or be overridden by insolvency law to facilitate corporate reorganisation and 
rescue, or whether employment protection laws should remain intact during corporate 
insolvency. It will be argued that theory should be used as a balancing tool to meet both labour 
and bankruptcy law policies and objectives. 
This chapter analyses corporate insolvency through a theoretical perspective. The chapter sets 
out the traditionalist and proceduralist perspectives and ideologies on the role of insolvency 
law in a legal system and how these perspectives influence insolvency proceedings in both the 
US and the UK. This chapter contends that the traditionalist perspectives on insolvency law 
identify factors that should be taken into account during corporate insolvency proceedings but 
do not satisfactorily say how these factors should be balanced.  
The chapter argues that although the proceduralists provide clear answers as to the factors to 
be taken into account during corporate insolvency, they do so in an unsatisfactory way to the 
                                                          
29 Donald L. Martin, ‘The Economics of Employment Termination Rights’ (1997) 20 J. L. & Econ. 187, 188. 
30 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment 
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chi. L. Rev. 97. 
31 Giles Saint-Paul, ‘The Political Economy of Employment Protection’ (2002) 110 J. Pol. Econ. 672, 673. 
32 Hugo Hopenhayn and Richard Rogerson, ‘Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis’ 
(1993) 101 J. Pol. Econ. 915, 916. 
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interests of extant stakeholders. Therefore, the chapter analyses Dworkin’s Interpretative 
Theory of Law to explore how the theory could be applied and as a remedy to the limitations 
that these theoretical schools present. The chapter will argue that this lack of clarity from the 
traditionalists and an unsatisfactory approach from the proceduralists may arguably, be 
remedied through an interpretative approach as posited by Dworkin. 
2.2 The Theoretical Divide Analysed 
A theory is a factual concept or framework describing a given phenomenon, the way it is or it 
ought to be.33 Although there exist various theories on different disciplines, where theories are 
used in insolvency disciplines, they are explored as normative phenomena as they prescribe 
evaluation of why insolvency is the way it is or ought to be in a given state or society.34 Although 
it may be argued that theories on their own cannot solve underlying insolvency issues in a given 
state, they however provide the basis upon which substantive insolvency laws and policies in 
different jurisdictions can be prescribed and provide arguments for constructing different 
insolvency regimes.35 
2.2.1 The Role of a Legal System in an Insolvency Setting 
Modern insolvency regimes have approaches that deal with the debtor-creditor relationships 
during corporate insolvency. However, these insolvency regimes restrict the coordination of 
the debtor-creditor relationship to one particular collective approach in place of individual 
bargaining. Parties to a contractual agreement are restricted by that particular insolvency 
regime from inserting clauses in their contractual agreements that prescribe using alternative 
bankruptcy or insolvency regimes to address their contractual rights and obligations upon the 
commencement of formal proceedings.36  
These insolvency laws are influenced by governmental policies that dictate the way the debtor-
creditor relationship is resolved.37 These may include for example, policy goals of boosting 
corporate rescue or policies designed to curb rising levels of unemployment in a given legal 
                                                          
33 Brian H Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, (6th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London 2012) 4.  
34 D.R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas L. Rev. 
98. 
35 Hamiisi J. Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 4(1) 
NIBLeJ 4. 
36 Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851. 
37 See for example, Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 
1851. 
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system which could be jeopardised by individual creditor actions.38 Therefore, when 
bankruptcy strikes, the dictates of the debtor-creditor relationships that arise outside 
bankruptcy settings give way to the particular legal system’s insolvency laws in coordinating 
their resolution, yet the same insolvency laws of course do not play a part in regulating these 
debtor-creditor arrangements pre-bankruptcy.39 
There is sense in the argument that where contractual arrangements are not regulated by a 
particular system of laws, creditors and debtors would enter into contractual arrangements 
that might not only be detrimental to each other but might also bring burdensome effects to 
the economy as a whole.40 However, bankruptcy laws are designed to address these 
coordination problems during corporate insolvency, rather than regulating substantive 
contractual transactions that lead businesses to bankruptcy in the first place.41 
This has led to questions being asked by different actors in the bankruptcy field, such as 
business owners, employees, bankruptcy scholars and commentators on the role that a state 
or legal system should or ought to play in coordinating the debtor-creditor relationships during 
corporate insolvency.42 How far should a legal system strive to keep a financially struggling 
company continuing trading as a going concern? How should bankruptcy policies be 
implemented in a legal system and what role should judges play in balancing overlapping 
stakeholder interests during corporate insolvency and bankruptcy? Traditionalists and 
proceduralists answer these questions in different ways. 
2.2.1 (a) Encouraging Corporate Reorganisations and Rescue 
Traditionalists believe that affording a financially struggling company a chance to reorganise is 
one of the essential aims of insolvency law.43 This is a form of maintaining the going concern 
                                                          
38 Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice’ (1994) U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 43. 
39 Douglas G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’ (1986) 15 J. Legal Stud. 127, 147; Omeri 
Kimhi & Arno Doebert, ‘Bankruptcy Law as a Balancing System: Lessons from a Comparative Analysis of the 
Intersection between Labor and Bankruptcy Law’ (2015) 23 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 491, 529. 
40 Paul F. Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. 
Rev. 503, 544. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See for example, Donald R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. 
L. Rev. 717; Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 367; 
Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice’ (1994) U. Ill.L. Rev. 1, 43; Alan 
Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851; Paul F. Kirgis, 
‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503, 544. 
43 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578 at 577. 
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value of the business and the company itself is preserved. Traditionalists believe that corporate 
liquidations create grave effects for employees and other involuntary and tortious victims, such 
as the community44 and governmental bodies, such as tax authorities. Therefore, liquidation 
should be avoided as much as possible, by aiming to enact legislation to support financially 
struggling companies to reorganise and continue trading as going concerns.45  
Proceduralists however, view the role of insolvency in a legal system from a different 
dimension to that of the traditionalists. Proceduralists are of the view that the substantive goal 
of insolvency law is to maximise the value of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate for the benefit of 
creditors.46 They believe that a business entity should be able to ‘live or die’ in the market.47 
They believe that the only aim of insolvency law is to avoid premature liquidations arising out 
of uncoordinated creditor actions through the adoption of a collective debt collection 
regime.48 
According to the proceduralists, it is the collective nature of the debt collection procedure that 
governs how insolvency law deals with extant creditor interests. Therefore, insolvency law 
should exclusively and procedurally aim to address debt collection problems arising out of 
extant creditor interests and avoid addressing issues, such as redistribution or modifications to 
non-insolvency creditor interests that are beyond collective imperatives.49  
                                                          
44 A community may lose its interests from a company if liquated. For example, a community may lose a retail 
store such as Tesco which arguably, offered affordable prices to local residents and the store is replaced for 
example, by Waitrose, which may be slightly expensive to local and community residents. On this aspect,  see for 
example, a short article, titled, ‘Today’s Woman: OAP who fights for the Rights of Others’ in the Sheffield Star 
published on 8 February 2010 where a ‘local community champion’ described a local Waitrose store as an 
expensive ‘posh’ supermarket where residents from an  impoverished local estate in Sheffield would be 
challenged to go shopping, at <http://www.thestar.co.uk/lifestyle/features/today-s-woman-oap-who-fights-for-
rights-of-others-1-312507> <accessed November 2016). A community may also face increasing levels of 
unemployment due to local business closures or liquidations. Generally, see, Karen Gross, 'Taking Community 
Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay' (1994) 72 Wash. Univ. L. Q. 1031; Ronald J. Mann, 'Bankruptcy 
and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it Anyway' (1995) 70 (5) N.Y.U L. Rev. 1040; Karen 
Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
45 Donald R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 717; 
Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 367. 
46 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L. J. 
857. 
47 Ibid, at 578. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851; Paul F. 
Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503, 
544. 
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2.2.1 (b) A Company Should Die or Live in the Market 
Proceduralists are of the view that the role of insolvency law in a legal system is neither to 
support the liquidation nor reorganisation of a financially struggling company. Rather, 
insolvency law should be used to ensure that a struggling company’s assets are put to their 
best use.50 Proceduralists argue this point of view by reference to a two stage analysis of a 
company’s financial struggles. These stages are economic distress and financial distress.  
A company is in economic distress where its assets cannot generate adequate revenue to 
facilitate its operating costs to the extent that its value is best achieved by breaking it up to 
realise any available returns rather than trying to rescue it as a going concern. An insolvency 
practitioner may sell off any realisable assets of the company that are of saleable value, rather 
than attempting to rescue and sell the business as a package.  
An example of economic distress may be best illustrated by the 2008 administration process 
of Woolworths stores in the UK.51 In order to recover any available value in the company, 
having failed to achieve a going concern business sale, the administrators opted to sell any 
item or property that they could, which included selling shop-racks, back-office furniture and 
shelf-products. However, a company is in financial distress when it is unable to pay its debts 
and invoices as they fall due.52 This may be a temporary financial situation that a company may 
be experiencing that may arguably be solved through reorganisation. 
According to the proceduralists, insolvency law’s main aim should not be the reorganisation of 
financially struggling companies. To the proceduralists, a market economy functions well if 
companies that cannot compete for their market place are allowed to fail.53 However, 
traditionalists are of the view that keeping a company intact through insolvency is an 
independent goal of insolvency law. A company is not a pool of assets for stakeholders to 
                                                          
50 Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851; Paul F. 
Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503, 
544.  
51Nina Jones, ‘U.K’s Woolworths Files for Administration’ 28 November 2008 available online at 
<http://wwd.com/business-news/direct-internet-catalogue/woolworths-in-uk-files-for-bankruptcy-protection-
1872662/> (accessed October 2016); BBC News article, ‘Woolworth Set for Administration’ published on 28 
November 2008, available online at, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7751064.stm > (accessed October 2016). 
52 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 578; Gregor Andrade & Steven 
N. Kaplan, ‘How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leverage Transactions That 
Became Distressed’ (1998) 53 J. Fin. 1443, 1444. 
53 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment’ 
(1958) 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261. 
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collect or sell piecemeal, but a collection of diverse interests that may be severely affected by 
a company’s liquidation.54 Therefore, if a company in financial distress is not supported by a 
legal system through its reorganisation process, it may be forced into liquidation by a selfish 
debt collection regime that secured creditors adopt to recoup their debts or interests. This 
would have grave consequences for all interested stakeholders.55  
However, it should be noted that choosing rehabilitation of the company over liquidation 
curtails a secured creditor’s security and recovery options.56 Although giving a debtor company 
a chance and time to execute a reorganisation plan may seem reasonable, there is no 
guarantee that such a company will utilise its reorganisation plan effectively and emerge out 
of insolvency successfully.57 There is a possibility that the costs of reorganisation may result in 
lower returns to creditors. 
To the traditionalists, saving an insolvent but viable company is the very essence of insolvency 
law as the company is allowed to continue trading as a going concern and employees may keep 
their jobs. However to proceduralists, this is a form of prolonging the life of a bad company 
with no guarantees that such a company would emerge out of reorganisation successfully.58   
2.2.2 Uniform Application of Laws inside and outside Bankruptcy 
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Butner v. United States59 observed that a uniform 
application of the law inside and outside bankruptcy ‘serves to reduce the uncertainty’ and 
prevents a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy.60 Therefore, unless a federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason 
why bankruptcy should be analysed differently simply because an interested party is involved 
in a bankruptcy proceeding.61 This is a point of view supported and advocated for by the 
                                                          
54 Donald R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 717, at 745. 
55 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997) 253. 
56 Ibid, at 129. 
57 J. Berry, ‘Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Have on Employees of the Debtor 
and Why Do These Affects Drive Companies to Bankruptcy?’ (2012) Social Sciences Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139062> accessed 10 December 2016. 
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proceduralists as they believe that law, be it inside or outside bankruptcy, should uniformly be 
applied.62 
Proceduralists believe that bankruptcy law should mirror and replicate substantive stakeholder 
interests and entitlements of the non-insolvency setting and avoid insolvency specific changes, 
such as redistribution or expropriation of non-insolvency entitlements into insolvency.63 
Insolvency should preserve the absolute priority rules of the non-insolvency setting according 
to the proceduralists.64  
In a non-insolvency setting, secured creditors have absolute priority of distribution over the 
proceeds from the sale of the company assets or collateral.65 Proceduralists contend that 
secured creditors should have the same absolute priority in an insolvency setting. However, 
this right is affected where calls for fairness or equality of distribution, such as to employees 
and other constituent stakeholders are invoked as normatively advocated for by the 
traditionalists.  Proceduralists are of the view that questions of fairness, equity of treatment 
and minimum right of compensation should have no place in insolvency unless they are given 
effect outside bankruptcy.66  
This contention is further supported by the contractarian approach to insolvency law,67 an 
offshoot of the proceduralist view of insolvency law.  This approach looks at certain provisions 
of a legal system, such as legal rules and principles, as either mandatory rules or mandatory 
structural rules.  For example, Alan Schwartz68 describes mandatory rules as rules in an 
insolvency context that seek to enhance or augment the value of the bankruptcy estate even 
if doing so unfairly leaves the other party at loss.  
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Alan Schwartz cites for example, 11 U.S.C. 362 and 11 U.S.C. 365 of the US Bankruptcy Code69 
as mandatory rules in the current US Bankruptcy Code that seek to augment the value of the 
bankruptcy estate. This is through staying creditors’ recovery actions against the debtor 
company and also affording the debtor company’s trustees or DIP power to either assume or 
reject employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements (subject to court approval) 
upon filing for a bankruptcy petition.70 
Alan Schwartz describes mandatory structural rules in a bankruptcy context as rules that seek 
to maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy system by maximising value for creditors, rather 
than creating inefficient incentives to parties in their earlier economic relationship.71 Non-
structural mandatory rules, that is, rules that seek to enhance and achieve a fair redistributive 
aspect of the bankruptcy system are regarded as inefficient and therefore, should not form 
part of the bankruptcy system.72  
There is no good distributional reason to benefit one set of interest holders, such as the 
secured creditors at the expense of subsequent stakeholders, such as employees.73 Therefore, 
mandatory rules in insolvency should only be structural; that is, they should seek to maintain 
the integrity of the insolvency system and uphold creditors’ pre-insolvency arrangements. By 
following absolute priority rules in insolvency, debts are paid in the order stipulated pre-
insolvency in contractual arrangements between the debtor and creditor. 
This contention is however, not supported by traditionalists. Traditionalists believe that as part 
of the rehabilitation and reorganisation processes, modifications to stakeholder non-
insolvency interests and rights that are involved in the insolvency process may be desirable, 
where it would serve the interests of all stakeholders and preserve the company from 
liquidation.74 Traditionalists support changes to the law outside insolvency, where such 
changes enhance the prospects of rehabilitation of financially struggling companies enabling 
them to avoid liquidation.75   
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Per Professor Elizabeth Warren;  
‘When dealing with redistributive issues, it is necessary and inherent to bankruptcy 
policy to define moral choices. Bankruptcy is not merely procedural or derivative in 
nature; to the contrary, it also reflects a deliberate decision to pursue different 
distributional objectives from those the de facto scheme of general collection law 
embodies’76 
For traditionalists, effecting insolvency specific modifications to employment protection 
provisions would moderate the rigidity of labour protection laws, to allow debtor employers 
to reorganise their businesses, which would benefit employees as a group. This is because 
insolvency law can be a vehicle for reorganisation that may help a struggling company to 
restructure its business.77 
Proceduralists however, see insolvency and reorganisation changes as a gateway to using 
bankruptcy filing for strategic gains. Proceduralists are of the view that moderating certain 
labour protection laws and policies in insolvency proceedings may incentivise some debtor 
companies to file for bankruptcy to gain the advantages and protection that bankruptcy filings 
afford that debtor company. Proceduralists are of the view that this would amount to 
bankruptcy abuse and it would be a form of weakness within a legal system.78   
Proceduralists believe that if a particular policy is worth implementing in the general law, it 
should also be implemented in bankruptcy. For example, if a legal system adopts a policy on 
curbing unjust enrichment or fraudulent transactions in contract law, that policy should also 
be applicable and implementable in insolvency law. It should not be only applicable in one 
specific area as it may arguably, create inconsistencies within a legal system79 and provide 
perverse incentives for its use. 
To proceduralists, insolvency is a foreseeable risk that should be fairly coordinated by a legal 
system like any other risk. In a non-insolvency setting, a legal system does not protect 
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stakeholders and companies against misfortunes, such as property damage, fire or theft. 
Although certain areas of the law, such as the law of equity seek to protect stakeholders and 
consumers on matters of misrepresentation and fraud that may be borne out of 
unconscionability, beyond this imperative stakeholders or investors take out protective 
remedies, such as insurance policies or remedial contract clauses to curb potential risks. 
Therefore, insolvency law should be treated the same as any other area of the law within a 
legal system and redistribution is not justified. 
2.2.3 The Role of Judges in an Insolvency Setting 
Insolvency is or ought to be a platform where competing stakeholder interests are addressed 
or coordinated to limit avoidable losses. However, the problem, and therefore, the point of 
contention between the traditionalists and proceduralists arises because the current 
bankruptcy system in the US revolves around one decision making vehicle. This is the 
bankruptcy court. While there exists specialist bankruptcy courts in the US that govern 
bankruptcy proceedings, in contrast, the UK insolvency proceedings are presided over by 
general non-insolvency specialist judges who do not tend to be required to decide upon 
redistributive matters during insolvency proceedings. However, they can still be called upon to 
interpret the law when there are disputes, such as contentious issue during insolvent relevant 
transfers.80 
Legal systems may bestow powers upon courts to regulate insolvency proceedings. These 
courts may make strategic decisions, such as deciding whether a company faced with financial 
difficulties is worthy of a chance to reorganise rather than be liquidated and whether, in a US 
context, a petition for rejection of executory contracts, such as employment contracts and 
collective bargaining agreements by the debtor employer may be granted or declined. In the 
US, this power is bestowed onto bankruptcy courts81 by the US Congress through provisions in 
the Bankruptcy Code82 to regulate the bankruptcy process.83 However, in the UK the legislation 
                                                          
80 For example, see, Re Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd and Re Ferrotech Ltd and Granville Technology Ltd [2005] 
EWCA Civ. 1072 where the UK judges were called upon to interpret legislative provisions involving judicial 
discretion during in bankruptcy proceedings. This case is discussed in chapter seven at 7.3.1. 
81 Bankruptcy courts include federal district courts and state bankruptcy courts. However, federal district courts 
have broader jurisdiction over state courts in deciding matters that arise under the Bankruptcy Code or matters 
related to a bankruptcy case. See, 29 U.S.C. s.1334 (b). 
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tends to place such factors in the hands of insolvency practitioners, subject to court oversight 
if needed.84 
A company’s disputes with its employees and other creditors generally present a court with an 
opportunity to solve a number of different problems. These problems may range from 
coordination of debt collection to mitigating the effects that insolvency would have on 
employees, such as changes in their livelihood or a break in the chain of continuity of 
employment. The court may also be able to mitigate the rigidities in individual debt collection 
regimes to give a struggling company a second chance, which in turn saves employee jobs. 
However, one point of contention between the proceduralists and the traditionalists in 
discussing the US system is as to whether the court is afforded too many powers and too much 
flexibility in the execution of its roles. The judge makes the most important decisions based on 
the factual arguments or matters before the court. The judge makes decisions that direct the 
way the debtor-creditor relationship is coordinated during bankruptcy proceedings, yet 
traditionalists and proceduralists offer differing perspectives on the role that a judge ought to 
play in a bankruptcy setting.  
For example, proceduralists view the role of a judge in bankruptcy proceedings as that of a 
disinterested arbiter.85 Proceduralists believe that the judge’s role during insolvency 
proceedings should be to direct and control competing stakeholders’ collection processes but 
that they should not be committed to any particular outcome.86  To proceduralists, judges 
should allow creditors to make their own decisions and destinies.87 The judge’s task is to 
control parties’ conflicting interests and to ensure transparency and integrity in the bankruptcy 
process.88 
However, on the other hand, traditionalists view the judges’ role in the interpretation and 
enforcement of insolvency laws as a paramount aspect. Traditionalists believe that a judge 
should implement insolvency’s equity goals on a case by case basis and that judges should 
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exhibit broader discretionary powers89 in discharging their roles. This is to ensure that 
bankruptcy goals are justifiable, and are fairly and reasonably used to meet the interests of 
competing stakeholders, such as employees.90 
Traditionalists believe that because each case is different with different facts and stakeholders, 
a legal system should not have a specific or particular system or standard that fit every legal 
question at hand.91 This is because, it may be difficult to ascertain or predict with certainty, 
competing and underlying diverse values and policy dimensions that may necessitate or inform 
a legal decision.92 However, for employees, the presence of a judge in the bankruptcy process 
may reassure them that their interests are fairly considered.93  
In comparison, proceduralists do not support the idea of broad judicial discretion. According 
to the proceduralists, judicial use of discretion is only useful if a judge is well positioned to use 
such discretion to make informed decisions. Proceduralists believe that judges have no magical 
powers to make business decisions or predict market behaviour that may enhance the going 
concern value of a company.94  
2.3 Theoretical Limitations Analysed  
From the discussion above, it may be established that proceduralists provide clear answers as 
to the factors to be taken into account during corporate insolvency.95 However, proceduralists’ 
perspectives give more primacy to maximising creditors’ returns during insolvency yet these 
returns are arguably most enjoyed by secured creditors who already enjoy priority over other 
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creditors, such as employees and the theoretical approach neglects the position of other 
stakeholders. This may arguably, be perceived as being unsatisfactory and unfair to the 
interests of overlapping stakeholders as group. Moreover, other stakeholders, such as 
employees lack bargaining powers pre-insolvency and post-insolvency, and they cannot easily 
absorb loss. 
In addition, proceduralist perspectives on issues such as the role of judges in an insolvency 
setting and the judicial use of discretion further support the contention that this theoretical 
school prescribes approaches that are not inclusive to the interests of all stakeholders as a 
group during corporate insolvency.  For example, proceduralist perspectives of equating a 
judge’s role to that of a disinterested arbiter96 during insolvency proceedings, and the 
contention that judges should allow creditors to make their own decisions and destinies,97 
would arguably, be seen as an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the interests of overlapping 
stakeholders as a group.   
In addition, it may be argued that proceduralists’ insistence that insolvency should aim to solve 
debt collection and coordination issues among creditors, rather than rehabilitating insolvent 
but viable companies, may limit bankruptcy law to being a debt collection tool or a remedial 
tool for mitigating bad investment decisions. Where this is the case, it may echo the 
administrative receivership era in the UK that the Enterprise Act 200298 sought to remedy 
through the virtual abolition of administrative receivership and the improvement of the 
administration process, as administrative receivership was essentially, a debt collection 
procedure.99 It was considered inappropriate for insolvency law to be dominated by a debt 
collection device like administrative receivership, rather than the collective administration 
process. 
In the US, this approach would also echo the state of affairs of the US bankruptcy law pre-
Bankruptcy Code era - the Railroad receivership era. It should be remembered that bankruptcy 
law in the US is deeply rooted in equity and common law. This may be evidenced in the 
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overwhelming use of equity receiverships in the pre-Bankruptcy Code era. The use of equity 
receiverships arose because the insolvency laws that regulated the debtor-creditor 
relationships during the Railroad era predominantly focused on liquidation rather than 
rehabilitation of financially struggling companies.100 
Creditors used equity receivership as a model of preserving Railroads as they underwent 
restructuring.101 However, receivership is essentially a debt collection device and creditors 
used it for personal and selfish goals rather than the reorganisation of the debtor’s business. 
A secured creditor of a Railroad would seek court approval to obtain control of the debtor 
company’s assets. Receivership would then act as an automatic stay to competing creditor 
actions against the Railroad’s assets but usually at the detriment of other creditors.102 This was 
one of the key factors that led to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, laying 
grounds for the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.103  
Traditionalist perspectives on insolvency law in a legal system, however, may be seen as more 
inclusive in approach than those of the proceduralists. Traditionalists consider the interests of 
stakeholders as a whole and they support mechanisms that may ensure fairness in distributive 
imperatives in insolvency. The traditionalist approach is therefore, flexible and can be adopted 
for different circumstances. However, traditionalists do not provide how these factors or 
perspectives may be balanced despite the fact that they are identified. The approach fails to 
provide clear answers and this may be regarded as a weakness to this theoretical school’s 
perspectives and approaches. 
For instance, Professor Warren concedes that:  
‘[w]hile I hope that it is useful to have distinguished the policymaking thrust of 
state collection law from that of bankruptcy and to have identified the 
distributional rationale of bankruptcy,… I have not offered a single-rationale 
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policy that compels solutions in particular cases. I have not given any answers 
to specific statutory issues.’104  
Therefore, the lack of clear answers from the traditionalist approach as discussed above and 
the fact that the proceduralist approach would create unfairness towards stakeholders creates 
a form of limitation on both theoretical schools’ perspectives on the role of insolvency law and 
how insolvency law ought to be applied during corporate insolvencies.  This form of limitation 
may arguably be remedied through interpretation, that is, by adopting Ronald Dworkin’s 
interpretative approach to law as posited in his Interpretative Theory of Law.   
In the next section, I introduce Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law as an approach that 
would arguably, remedy the limitation in the theoretical schools’ perspectives on insolvency 
law. However, the application of Dworkin’s interpretative approach to US law will be discussed 
in chapter four while the application of Dworkin’s interpretative approach to UK law will be 
discussed in chapter six. 
2.4 The Interpretative Theory of Law – Ronald Dworkin 
There have existed many normative theories from various theoretical perspectives. However, 
in the field of legal theory and jurisprudence, there have existed mainly two dominant schools 
of thought. These are the natural law theorists and the legal positivists. The difference in these 
approaches is best illustrated by the famous debate between Professor Lon Fuller (on the 
natural law side) and H.L.A Hart (on the positivist legal side).105 However, it is worth noting 
that, since this debate, most legal theorists have continued to identify their theories as either 
being on the natural law side or the positivist legal side of this theoretical divide. 
There are mainly two particular versions of legal positivist ideals that natural law theorists 
argue against that have greatly contributed to this theoretical divide. Legal positivists see law 
as entirely comprising of rules.106 To them, law is the law as posited. Secondly, legal positivists, 
believe in the concept of judicial discretion. That is, during the course of their adjudication, if 
faced with legal questions (sometimes referred to as hard case thesis) that cannot be decided 
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on existing laws and precedents, judges must be able to draw on their discretion to fill the 
gap.107  
Among the most famous critics of these legal positivist ideals, is Professor Ronald Dworkin 
through his Interpretative Theory of Law.108 Through this theory, Dworkin is seen as creating a 
sophisticated theory of law that can be termed as an alternative to legal positivism and natural 
law theories.109 However, it should be noted that, occasionally Dworkin has referred to his 
theory as a natural law theory. Moreover, viewed from the lens of the famous Fuller - Hart 
debate, Dworkin’s theory seems to be on the natural law side of the theoretical divide. 
Throughout this theory, Dworkin bases his arguments on three main ideals, which if analysed, 
support his interpretative approach to law as they offer normative perspectives on how law 
ought to be seen and interpreted in a given legal system or society. These ideals comprise of 
the right answer thesis (that centres upon his dissent to judicial discretion and Judge Hercules), 
law as integrity and constructive interpretation (law as principles and rules).110  
I have chosen Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law in analysing the proceduralists’ and 
traditionalists’ perspectives on insolvency law as the theory offers a normative approach to 
how insolvency laws, policies or practices should be interpreted in a more principled approach. 
This is by drawing upon social ideals like moral obligation, value and purpose of the law rather 
than a static rule based approach as will be discussed in chapter four and chapter six. 
Dworkin’s Interpretative approach to law considers social factors, such as fairness, equality and 
justice that may be useful in analysing extant stakeholder interests during corporate insolvency 
proceedings. The Interpretative approach would be used as a balancing tool to remedy the 
limitations presented by both the traditionalist and proceduralist perspectives on corporate 
insolvency, such that the policy objectives of employment protection law and those of 
corporate rescue law may be balanced.   
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Through his Interpretative Theory of Law,111 Dworkin posits that law as practice and law as 
legal theory are best understood as a process of interpretation.112 Dworkin opines that 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation leads to a right answer to the question before 
the judge.113 Dworkin states that ‘every time a judge is confronted with a legal problem, that 
judge should construct a theory of what the law is, that is, a theory that must adequately fit 
the past relevant governmental actions, such as the policies underlying the passing of that law 
to make the law the best it can be.’114 Therefore, the judge must interpret the law in a manner 
that fits the legal context at hand because constructiveness in interpretation is the proper 
approach to artistic and literal interpretation as it coheres with the need to make the law the 
best it can be, carrying with it, the principles of moral value.115  
Where constructiveness and integrity are applied in the interpretation of laws, policies and 
practices, it makes the laws of that society more like a product of a single moral vision. After 
all, a judge who accepts the interpretative ideal of integrity decides cases by trying to find in 
some coherent set of principles, about peoples’ rights and duties. This is by drawing on the 
political and legal doctrines embedded in that community or field116 to find a unique right 
answer to the legal question before him. This is opposed to a judge using his discretion to fill 
the gap – a legal positivist notion that Dworkin greatly criticises.  
Through his right answer thesis,117 Dworkin claims that all or almost all legal questions have a 
unique right answer, even the hardest of cases. To achieve that unique right answer, Dworkin 
devises the idea of a model judge in Hercules who is seen as super judge that can find an 
answer to every legal question before him.118 
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However, the idea of Hercules has been seen as one of the most controversial propositions by 
Dworkin in his writings on legal theory and has therefore attracted more criticism.119 Among 
the criticisms is the question as to whether such a judge may ever exist in reality and execute 
the duties put before him diligently as Dworkin posits. Criticisms put aside, the idea of judge 
Hercules may be useful in the quest for novel interpretation of laws and policies in our society. 
This is, especially, where there are no existing legal precedents from which a judge and other 
legal practitioners may seek guidance and direction. Dworkin’s interpretative approach can 
provide more substance from traditionalist approaches and proceduralist perspectives on 
insolvency law as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters in this thesis. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be submitted that the tension between corporate rescue policy objectives 
inherent in insolvency laws and employment protection policy objectives inherent in 
employment laws both in the US and the UK has existed for decades. This tension is to a large 
extent, influenced by the traditionalist and proceduralist perspectives and ideologies on what 
the role or ultimate aim of insolvency is or ought to be in a legal system. This is because these 
theoretical perspectives influence the policies and practices underlying the passing of the law 
that govern the debtor-creditor relationships during corporate insolvency.  This tension further 
transcends into judicial interpretation and application of the law during corporate insolvency 
proceedings as shall be discussed in chapter four (for the US) and chapter six (for the UK). 
In the US, the tension between provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that seek to support 
bankruptcy reorganisation120 and the provisions in labour laws that seek to protect employees 
and their rights during corporate insolvency121 has not gone unnoticed.122 In the UK, the 
tension between corporate rescue objectives within the IA 1986 and employment protection 
                                                          
119 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) Postscript, at 248, 249; David Plunkett 
and Timothy Sundell, ‘Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes’ (2013) 19 Legal Theory 242. 
120 See generally, provisions such as s.362, s.363, s.1113, s.1114 among other provisions. These provisions are 
broadly discussed in chapter 3 (discussing general US bankruptcy law). 
121 For example, see, NLRA (1935) s.8 (a) (5) and s.8 (a) (1). 
122 See for example, Clyde W. Summers, ‘The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and the 
Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1082, 
1085; Christopher D. Cameron, “How ‘Necessary’ Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate 
of Collective Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section 1113” (1994) 34 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 841, 869; S.F. Befort, ‘Labour and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment’ (2001) 43 B. C. L Rev 460, 355-375. 
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policy objectives of ERA 1996 and TUPE provisions, has also attracted varied debates.123 
However, despite the existence of the tension between the two policies’ objectives, and the 
various debates around this notion, neither of the theoretical schools’ perspectives arguably 
prescribe a satisfactory solution to this tension.  Therefore, a remedy is yet to be established 
that would remedy this tension and balance both policies’ objectives such that both policies’ 
objectives may be pursued simultaneously.  
As discussed above, it is the notion that while traditionalists identify factors that should be 
taken into account during corporate insolvency, they do not say how these factors ought to be 
applied. The proceduralists on the other hand, provide clear answers to the factors to be taken 
into account during corporate insolvency, however, these perspectives if applied to 
insolvencies, would cause unfair outcomes for all stakeholders with interests in the debtor 
company. There is therefore, a lack of clear answers from the traditionalists and a degree of 
potential unfairness in the proceduralist perspectives which present a form of limitation on the 
adoption and application of both theoretical schools’ perspectives to corporate insolvencies.  
This is the form of limitation that Dworkin’s Interpretative theory of law, if adopted, may 
remedy such that a fair and balanced approach is adopted. Otherwise, without a balanced 
interpretative approach, judges may continue to give inconsistent decisions during corporate 
insolvency proceedings which may further exacerbate the tension between insolvency law 
policy objectives and employment law policy objectives. 
According to Dworkin, a judge guided by the legal principles and the policies underlying the 
passing of that law, would constructively achieve a right answer that would not only conform 
to fairness, but would also uphold the integrity of the law. This would arguably, help to remedy 
the tension between insolvency law policy objectives and employment law policy objectives. 
Arguably, it would also help remedy the lack of clarity from the traditionalist perspectives on 
corporate insolvency law and the potential unfairness in the proceduralist theoretical 
perspectives on corporate insolvency.  
                                                          
123 F. Toube and G. Todd, ‘The Proper Treatment of Employees’ Claims in Administration’ (2005) 18 Insolvency 
Intelligence 109; D. Pollard, ‘Personal Liabilities of an Insolvency Practitioner for Employee Discrimination Claims: 
Part 1’ (2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 145; V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves, (2012) 32(2) 
Legal Studies, 302 – 324; J. McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 ILJ 
364. 
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Chapter Three  
Employment Protection under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reorganisations 
in the United States  
 
 3.1 Introduction 
Bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings in the US are governed by Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code that was enacted in 1978 as Title 11 of the US Code.1 The US Bankruptcy 
Code prescribes a traditional Chapter 11 filing process through which outcomes, such as,  s.363 
business sale or a prepack plan may be achieved by a US debtor company during bankruptcy 
reorganisation proceedings.2      
The US has a federal system of government.3 Bankruptcy law is under the control of the federal 
government.4 However, while bankruptcy law and its structures are a matter of federal 
concern, and therefore guided by federal law, other areas of law, such as labour law and 
contract law that establish certain employment rights and protections, such as a right to a 
minimum wage, right to equal pay, et cetera, are state law and are covered by the Commerce 
Clause,5 not the bankruptcy law.  
 
The Commerce Clause affords the federal government duty to regulate business activities 
conducted at state level across the US.  Although the diffusion of power between federal and 
state jurisdictions has had the effect that some labour law statutes, such as the National Labour 
Relations Act (NLRA) 19356 are federal laws, labour law in the US is not the subject of federal 
jurisdiction. It is the subject of state jurisdiction.  
                                                          
1 11 U.S.C. ss. 101 – 1330 (2012) Enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 (Pub. L. No.95 – 598, 92 Stat. 2549). 
2 These Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisation routes are discussed in chapter one above at 1.2. 
3 M H. Redish, ‘Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. US and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require 
State Law Legislation’ (1993) 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 593, 604. 
4 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the US Constitution affords the US Congress with power to establish a uniform 
rule on naturalisation and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the US. 
5 Article 1, Section 8 of the Preamble to the US Constitution. 
6 29 U.S.C. ss.151 – 169 (2017) (hereafter NLRA). Enacted by the 74th United States Congress on July 6 1935, Pub. 
L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 to create a National Labor Relations Board and to regulate labour disputes between 
employers and employees that may burden or obstruct interstate and foreign commerce. This statute is also 
known as the Wagner Act. 
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The Bankruptcy Code was enacted by the US Congress on a federal level to regulate the debtor-
creditor relationships during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. However, although the 
Bankruptcy Code seeks to regulate these relationships, it does not create these relationships. 
It is the non-bankruptcy laws, at state level, such as contract law and labour law that create 
these relationships.7   
Consequently, bankruptcy creates tensions between state law and federal law provisions on 
employee protection and bankruptcy reorganisations. This tension is reflected in the level of 
protection that both federal law and state law afford employees during bankruptcy 
reorganisations.8 For instance, employment protection concerns that arise out of bankruptcy 
but are beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Code may create tensions between state law 
provisions and federal law provisions mandating employment protection during bankruptcy 
reorganisations.  
Substantive provision in state labour laws, such as provisions defining what constitutes a right, 
an interest, or benefit to an employee that are not specifically defined or established by the 
Bankruptcy Code but covered and well controlled by state laws and state courts may be 
affected by federal bankruptcy laws, such as the Bankruptcy Code.9 This is because, in certain 
instances, provisions of the Bankruptcy Code make references that invoke state laws to 
determine whether certain debtor-creditor arrangements were breached pre-bankruptcy.10 
However, a majority of the provisions in the Bankruptcy Code override state law11 under the 
jurisprudence of the Supremacy Clause in the US Constitution.12 
                                                          
7 Daniel A. Austin, ‘Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Law”’, (2012) 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1081, 1168.  
8 Thomas E. Plank, ‘Bankruptcy and Federalism’ (2002) 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1063. 
9 See, Ralph Brubacker, ‘The Erie Doctrine, Code Common Law, and Choice–of–Law Rules in Bankruptcy (Part 1)’ 
Bankr. L. Letter Online (Thompson Reuters) at 4. (June 2012). 
10 For example, 11 U.S.C. s.365(C). 
11 See for example, Bankruptcy Code provisions such as; 11 U.S.C. s. 362 – mandating moratoria on creditor actions 
against the debtor, after filing for bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C s.365 – allowing a debtor to assume or reject executory 
contracts upon bankruptcy filing, 11 U.S.C. s.1113 – allowing a debtor to assume or reject collectively bargained 
agreements, et cetera. The provision if invoked, would override any state law provisions that arise out of contract 
law and labour law bestowed upon stakeholders by state law. This issue is further discussed at 3.4 below under 
Delaware state laws’ employee protection provisions. 
12 The Supremacy Clause is enshrined in Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the US Constitution. This clause establishes 
federal law supremacy over state law. It provides that the federal constitution and federal laws of the US take 
precedence over state constitutions and state laws. 
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This chapter examines the position and treatment of employees’ rights and interests during 
bankruptcy reorganisations under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Analysis is made 
from the social and economic perspectives, of the need to give struggling businesses a chance 
to reorganise their financial affairs and the drive for employment protection and continuity 
during bankruptcy reorganisations.  
Labour union movement and collective bargaining agreements, as the two most effective 
forms of employee protection in the US private labour sector, will be analysed. Analysis of how 
these two forms of employee protection are affected by bankruptcy reorganisations will be 
undertaken. The non-uniform application of employee protection laws and policies to all 
employees in the private sector workforce in the US during bankruptcy reorganisation is also 
examined. The social policy and economic underpinnings that are mainly created by different 
ideological and entrepreneurial culture and perspectives within the US Bankruptcy institution 
will be discussed.  
This chapter also examines the impact of the federal – state law division under the US system 
of governance and its impact on the treatment of employee interests during bankruptcy 
reorganisations. The diffusion of power between state and federal jurisdictions that dictates 
the way stakeholder interests, such as those of employees, are handled during bankruptcy 
reorganisations in the US is analysed. The supremacy of federal law over state law provides an 
analytical frame, through which social and economic policy issues that affect the debtor – 
creditor relationships during bankruptcy reorganisations are analysed in this chapter.  
3.2 The US Social Policy:  
Employment at Will, Collective Bargaining and Labour Union Movement 
The term ‘social policy’ may be termed as an approach through which social aspirations, such 
as income, wealth, infrastructure, security (in terms of protection to the vulnerable or those 
who cannot defend themselves) et cetera are distributed and monitored in a state or society.13  
In the US, the employment relationship in the private labour sector which is arguably, the main 
source of social income and livelihood is mainly dominated by the employment-at-will 
practice.14 The term ‘employment at will’ is a term used in US labour law contractual 
                                                          
13 Bryan Warde, Inequality in U.S Social Policy – An Historical Analysis, (New York, Routledge 2016). 
14 Stephen F. Befort, ‘Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment’ 
(2001) 43 B C L Rev. 351, 460. 
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relationships to refer to an employment relationship under which an employer possesses the 
legal authority to determine unilaterally the terms of an employment relationship.  
The ‘employment at will’ practice does not only allow employers to hire and fire employees at 
will, but is also a justified practice arising from the mutual freedom in the employment 
relationship. This is because as well as employers having the power to hire and fire employees 
at will, employees can also terminate their jobs at will at any time. However, these mutual 
powers can work to the disadvantage of employees, as the employment-at-will practice allows 
the imbalance in the bargaining powers between employers and employees to operate without 
restriction which in turn, creates a lack of uniform protection to all employees in the private 
sector workforce.15  
With the exception of only a few exceptionally talented and skilled employees who may be 
able to negotiate certain provisions of their employment contracts with their employers and 
employees who are members of labour union who can acquire union representation, a 
majority of employees rely on their employers for the continuity of employment.16     
The main form of protection to employees in the private sector workforce in the US is through 
collective bargaining and the labour union movement as discussed below at 3.2.1. Statutory 
protection against employee discharge is substantially low. The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (ULC) adopted The Model Employment Termination Act 
(META) in 199117 as a measure to remedy the imbalance between employers’ and employees’ 
concerns in an equitable manner within the US upstream labour market.  
This statute was to regulate issues that may affect the employment relationship, such as unfair 
dismissals (discharge), and employment security and continuity. However, since its enactment, 
the only US state that has adopted it is the US state of Delaware, which is a further indication 
                                                          
15 C. W Summer, ‘The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and 
Employment at Will’ (1984) 52(6) Fordham L. Rev. 1082; Jennifer L. L. Gant, ‘Studies in Convergence? Post-Crisis 
Effects on Corporate Rescue and the Influence of Social Policy: The EU and the US’ (2006) 25 Int. Insolv. Rev.72 - 
96. 
16 J Berry, ‘Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Have on Employees of the Debtor 
and Why Do These Affects Drive Companies to Bankruptcy?’ (2012) Social Sciences Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139062> (accessed 10 February 2016.) 
17 Available at <http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Employment%20Termination/META_final_91.pdf> 
(accessed February 2017). 
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of the relaxed approach from several US states to adopting uniform laws that would enhance 
employment protection.18  
There have been some legislative attempts by the US Congress to address the employment at 
will culture within the US. For example, the National Labour Relations Act (1935)19 mandates 
collective bargaining rights between employers and employees. The statute makes it an unfair 
labour practice for employers to fail to comply with the collective bargaining requirements.20 
The Fair Labour Standards Act (1994)21 mandates the minimum wage and the forty-hour 
working week. The Genetic Information and Non-Discrimination Act 200822 mandates a 
prohibition on discrimination based on genetic information in relation to health insurance and 
employment, et cetera. However, despite the legislative attempts above to curb the 
employment at will culture, it is still in place and it is still a widely accepted practice within the 
US private sector labour market.23 
3.2.1 Collective Bargaining and Labour Union Movement  
Employer power plays a significant role in the way employment relationships are handled in 
the US. Collective bargaining also plays an important role in some instances in balancing and 
moderating the employer - employee relationship through a representational approach. 
Collective bargaining is a means of ensuring that employee participation centres on the duty 
to consult in good faith and in the performance of mutual obligations.24 However, the most 
significant role of a collective bargaining agreement ‘CBA’ is the provision that an employee 
who is part of a CBA may not be discharged by the employer, except for ‘just cause’.25  
                                                          
18 Stephen F. Befort, ‘Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment’ 
(2001) 43 B C L Rev. 351, 460. 
19 29 U.S.C ss. 151 – 169 (1935). 
20 Especially, under NLRA (1935), s.8 (a) (5) and s.158 respectively. 
21 29 U.S.C ss. 201 – 209 (1994). 
22 42 U.S.C. ss.110 -233, (2008) (Pub. L. 110 -233, 122 Stat. 881). 
23 Stephen F. Befort, ‘Labor Law and the Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter 
Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation’ (1987) Wis. L. Rev. 67, 101. 
24 Clyde W. Summers, ‘The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation 
and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1082, 1085. 
25 ‘Just cause’ dismissal is where an employer dismisses an employee without fulfilling the statutory dismissal 
requirements, such as providing reasonable notice of termination or payment in lieu of notice to the employee.   
For a ‘just cause’ dismissal, the employer has to prove that an employee has done something contrary to his or 
her employment contract capable of undermining the employment relationship, such as an employee breaching 
a key term of an employment contract, insolence or insubordination, conflict of interest, et cetera.  
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Moreover, an employee covered by a CBA is exempt from the operation of the common law 
rule on employee discharge by the employer. This common law rule stipulates that employers 
may discharge their employees at will, for good cause, no cause, or even for a cause morally 
wrong, without being held guilty of a legal wrong.26 This old common law rule has however, 
been somehow mitigated by the presence of the labour union movement in the US although 
the percentage of employees under labour union membership has been steadily declining year 
on year since 1980 when labour union statistics were first reported. This particular trend is 
analysed below at 3.2.2. 
The National Labour Relations Act (NLRA)27 grants employees the right to bargain collectively 
over wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.28 Failure by the 
employer to engage in collective bargaining arrangements (CBA) with respective unions or 
representatives of its employees in good faith is considered an unfair labour practice.29   
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code further protects this provision by making it difficult for the 
employer to modify or reject agreed CBAs, in s.1113.30 This provision imposes both procedural 
and substantive conditions that a debtor employer has to navigate, before rejecting or 
modifying a CBA. The provision requires the debtor to make proposals to the union that 
provide for necessary modifications before initiating negotiations to either modify or reject a 
CBA. The employer also has to ensure that all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are 
treated fairly and equitably.31  
Labour unions empower employees through collective actions, providing a voice and platform 
through which their employer can listen to their concerns and make endeavours to address 
those concerns.32 As a result, employees who are part of labour unions tend to enjoy better 
                                                          
26 Per the ruling in Payne v. Western & A.R.R. 81 Tenn. 507, 519 – 20 (1884); Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn.527, 
179 S.W 134 (1915). 
27 29 U.S.C. ss.151 – 169 (2017) Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449.  
28 29 U.S.C. s.158 (d). 
29 29 U.S.C. ss.8 (a) (5) and 158(a)(5). 
30 11 U.S.C s.1113. 
31 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (I) (A). However, see, Christopher D. Cameron, ‘How “Necessary” Became the Mother of 
Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate of Collective Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of 
Bankruptcy Code Section 1113’ (1994) 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 841, 869. 
32 M. Finkin, ‘Directions in Labor Law – Concerns for the Dignity of the Worker: Revisionism in Labor Law’ (1984) 
43 Md. L. Rev. 23. 
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wages, benefits and usually have a better degree of representation over non-unionised 
employees in the US private work sector.33 
However, it is worth noting that, although these legislative provisions recognise the need to 
give employees a voice and a right to participate in issues pertaining to their employment 
relationships with their employer, the threat employees face as a result of Chapter 11 
reorganisations remains huge and plays a big role in the balancing of the employee – employer 
relationships during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings.  
It is the concern that the framework within which unions work with respective employers limits 
the level of input from unions as they are excluded from meaningful decision making 
processes. These include for example, corporate investment decisions and those regarding the 
future direction of the employer’s business which may affect member employees’ interests.34 
The law affords the employer broader corporate decision making powers while employees, 
apart from a few in higher management positions, and their unions are not afforded the same 
participation rights in this respect.  
This may affect the union’s ability to protect their members’ employment related interests, as 
they may find it difficult to deal with issues, such as the ever changing labour market, capital 
mobility and corporate structural changes, especially, in situations where, the employer has 
other affiliates in other US states or international subsidiaries.35  
Where this is the case, it further shifts the balance of power on the side of the employer and 
against the union and its employee members, which is a shift away from the notion of industrial 
democracy, that the NLRA sought to implement as a central rationale for the protection of 
employees and the regulation of the employer – employee relationships in general.36 
                                                          
33 See for example, L. Mishel & M. Walters, ‘How Unions Help All Workers’ Economic Policy Institute (2003) at < 
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/> (accessed 15 January 2017).  
34 J. Melone, ‘Union Blues: Why Collective Bargaining Agreements that are Neither Rejected nor Modified 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1113 are Not Granted Administrative Expense Priority in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Reorganization by S. 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code’ (2006) 32 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 429, 442. 
35 D. Bordewieck and V. Countryman, ‘The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors’ 
(1983) 57 Am. Bankr. L. J. 293, 294; D. Keating, ‘The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
Bankruptcy’ (1994) 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 526. 
36 A. Cox, ‘The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1407; M. West, ‘Life After Bildisco: Section 
1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1986) 47 Ohio St. L. J. 65, 103. 
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3.2.2 The Diminishing Role of Labour Union Movement in the US 
An employer who is under a collective agreement with its employees’ union is restrained from 
making alterations to the terms and conditions of its employees’ contracts of employment 
without first negotiating with the relevant union.37 The employer is also restrained from 
unilaterally making alterations to specific terms of an already existing collective bargaining 
agreement38 without the respective union’s consent. This is a move to afford employees a 
voice through representation to avoid arbitrary managerial decisions that may infringe on 
employees’ rights.  
On occasion, labour unions have negotiated successfully for provisions restricting employee 
dismissals to those for just cause. Successor and assignment clauses have also been negotiated 
successfully, requiring the new buyer or successor employer to adopt collective bargaining 
agreements following a business transfer.39 However, labour unions still face challenges in that 
they lack power to influence or effect the transfer or business sale. This is because the decision 
to sell or transfer the business is termed as a permissible subject of bargaining out of the union 
and their member employees’ control.40  The employer has exclusive choice as to whom to sell 
and when to sell or transfer the business. The employer is only required to bargain with unions 
and employees on how employee interests are to be treated where jobs are to be terminated.   
Moreover, the success of the labour union movement in the US, even in the former 
strongholds, such as in the Steel, Aircraft and Automobile industries, has substantially declined 
over the years. A 2017 Economic News Release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States 
Department of Labor, on 26 January 2017 reported that the percentage of wage and salary 
workers that were members of unions in 2016 was at 10.7 percent, down 0.4 percent from the 
overall membership in 2016.41  
In 1980 when these statistics were first published, the percentage of unionised workers was at 
20 percent. Even this represents a proportionately low level of union representation which 
                                                          
37 See NLRA s.158 (a) (5). 
38 See, NLRA s.158 (d). 
39 See cases, such as John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 376, U.S. 543 (1963); NLRB v Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 406 
U.S. 272 (1972); Fall River Dyeing & Fishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
40 G M. Roberts, ‘Bankruptcy and the Union’s Bargain: Equitable Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements’ 
(1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1015, 1047; B A. Ceccotti, ‘Lost in Transformation: The Disappearance of Labor Policies in 
Applying Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code’ (2007) 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 415, 431. 
41 Full report / news release, available at, <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm> (accessed 10 
March 2016). 
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leaves a majority of employees lacking protection. This has arguably, weakened the political 
influence in both advocacy and representation to its members. The decline may be attributed 
to the changing nature of the US market economy, with both capital mobility and technological 
advancement having shaped and changed the private sector labour industry.42  
For example, in the 1970s and the 1980s, mobility of capital and labour was very limited. 
Technology was still in its early stages of influence. Therefore, if an employer made irrational 
proposals to a labour union and member employees to modify or reject collectively bargained 
agreements and those proposals were rejected by the union, the employer would be inclined 
to consider those proposals. Threats of potential strike actions or walkouts by union employees 
would be costly to that employer. An employer would not easily obtain immediate substitute 
labour providers to continue running the business during the standoff period. 
However, today, labour and capital mobility is very fast-paced due to technological 
advancements. Moreover, companies may now have subsidiaries and affiliates in other US 
states which may provide substitute labour cover at shorter notice periods. In addition to the 
above, some employers incorporate mobility clauses43 in labour contracts with terms and 
conditions that give them the leverage to change them, as per the need of the service.44 
Moreover, the policy underpinnings of the need to provide unionised employees with a voice 
through union representation in the NLRA, have on occasion, been found to be in conflict with 
the provision of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. It is the notion that during the build up to 
the confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, a debtor may assume or reject an existing 
CBA, with court approval45 provided the debtor employer shows that a rejection of that CBA is 
in the best interests of bankruptcy estate.46 This is a move that conflicts with the ethos of s.158 
                                                          
42 D. Keating, ‘The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy’ (1994) 35 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 503, 526. Stephen F. Befort, ‘Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment’ (2001) 43 B. C. L. Rev 351, 460.  
43 ‘Mobility Clauses’ are terms or conditions that may be incorporated into an employment contract by an 
employer affording that employer power and flexibility to change employees’ place of work. This is, especially, 
where the employer has not identified a specific place as the principal place of work in the employees’ terms and 
condition of employment. See cases, such as Horst v High Tables Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ. 2000; Home Office v Evans 
[2007] EWCA Civ. 1089 (CA). 
44 Laura N. Coordes, ‘The Geography of Bankruptcy’ (2015) 68 Vand. L. Rev. 381- 439.  
45 11 U.S.C. s.365 (a). 
46 See cases, such as In re Del Grosso, 115 B.R 136, 138 (Bankr. N.D 111 1990); In re Tres – Ark Inc., 09 -12589 
(Bankr. W.D Texas 2012). 
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(a) of the NLRA47 in its mandate for negotiation and representation for employees through 
collective bargaining.  
3.2.3 A Paradigmatic Shift in Collective Bargaining: NLRB v Bildisco & Bildisco 
The influence of labour union movement and collective bargaining movement as a concerted 
model of employee protection in the US was largely affected by employers’ ability to reject 
collective bargaining agreements. The question of an employer’s ability to reject or assume a 
CBA was at the central point of deliberation in the case of NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.48 The 
court in this case had to decide whether a CBA like any other contract of the debtor, could be 
rejected by the debtor, by showing that its rejection would be to the benefit of the bankruptcy 
estate.   
The respondent debtor (Bildisco), a building supplies distributor, filed a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy for reorganisation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and was subsequently 
authorised by the bankruptcy court to operate the business on a debtor-in-possession basis in 
1980. At the time the petition was filed, approximately forty-five percent of Bildisco’s workers 
were represented by the Local 408 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union). Bildisco had negotiated a three - year 
collective bargaining agreement that was to expire in April 1982. The CBA expressly provided 
that it was binding on the parties and their successors even though bankruptcy should 
supervene.    
By early 1980, Bildisco had failed to meet some of its obligations under the CBA including the 
payment of health and pension benefits and the remittance to the Union, of the dues collected. 
Bildisco had also refused to pay wage increases called for in the agreement by the Union. 
Bildisco then filed a motion with the bankruptcy court requesting permission to reject the CBA 
on the ground that rejection of the CBA would save the company approximately $100,000 that 
was granted in 1981.   
The Union filed unfair labour practice charges with the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB). 
The NLRB found that Bildisco had violated ss. 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the (NLRA 1935) by 
                                                          
47 This provision provides that ‘[I]t shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. For full provisions under 
s.158 (a), please see, NLRA (1935), s.158 (a) (1) – (5).   
48 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984) (Hereafter Bildisco). 
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unilaterally changing the terms of the CBA and by refusing to negotiate with the Union. The 
NLRB ordered Bildisco to make the pension and health contributions, and to remit dues to the 
Union and petitioned the Court to enforce its order. The Court rejected NLRB’s request to 
enforce its order and held that a collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract 
subject to rejection by a debtor-in-possession under s. 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.49 
The decision by the Court was that a debtor can reject a CBA only in circumstances where the 
court finds that ‘equities balance in favour of rejecting such a contract.’50 In addition, the Court 
also held that a debtor can unilaterally alter the terms of a collectively bargained agreement 
during the interim period that runs between the period of filing of the bankruptcy petition, and 
the time during which the order authorising rejection is entered.51  
However, the Court recognised the fact that, as a result of this decision, the incentive to 
bargain collectively on the side of the employees and their unions may be lost, which might 
lead to increased abuse of employees’ rights to bargain collectively and to be represented. 
Consequently, the Court placed a pre-condition that, for the debtor employer to benefit from 
the above provisions, and therefore, reject a CBA, or make changes to its specific provisions, 
that employer should have made reasonable efforts to renegotiate the terms and conditions 
contested with unions. The employer must also show that such efforts of renegotiation are not 
likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory outcome before rejecting that CBA effectively.52  
However, it may be argued that this pre-condition may be vulnerable to misinterpretation and 
application by the debtor employer. This is because it affords a certain degree of indirect 
advantage to the debtor employer. The debtor employer has an upper hand in determining 
the likelihood of the ongoing negotiations with the union to produce a satisfactory outcome.53 
                                                          
49 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984), at [516]. 
50 Ibid, at [526]. 
51 Ibid, at [532], [533]. 
52 Ibid, at [525], [526]. 
53 M. West, ‘Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1986) 47 Ohio St. L. J. 65, 
103; Ann J. McClain, ‘Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements: Labor Loses Again’ (1991) 80 Geo. L. J. 191, 206; William Bodoh & Beth Buchanan, ‘The Future of 
Labour Through the Prism of Bankruptcy: Ignored Consequences – The Conflicting Policies of Labor Law and 
Business Reorganization and Its Impact on Organized Labor’ (2007) 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 395. 
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This is to the advantage of the debtor employer, in that the length (in terms of duration) and 
mode of negotiation may make it difficult for the unions to reach a satisfactory outcome.54 
Moreover, the debtor employer has an added advantage in that, during the negotiation to 
modify or reject a CBA, a court may authorise interim alterations to employees’ benefits, such 
as wages and other employment related benefits, where doing so is essential to continuation 
of the debtor employer’s business.  The court may also authorise interim alteration to a CBA 
where doing so would help prevent irreparable damage to the bankruptcy estate.55 Although 
this may turn out to be advantageous to employees in the long run where, the survival of the 
bankruptcy estate preserves jobs and ensure continuity of employment, the overall effect still 
remains that the debtor employer retains an upper hand over the union and its employee 
members whenever these provisions are applied.56   
3.2.4 Legislative Response Post-Bildisco: Failure in Ascendancy?   
As a form of mitigating the effect originating from the Bildisco decision above, the US Congress 
enacted s.1113 of the Bankruptcy Code,57 as a move that would restrict the debtor’s ability to 
reject or modify collective agreements strategically. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bildisco, there were numerous bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings that mainly targeted 
collective bargaining agreements and labour costs.58  
This was preceded by a tight split of a five-to-four majority in the case of Bildisco with the 
dissenting judges giving opinions that raised some concerns about the majority ruling.  Most 
notably, the dissenting judges (Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) led by Justice Brennan 
expressed dissatisfaction by the majority’s opinion led by Justice Rehnquist that the power by 
the employer to reject or modify CBAs included the power to reject or modify employment 
contract terms and conditions under s.365 immediately upon filing for bankruptcy without 
bargaining with the labour union.59  
                                                          
54 Clyde W. Summers, ‘The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation 
and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52 (6) Fordham L. Rev. 1082, 1085. 
55 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (e). 
56 For example, see In re WorldCom Inc., 346 F. 2d 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2004).  
57 11 U.S.C. s.1113.  
58 See for example, In re Chateaugay Corp., 64 B.R 990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Continental Airlines, 64 B.R. 
858 (Bankr. S.D Texas 1984); In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 269 (Bankr. Okl. 1983). 
59 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984), at [528 - 29]. 
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Justice Rehnquist was of the opinion that: 
“…[t]he debtor was empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with 
its contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the 
bankruptcy filing”60 
However, Justice Brennan was of the opinion that: 
 ‘…[f]or both policies of bankruptcy (allowing rejection or modification of CBA 
by the employer) and the NLRA (1935) (of ensuring the continuation of 
collective bargaining) in the interim period between filing for bankruptcy and 
rejection, the requirement on the debtor (DIP) under the NLRA (1935) s.8 (d) 
‘to bargain collectively and to confer in good faith with employees in respect 
to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment or the 
negotiation of an agreement or any questions arising their under’ should 
remain effective and enforceable on the DIP until rejection is approved by the 
bankruptcy court.’61 
However, the Supreme Court was of the view that from the filing of the bankruptcy petition 
until formal acceptance, a CBA is not an enforceable contract. The requirement on the debtor 
employer under s.8 (d) of the NLRA 1935 would be in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s 
overall objective of allowing a DIP some flexibility and breathing space.62 Therefore, it would 
undermine the debtor’s rejection or modification rights.63 
The difference in opinions by the Supreme Court judges attracted both Congressional and 
Senate debates in relation to the effects that the Bildisco ruling was having on collective 
bargaining and labour union movement during bankruptcy reorganisations in the US. For 
example, in Congress, Congressman Peter Rodino Jr. introduced a bill to amend title 11 of the 
United States Code to clarify the circumstances under which collective bargaining agreements 
may be rejected in cases under Chapter 11 of such title and for other purposes.64  
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This bill lobbied for a stringent standard to be applied to CBA rejection cases and a prohibition 
on unilateral modification of CBAs. Rodino’s bill was incorporated into the Omnibus Bankruptcy 
Bill (H.R. 5174)65 that was later passed into legislation by the 98th US Congress as the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 1984.66 
In the Senate, Senator James Strom Thurmond introduced a bill that required a thirty days’ 
notice by the debtor to labour unions before unilateral modifications to CBAs and the balancing 
of equities test.67 Senator Thurmond’s bill was followed by Senator Robert William Parkwood 
tabling a bill before the Senate with proposals to permit CBA rejection where the debtor had 
shown that minimum modification to employees’ benefits and protection would also permit 
the reorganisation of the debtor taking into consideration the sacrifices to be made by all 
affected parties.68 However, the debates continued in both Congress and Senate on the subject 
of collective bargaining post Bildisco.69 
It should be noted that at the time the Supreme Court gave its opinion in Bildisco, the US 
Congress was undergoing a period of ‘jurisdictional crisis’ following the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Corporation.70 The Supreme Court 
had held in this case that the 1978 Congressional jurisdiction grant to bankruptcy courts was 
unconstitutional as the bankruptcy judges created by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code were not 
article III judges who could exercise the broad jurisdiction created by the Bankruptcy Code.  
However, in order to reach the agreement on the treatment of collective bargaining post 
Bildisco, both Congress and Senate reached a general consensus by adopting an amendment 
bill H.R. 517471 on the jurisdictional amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, a joint 
House of Congress and Senate conference committee was held on 28 June 1984 and a 
compromise was passed by the US Congress on 29 June 1984 and signed into legislation by the 
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President on 10 July 1984 as the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 198472 
that led to the enactment of s.1113 to the bankruptcy Code. 
Section 1113(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code provides that: 
 ‘[T]he debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under 
the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by 
subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act, may 
assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with 
the provisions of this section.’ 
This provision imposes both procedural and substantive conditions that a debtor has to 
navigate, before rejecting or modifying a CBA. The provision requires the debtor company to 
make proposals to the union that provide for necessary modifications before initiating 
negotiations and to ensure that all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are treated 
fairly and equitably.73 
This provision provides a protective shield to employees as it imposes a parallel obligation on 
the debtor employer to bargain in good faith like the obligation imposed under s.158 of the 
NLRA.74 To employees, this may be viewed as an elevation to the participation and consultation 
rights on the issues that may affect their interests and benefits during bankruptcy 
reorganisations. This is because for employees and their unions to fully evaluate the proposals 
on offer from the debtor employer, the employer would have to supply them with information 
that is relevant enough for them to make informed decisions. The information must also be 
conferred in good faith in order to reach mutually satisfactory decisions.75  
In addition to the above, the employees’ authorised unions or representatives may reject such 
proposals, but rejection must be born out of good causes.76 Otherwise, the court may 
authorise a rejection of a CBA where it is satisfied that employees or representative unions 
                                                          
72 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act (1984) (Pub. L. No. 98 – 353, 98 Stat. 333, 392 (1984). 
73 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (I) (A). 
74 Particularly, see, NLRA (1935), s.158 (a) (1) – (5). 
75 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (2). 
76 11 U.S.C. s.1113(c)(2). 
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have rejected the proposals without good cause or where, the balance of equities favours 
rejection.77  
However, despite the legislative attempts to mitigate the effects of Bildisco above, employee 
protection through labour union movement and collective bargaining has not gained the 
balance that the US Congress sought to implement through the enactment of s.1113. This is 
because the provisions in s.1113 protect unionised employees as opposed to non-unionised 
employees who are not parties to CBAs. This leaves non-unionised employees with no formal 
legislative protection of s.1113 and therefore, vulnerable to unfair and unjustifiable 
modifications to wages, benefits, and other employment related interests.78  
Moreover, as will be discussed in chapter four at 4.3, the interpretation and application of 
s.1113 by the bankruptcy courts during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings may not have 
helped to fulfil the protective mandate of s.1113 that the US Congress envisaged.79 This is 
because the judicial approaches to interpreting and applying s.1113 have led to inconsistent 
judgments from different bankruptcy courts, which has arguably caused further confusion and 
challenges within the bankruptcy institution in the US.  
3.2.5 Proposals for Reform of s.1113: The American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) 
Recommendations 
In 2012, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) commissioned a study into the operation of 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and provided a report and recommendations for reform 
of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code in March 2013.80 Among the major areas explored 
by the ABI Commission, and therefore, part of the recommendations for reform in the ABI 
report was the operation of s.1113 of the US Bankruptcy Code during bankruptcy 
reorganisations proceedings in the US. 
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In its Report, the ABI Commission acknowledged that the use of s.1113 during bankruptcy 
reorganisation proceedings by the debtor to reject or modify a CBA creates disputes that can 
be time-consuming, emotionally charged and disruptive to employees who are critical to a 
company’s successful restructuring.81 On the same point, Stephen S. Mitchell, a retired US 
bankruptcy judge in his statement on the ABI Report referred to Chapter 11 as being largely 
about breaking economic promises such as collective bargaining agreements, pension plans 
and retiree health plans that have historically been judged of special importance in the interest 
of promoting the rehabilitation of financially troubled businesses.82  
The ABI Commission recommended that s.1113 should be amended to further the objectives 
of negotiation and consensual resolution underlying the collective bargaining process under 
s.1113.83 To achieve this, the ABI Report recommended that in addition to provisions in 
s.1113(b)(1),84 the trustee (DIP) should provide notice to the applicable labour organisation 
that modifications to the CBA are being proposed along with an initial proposal and description 
of the information to be made available for the labour organisation to evaluate the proposal.  
The trustee (DIP) should also file a notice of intent to initiate proceedings under s.1113 (b) and 
schedule an initial conference with the court regarding such proceedings.85  
With notice from the trustee and (served to the authorised employees’ representatives), the 
court would schedule a status conference with the trustee (DIP) and authorised 
representatives or labour organisation to review the notice and discuss the initial proposal, 
proposed information disclosure, timetable for conducting negotiations and to decide whether 
                                                          
81 ABI Report at [156]. 
82 See, Stephen S. Mitchell, ‘Statement on American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 
11’ at <http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/14mar2013/Stephen_Mitchell.pdf> (accessed 
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83 ABI Report at [156]. 
84 Section 1113(b)(1) provides that:  
Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of a collective bargaining 
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85 ABI Report at [156, 157]. 
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a mediator may be required to assist in the negotiations. These arrangements are aimed at 
facilitating consensual and mutually agreed modifications to the CBA between the trustee (DIP) 
and the labour organisation or representatives.  
In the absence of mutually consensual agreement between the trustee and labour organisation 
in the first conference, the court may schedule another conference for further negotiations 
and the trustee may also request for a case management process for a motion to reject or 
modify the CBA.86  
In view of these proposals, it may be submitted that the proposals aim to improve the industrial 
relations through negotiations between debtors and employees where s.1113 rejections to 
CBA are initiated. These recommendations, if adopted by the US Congress and changes made 
to the provisions under s.1113, a balance in bargaining power and control in the CBA rejection 
process may be achieved between the debtor and its employees.  
However, it may be noted that these recommendations are subject to certain limitations. The 
ABI Report recommended that the above recommendations should not be read to and 
intended to alter the current law under s.1113 (e).87  
Section 1113 (e) provides that: 
“(e) - If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in 
effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor’s business, or in order 
to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a 
hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, 
conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bargaining 
agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance 
with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim changes 
shall not render the application for rejection moot.” 
In this perspective, it may be argued that although the recommendations above if adopted by 
Congress and other policy makers would improve the CBA rejection process, the debtor would 
still have a broader scope and flexibility than employees in the CBA rejection process. By 
leaving the provisions under s.1113 (e) intact (not subject to reform proposals) the balance is 
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tipped toward augmenting the reorganisation prospects of the debtor rather than favouring 
employee protection.88  
The ABI Report however, made a recommendation that the trustee (DIP)’s rejection of the CBA 
be treated as a breach of such agreement.89 Where such rejection of the CBA is treated as a 
breach of the CBA agreement, authorised representatives or labour organisations may initiate 
claims on employees’ behalf for monitory damages arising from the breach of the CBA. 
However, the ABI Commission recommended that if such a breach occurred prior to the 
assumption of the CBA, claims arising out of it should be treated as a general unsecured claim 
and the damages arising out such breach are to be determined in accordance with non-
bankruptcy law and subject to mitigation.90 
It is therefore the contention that although the ABI Recommendations aim to improve the 
negotiation, participation and transparency imperatives in the employer-employee 
relationships during s.1113 CBA rejection proceedings that have been the subject of academic 
and judicial critical analysis for decades,91 it remains a moot point whether, if adopted and 
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code, these recommendations would improve the industrial 
relations between employers, employees and labour union movement in the US as originally 
sought by the NLRA (1935).  
3.2.6 Retiree Benefits Protection under Section 1114 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
Following the Bildisco92 decision that an employer may reject or modify executory contracts 
upon filing for bankruptcy, collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefits became 
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92 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984). The facts of this case, outcome, policy consideration that 
followed its outcome and the judicial and legislative response to the outcome are broadly analysed above at 3.2.3 
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increasingly targeted by debtors for strategic modification or rejection upon filing for 
bankruptcy as they were deemed to fall under executory contracts.93  
For example, in 1986, a Dallas – based Corporation, LTV Steel Corporation, filed for a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy and subsequently terminated the retiree benefits of 78,000 former LTV 
employees.94 This led to a strike by the union workers, attracting a strong reaction from the US 
Congress, which condemned the actions of LTV Steel Corp., by branding the termination 
‘irresponsible, unfair and unwelcome.’95 The US Congress followed their condemnation of 
LTV’s termination of retiree benefits by extending temporary retiree benefits to the former 
LTV employees and enacted the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act (RBBPA) (1998)96 
which became codified as section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code.97  
Retiree benefits under s.1114 are defined as:  
‘a payments made “to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or 
reimbursing payments for retired employees and their spouses and 
dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the 
event of sickness, accident, disability, or death” through fund established at 
least in part by debtor prior to filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy’.98 
The enactment of s.1114 provided additional protection in respect of retiree benefits during 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisations.99 This is because s.1114 mandates the continuation of 
retiree benefits by a corporation upon filing for bankruptcy and also limits a debtor from 
modifying retiree benefits except where such modifications are permitted by statute.100 The 
provisions under s.1114 state that:  
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‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the debtor in possession, or 
the trustee if one has been appointed under the provisions of this chapter 
(hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall 
timely pay and shall not modify any retiree benefits, except that – 
(A)- the court, on motion of the trustee or authorized representative, and after 
notice and a hearing, may order modification of such payments, pursuant to 
the provisions of subsections (g) and (h) of this section, or 
(B)- the trustee and the authorized representative of the recipients of those 
benefits may agree to modification of such payments, after which such 
benefits as modified shall continue to be paid by the trustee.’101 
From this provision, it may be submitted that s.1114 sets out to protect retirees from having 
their benefits modified upon their former employer filing for bankruptcy. Retirees are a 
particularly vulnerable class of creditors during Chapter 11 bankruptcy because a debtor may 
decide to modify or terminate retiree benefits based on economic pressures present in the 
bankruptcy context, yet retirees may lack a voice to protect their benefits.102 Retirees may rely 
on such benefits as a source of livelihood upon retirement and where such benefits are easily 
targeted by debtors to achieve their reorganisation plans, retirees’ livelihoods may be heavily 
impacted.103 
However, like the treatment of CBA modification and rejection processes under s.1113 during 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings (discussed above at 3.2 and in chapter four at 4.3), the 
protection to retiree benefits is not guaranteed by s.1114.  Retiree benefits may be either 
modified or rejected by a debtor upon fulfilling the procedural and substantive requirements 
under s.1114 (f).104 
Under s. 1114(e)(1)(A) and (B), a debtor may modify retiree benefits upon filing a request to 
the court and following hearing processes, a court may permit retiree benefits modification 
provided the debtor and retiree representatives agree to the modification of the retiree 
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benefits.105  However, the procedural and substantive requirements for modification of retiree 
benefits have to be exhausted. The debtor must initiate negotiation proposals with the retiree 
representatives, detailing the desired modifications of the retiree benefits and the proposals 
must be necessary to permit the reorganisation of the debtor.106  
In other words, the debtor must provide retiree representatives with sufficient information 
regarding the proposed modification of retiree benefits for the retiree representatives to make 
informed decisions.107 Otherwise, the court may grant modifications of the retiree benefits 
where retiree representatives fail to agree to the proposed modifications without good cause. 
Moreover, the court may also grant permission to the debtor where the court is satisfied that 
modification of retiree benefits is essential to the successful reorganisation imperatives of the 
debtor.108 
Therefore, it is contention that although the US Congress sought to afford retirees a chance to 
have their benefits protected from strategic modification by their former employers upon filing 
for bankruptcy, this protection may not be fully utilised by retirees as it would require time and 
money to challenge former employers where retiree benefits have been modified by the 
debtor.109  
Moreover, the judicial approach to s.1114 is still a point of concern in relation to jurisdictional 
imperatives. While some courts have accepted that s.1114 applies to all debtors in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings,110 a majority of courts are of the view that s.1114 does not apply to 
retiree benefits that can be terminated or modified unilaterally outside bankruptcy.111 In this 
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perspective, it may be submitted that the protection to retiree benefits under s.1114 that the 
US Congress sought to achieve is yet to be fully realised.  
3.3 Impact of Chapter 11 Reorganisations on Employee Interests  
The commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate.112 During 
bankruptcy reorganisations in the US, the main area of concern to employees is likely to centre 
on job security and whether they will be paid what they are owed. However, job security during 
bankruptcy reorganisations depends on the employer’s decision, subject to court approval, to 
either adopt or reject executory contracts such as collectively bargained agreements.113  
However, in the event that the company is liquidated and therefore, employment security is 
not guaranteed, the treatment of employee claims, such as for accrued wages and salaries, is 
cast into the spotlight. This is because the allocation of the company’s assets for the payment 
of unsecured claims of the debtor company on liquidation is based on statutory priorities.114   
Where assets of the debtor company are insufficient to pay in full all unsecured claims, it would 
mean that payments of unsecured claims will be dictated by their priority status. Pre-petition 
employee claims, such as claims for wages, salaries and commissions earned in the 180 days 
prior to bankruptcy filing that remain unpaid rank fourth in priority under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.115 Pre-petition pension and welfare benefit claims, such as a defined benefit 
plan claims also rank fourth in priority.116 
3.3.1 Pre-petition Employee Claims  
Employee pre-petition debts are benefits and interests that arise out of employee contractual 
arrangements with their employer that remain unpaid at the time when the debtor employer 
files for bankruptcy. These may include claims for wages, salaries and commissions that remain 
unpaid. Pension contributions arising out of pension plans, outstanding damage claims, such 
as for wrongful discharge arising in breach of employment contract, accrued welfare benefit 
                                                          
112 11 U.S.C. s.541 (a). 
113 See, 11 U.S.C. s. 365. 
114 11 U.S.C. s. 507(a) (3), (4) and (5). 
115 11 U.S.C. s.507 (a) (4) (A) and (B). However, wages and salaries, and sales commission claims (only where an 
employee worked as an independent contractor to the debtor company and 75 per cent of his earnings were 
earned as an independent contractor in the last twelve months prior to bankruptcy filing) are subject to a 
statutory limit of $10,000 per each individual employee as of February 2017.  
116 11 U.S.C. s. 507(a) (5) (A) and (B). Please note that pension income refers to retirement income while welfare 
benefits may include severance pay, training, medical, health, accident, death benefits, pre-paid legal services, et 
cetera. 
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claims for sick leave and holiday pay are among such claims. Some of these claims, such as 
claims for wages and salaries, take the form of direct compensation and therefore, are paid 
ahead of other claims subject to a statutory limit.117  
It may be noted that although the Bankruptcy Code accords some employee pre-petition 
claims with priority status, this priority protection only covers a small percentage of employees 
that are members of unions. As discussed above at 3.2, a significant majority of employees in 
the private sector workforce in the US are non-unionised.118  
In addition to the above, the priority statutory protection in s.507 (a) (3) and (4) of the 
Bankruptcy Code is not guaranteed. The protection is dependent on whether the debtor 
employer adopts or rejects employee contracts following the bankruptcy filing.119 This is 
because Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a debtor company power to free itself from 
pre-petition executory contractual agreements and liabilities by either amendment or 
rejection. These contracts include employment contracts and collective bargaining 
agreements. Trade and supply contractual agreements may also be affected.120  
If the debtor employer chooses to adopt employee contracts of employment, then 
employment protection and continuity may be maintained. This also comes with an inherent 
advantage in that it is a requirement on formal adoption of executory contracts that the debtor 
employer adopting such contracts cures any outstanding pre-petition defaults and payment of 
outstanding damages. As part of confirming a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, it is a 
requirement that such a plan provides for payment of priority claims as a pre-condition for a 
reorganisation plan confirmation.121  
However, in the event that employee contracts of employment are rejected, the debtor 
employer is under no obligation to honour claims for damages and other related claims 
immediately. They would be categorised as general unsecured claims which may not be paid 
until the time of formal distribution,122 which has no definitive timescale.  Although there have 
                                                          
117 11 U.S.C. s. 507(a) (3), (4). 
118 For example, see the economic news release by the by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department 
of Labor, on 26 January 2017 highlighting the decline in labour union membership in the US private sector 
workforce available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm>  (accessed March 2017). 
119 Via 11 U.S.C. s.365(a). 
120 Ibid. 
121 11 U.S.C. s.1129 (a) (9). 
122 11 U.S.C s.549 (a). 
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been instances where the debtor employer has made immediate payment of employee pre-
petition claims on a court’s authorisation,123 this is not a common practice and on other 
occasions, judges have turned down requests for such payments.124 This leaves employees’ 
fates to the mercy of bankruptcy judges to exercise their equitable powers125 to authorise 
expenditure outside the ordinary course of business to meet such claims.126 
3.3.2 Employee Pension and Retirement Benefits  
Like any other legal contract existing at the time of a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 11, a 
pension plan, is one form of contract that the debtor employer may contemplate modifying or 
rejecting after filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. However, pension plans existing at 
the time of filing for bankruptcy, are protected by the provisions of s.1113 of Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Code, provided, such a pension plan is part of a collective bargaining agreement.  
If covered by the collective agreement, for a debtor employer to reject or modify such a 
pension plan, procedural and substantive provisions of s.1113 have to be satisfied. The debtor 
employer has to show that proposals have been made to unions or employee representatives 
that provide for necessary modifications to the pension plan, and that all creditors, the debtor 
and all affected parties, are treated fairly and equitably.127 The negotiations must also be 
conducted in good faith, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.128 
 However, if existing employee pension plans are not covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement and the debtor employer seeks to modify or terminate such pension plans, the 
debtor employer is restrained by the provision of the Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) 1974,129 which governs the treatment of employee pension plans during corporate 
bankruptcy reorganisations in the private sector workforce in the U.S. 
This statute protects two categories of pension plans namely; defined benefit plans and 
defined contribution plans.130 The difference between these two categories is that, in a defined 
                                                          
123 See, for example, In re Gulf Air Inc., 112 B.R 152, 154 (Bankr. W.D. La 1989); In re Chateagay Corp., 80 B.R 279, 
286 -87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
124 For example, In re FCX Inc., 60 B.R 405, 411 -12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R 
922, 932. (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
125 11 U.S.C. s.105. 
126 11 U.S.C. s.363 (b). 
127 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (1) (A).  
128 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (2). 
129 29 U.S.C. ss. 1001 – 1461 (2016). 
130 See, 29 U.S.C. s.1002 (34). 
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contribution pension plan, employees make payments into the plan during their employment 
and their level of benefit depends on the amount of money paid into the plan. However, a 
defined benefit pension plan is one where employee members are promised a certain level of 
income or payment upon retirement arising from their employment relationship. This may be 
in a form of a lump sum or an annuity, payable on retirement, which accrues over the years of 
service.  
Defined benefit plans are guaranteed131 while defined contribution plans are not. Because of 
this difference in terms of guarantee, ERISA, as a means of protection, requires that promised 
pension benefits are adequately protected to ensure that in situations, such as the bankruptcy 
of the employer company, employee members, especially retirees do not fall victims, since 
they rely on such payments for their livelihood upon retirement.132  
Therefore, ERISA established a Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal 
government corporation, which insures defined benefit plans against defaults by employers.133 
PBGC is beneficial to employees in that, where a debtor employer files for bankruptcy, and 
does not have enough funds to pay for defined benefit payments, PBGC steps in and assumes 
responsibility for payments to employees, subject to a statutory limit.134 PBGC then initiates a 
statutory claim over the debtor employer for the amount paid.135 
However, it should be noted that although defined benefit plans are insured by the PBGC, 
defined contribution plans are not. ERISA requires employers to adequately protect defined 
contribution plans. For example, the employer is required to keep defined contribution plan 
assets in a separate trust, away from the corporate assets of the employer company. However, 
most defined contribution plans are attached to and tied into company assets which comes 
with a risk of depreciation in value, especially, where the company drifts into financial 
                                                          
131 29 U.S.C. s.1332. 
132 Please note that retiree benefits are protected by the Bankruptcy Code under s.1114 as they are afforded 
administrative expenses status under s.1114 (e) (1), (2). Therefore, the employer is restrained from making 
modification or terminating such benefits, unless agreed by respective unions, employee representative or court. 
(s.1114 (e) (1).   
133 29 U.S.C. s.1302 (a). 
134 The statutory limit to employees retiring at the age of 65 years, as of 2015, was $5,512.50, per month, on 
annuity basis. See, 29 U.S.C. ss. 1341, 1342. 
135 29 U.S.C. ss.1362 (a) and (b) (1) (A). 
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difficulties. However, the company or its benefit plan trustees may be subjected to civil 
enforcement for liability arising out of breach of fiduciary duty.136 
Where this is the case, employees may not be able to obtain all the benefits to which they are 
entitled where their employer opts to terminate such benefit plans on bankruptcy. However, 
the termination would be subject to distress termination rules under ERISA which requires the 
provision of a written notice of intention to terminate by the employer company to all affected 
employees.137 
Moreover, in a multi–employer defined benefit plan, the level of benefit assumed by the PBGC 
is substantially lower than the amount assumed in a single employer defined benefit plan. 
Multi–employer defined benefit plans usually arise out of collective bargaining agreements 
which may involve employee members of more than one employer. The risk is that, in a multi-
employer defined benefit plan, a single employer, who is part of a multi – employer plan, may 
file for bankruptcy with insufficient or no funds to meet guaranteed benefit payments which 
may lead to distress termination of the benefit plan.138  
Although the PBGC may provide financial assistance for the continued functionality of the plan, 
this may not be enough to sustain the running of the plan in the long run. This may negatively 
affect other employer members of the plan who may also terminate the defined benefit plans 
of their employees, which would be a threat to employee benefits and protection.139 
In addition to the above, other employee benefit plans, such as health care plans, medical and 
accidental care plans et cetera, are not covered by ERISA per se. These benefits arise out of 
non-bankruptcy legislation such as contract law and labour law. This has the effect that the 
employer, through contractual terms and conditions and company policies and procedures, 
may vary these benefit plans as they see fit. Where this is the case, the employer is not required 
to adhere to the requirements on employee consultation and participation rights in relation to 
these benefit plans under ERISA.140 Moreover, where such benefit plans are terminated due to 
                                                          
136 See, 29 U.S.C. 1132 and 29 U.S.C. s.1109. 
137 29 U.S.C.s.1341(C). 
138 29 U.S.C. s.1362. 
139 29 U.S.C. ss.1332(a) and 1341(a). 
140 29 U.S.C. s.1051 (1). 
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bankruptcy, the employer is under no obligation to honour claims arising out of such 
terminations as such claims are not covered by the PBGC. 
3.3.4 Post-petition Employee Claims 
The treatment of post-petition employee claims is however different from the treatment of 
pre-petition claims during bankruptcy reorganisations under Chapter 11. Employee post-
petition claims for wages and salaries are afforded priority status in payment, as they are 
deemed administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate.141 This is a direct form of protection 
to employee claims in that employees are assured that they will be paid wages and salaries for 
services rendered during the reorganisation process.  
The DIP is permitted to enter into contracts and transactions, such as for wages and salary 
payments, without notice or hearings during the ordinary course of business.142 Other post-
petition employee claims, such as for severance in lieu of notice or termination of employment 
by the debtor employer, are afforded administrative expense status and therefore, endorsed 
by bankruptcy courts.143 
However, although employees’ wages and salaries may be guaranteed post-petition, 
employees’ participation in their debtor employer’s reorganisation proceedings is not 
guaranteed, nor contemplated. Formal participation in post-petition bankruptcy proceedings 
is mainly controlled by the DIP and post-petition secured creditors to a certain extent. General 
employees have no participation in the business affairs of their employer yet they have 
interests and benefits that may be affected by their employer’s decisions.144  Therefore, apart 
from having claims for wages and salaries assured, and afforded priority in payment, employee 
participation in the affairs of their debtor employer’s reorganisation process post-petition is 
substantially low, if non-existent.  
Moreover, after filing for bankruptcy, employees’ hopes of participation are further curtailed 
as by the time a petition for bankruptcy is filed, decisions on the next course of their employer’s 
                                                          
141 11 U.S.C. s.503 (b) (1) (A). 
142 11 U.S.C. s.363(c) (1).  
143 See cases such as In re Mammoth Mart Inc., 536 F. 2d 955, (1st Cir. 1976); In re W.T Grant Co., 620 F. 2d 319,321 
(2nd Cir. 1980). 
144 J Berry, ‘Different Playing Fields: What Affect Does Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Have on Employees of the Debtor 
and Why do, These Affects Drive Companies to Bankruptcy?’ (2012) Social Sciences Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139062> (accessed 10 February 2017). 
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business are often already taken. This, arguably, leaves the employees’ hopes of participation, 
in the hands of the creditors’ committee as established by the Bankruptcy Code.145  
In contrast, creditors’ committees have a great deal of influence over the debtor’s business 
affairs during reorganisation proceedings. These include investigating the financial conditions 
of the debtor146 and access to information regarding the reorganisation proceedings. However, 
this does not mean that employees will be given a real voice and protection. This is because 
the established creditors’ committee represent creditors’ interests as a group and different 
creditors may have different interests. This comes with a risk that employee interests may be 
overridden or overshadowed by the divergent group interests. Although on occasion, a court 
may appoint a special creditors’ committee where it has discovered that a certain group of 
creditors is not adequately represented by the existing creditors’ committee,147 this has been 
rarely the case, as judges have often not supported it, whenever the need for it arose.148  
3.3.5 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act 1988 Protection 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 1988 (WARN Act)149 offers some 
additional protection to employees in the US where their employer is contemplating a sale of 
the business or part of it, or a business unit or plant closure that would lead to mass loss of 
employment during any thirty day period.  
The WARN Act was enacted by the US Congress on 4 August 1988 and took effect on 4 February 
1989. The WARN Act requires employers who employ over 100 employees or more including 
wage and salaried workers, hourly paid workers, managers and supervisors, to give a 60 days’ 
notice to employees to be affected by job losses.150 Employees’ representatives or labour 
unions (where employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement),151 state or chief 
elected official of the local government at locations where the layoffs are expected also have 
                                                          
14511 U.S.C. s.1102 (b) (1). 
146 11 U.S.C. s.1103(c). 
147 11 U.S.C. s.1102 (a)(b). 
148 See cases such as In re Salant Corp., 53 B.R158, 161. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings 
Inc., 96 B.R 779,781. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio).  
149 29 U.S.C. s.2101 – 2109 Pub. L. 100 -379, 101 Stat. 890 (Hereafter WARN Act). 
150 29 U.S.C. s.2101 (a) (2). A plant closure under the WARN Act is defined as a shutdown of a single site of 
employment or one or more facilities or operating units within a single site of employment. 
151 29 U.S.C. s.2102 (1). 
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to be notified.152 However, employees with less than six months’ employment in the last twelve 
months are not covered by this requirement on the employer. 
The requirement on employers to offer the 60 days’ notice to affected employees is a form of 
a process to give affected employees a transition period within which they may prepare and 
plan ahead of potential layoffs or transfers.153 The notice would include a description of the 
planned actions, a statement on whether the planned actions are short term or permanent, 
dates and duration of the process and contact details of the officials undertaking the planned 
actions. Affected employees may use this period to seek alternative employment or seek 
retraining to acquire skills that would enable them to compete in the job market.154 
However, these notification and information requirements on employers are not applicable to 
employees who are actively engaged in a labour dispute or lockout with their employer or 
taking part in a strike action at the time when the employer is contemplating a business sale 
or plant closures.155 In addition, workers employed on a temporary basis, business partners, 
consultants, regular federal, state and local government employees are exempted from the 
notification from the employer as long as they are aware that their employment was limited in 
duration.156 
In addition to the above exceptions, the employer may be exempted from fulfilling the 60 days’ 
notification and information requirements with employees where the reasons for the 
contemplated business sale, transfer or plant closures are caused by unforeseeable business 
circumstance such as a deep economic recession or loss of key contract of the business that 
were beyond the employer’s control.157 Capital liquidity issues, such as a drive to raise capital 
or investment for the faltering business may also be a justifiable reason for an employer not 
fulfil the 60 days’ the notice and information requirement.158  
                                                          
152 29 U.S.C. s. 2102 (2). 
153 L. Levin, ‘The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)’ 2007, Washing D.C Congressional 
Research Services, available online at < http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/321> (accessed 
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154 Christopher P. Yost, ‘The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988: Advance Notice 
Required?’ (1989) 38 (3) Cath. U. L. Rev. 675. 
155 29 U.S.C. s.2103 (1) + (2).  
156 29 U.S.C. s.2103 (1). 
157 29 U.S.C. s.2102 (b) (2) (a). 
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The employer may be convinced in good faith that there is a potential of raising key investment 
or capital to sustain the faltering business and invoking the notification requirement may 
jeopardise that prospect. Natural disasters such as flooding, hurricane or earthquake are other 
causes that may render an employer exempted from fulfilling the 60 days’ notification 
requirements.159 
Notwithstanding the above exceptions, the WARN Act affords individual or collective actions 
for employees or their representative labour unions or local government units power to initiate 
civil actions against an employer who has not fulfilled the notification requirement in federal 
district courts with a view of obtaining monetary compensation. The employees may be 
awarded back dated pay and benefits for each working day the notice was not provided to a 
maximum of 60 days.160  
Moreover, the sale of the business or part of it in itself does not constitute a job loss but may 
lead to a job transfer from the seller to the buyer. Therefore, the 60 days’ notification and 
information requirement on the employer may enable the employee subject to the transfer to 
make an informed decision about the new job arrangements, including (where applicable) the 
new place and location of the business or plant.161 In addition, where a business sale has led 
to an automatic transfer, WARN Act still places a duty on the buyer to comply with the 60 days’ 
notification requirement which is a form protection to employees.162 
3.4 The Federal -v- State Division: The US State of Delaware  
Different states may interpret the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code differently. This may be 
influenced by the provisions of their non-bankruptcy State laws, such as contract law, property 
law and labour law during bankruptcy reorganisations. This is in addition to different judicial 
attitudes.163 Where this is the case, it creates a certain degree of deviation from the intended 
uniform application of the federal Bankruptcy Code. A deviation from a uniform application of 
the Bankruptcy Code in various US states creates an inconsistency born out of inter alia, the 
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interaction between bankruptcy laws and state non-bankruptcy laws which may be 
detrimental to employee protection during bankruptcy reorganisations. 
In a bid to bring greater consistency to the protection to employees in the Bankruptcy Code, 
some US states have enacted legislation to regulate the employer – employee relationships 
during bankruptcy reorganisation. Among these states is the state of Delaware. Delaware is my 
choice of a state case study because its state labour laws are comparatively friendly to 
employees’ protection among US states.   
Delaware’s state labour laws have provisions that provide for employee protection on issues 
such as collective bargaining, continuity of the employment relationship through the 
successorship doctrine and protection from termination or impairment of a labour contract 
because of a business sale, transfer or merger. These provisions are discussed in the 
paragraphs below. The interplay between Delaware’s non-bankruptcy state laws and the 
provisions for dealing with employee claims during bankruptcy reorganisations in Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code would provide a good platform for analysing the treatment of 
employee interests and benefits during bankruptcy reorganisations in a form of a federal – 
state comparison.  
Delaware is one of the smallest states in the US164 but it is well known for its business - friendly 
incorporation laws, for businesses all over the US and the world at large. Delaware has in fact 
been crowned a haven for its handling of corporate businesses, establishing a market like the 
sort handled in other known havens, such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and Mauritius.165  
Due to its friendly incorporation laws, a majority of large publicly traded corporations in the US 
have been incorporated in Delaware, with the inherent advantages of this being partly, due to 
the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine. The ‘internal affairs doctrine’ is a choice of law term in the Law 
of Corporations which provides that the law of a corporation’s state of incorporation governs 
that corporation’s issues, such as shareholders’ voting rights, distribution of dividends, tax 
issues, et cetera.  
The overall effect of the internal affairs doctrine is that the internal affairs of a corporation are 
governed by the laws of the state or country of incorporation. Therefore, companies 
                                                          
164 Ibid, at 52. 
165 Ibid, at 53. 
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incorporated in Delaware are protected from restrictions from other US states or countries on 
issues like taxes, and other corporate disclosure requirements. Delaware’s record of being one 
of the most used US states for business incorporations is further supplemented by its record 
as one of the most used states for filing for bankruptcy in the US in recent years.166 
3.4.1 Employment Protection Provisions under Delaware State Law: The Delaware Code 
The state of Delaware has legislation that places a mandatory obligation on a debtor employer 
and a prospective successor employer to protect employee interests and benefits attached to 
an employment contract during a business sale, merger or changes in the identity of the 
employer. This is a form of ensuring employment protection and continuity.  
As a measure of employee protection, it is mandated in the Delaware Code that: 
 ‘no merger, consolidation or sale of assets shall result in the termination or 
impairment of the provisions of any labour contract covering persons engaged 
in employment in this state and negotiated by a labour organisation or by a 
collective bargaining agent or other representative.’167  
The Delaware Code also provides employees with remedies, such as a right to initiate a civil 
action against the employer or a successor in interest, where employee claims such as for 
wages or salaries, remain unpaid following restructuring, business sales or transfers.168 The 
Delaware Code further imposes notification, posting and records obligations on employers to 
ensure that an employer, who employs more than three employees, notifies each employee, 
at the time of hiring, the hourly or daily rate of pay and place of payment in writing, or through 
a posted notice, maintained and accessible to all employees.169 Although this protection is 
outside bankruptcy, it highlights how Delaware as a state protects employees at state level. 
Most importantly, the Delaware Code recognises and emphasises the need for employees to 
bargain collectively with their employers as a measure of participation and inclusion in 
regulating and moderating the employer – employee relationship.170 It is the notion that 
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through collective bargaining, issues such as successorship obligations on the new owner of 
the debtor’s business (in case of a business sale and transfer) may be imposed on the employer.  
The successorship doctrine, although not specifically prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code, has 
been developed by federal bankruptcy courts, on a case by case basis, where provisions for 
such obligations have been incorporated into a CBA and are therefore binding on the new 
owner.171 Where successorship obligations are imposed on the buyer / new owner of the 
business, it leads to automatic continuity of the rights and obligations attached to the 
employment relationship between the employer and the employees.  
State laws are enacted by state legislators who are locally situated and well acquainted with 
local state issues affecting both business owners and employees. State legislators know what 
the state needs. Very often, these state legislators would have witnessed the effects that 
corporate reorganisations may have on employees and other stakeholders, such as local state 
revenue and community development.  
The inherent advantage of state laws regulating the employer – employee relationship is that 
state law is usually broader than federal law in scope of application and protection to 
stakeholders, such as employees.172 For instance, The Delaware Code extends collective 
bargaining and successorship obligations to employers in all aspects that affect employee 
interests and benefits, such as on business sales, business transfers, mergers, or changes in the 
identity of the employer. This is in contrast to federal laws, such as the Bankruptcy Code or, 
the NLRA that are invoked during bankruptcy proceedings.173  
For instance, under the federal Bankruptcy Code, for employees to enjoy the benefits of 
successorship obligations discussed above, a CBA that mandates its existence and 
effectiveness, is dependent on whether, it is adopted, amended or rejected during 
reorganisation proceedings or business sales by the debtor employer, subject to exceptions.174 
The policy considerations underlying federal statutes, such as the Bankruptcy Code and the 
                                                          
171 See cases, such as John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 376, U.S. 543 (1963); NLRB v Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 406 
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NLRA (1935) that regulate the bankruptcy reorganisation process, often override state laws 
provisions in this respect, due to the Supremacy Clause in the US constitution.175  
The Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v Livingston176 recommended that; 
‘…[t]he objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of 
federal law require that the rightful prerogatives of owners independently to 
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be 
balanced by some protection to employees from a sudden change in the 
employment relationship.’177  
This was following a merger of a small publishing company (with forty employees) with John 
Wiley & Sons Inc., (John Wiley & Sons) represented by District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union (District 65). Following the merger, District 65 intended to continue 
to represent the merged employees, requesting that all seniority rights, vacation pay, 
severance pay and union pension fund contributions be recognised and continued by John 
Wiley & Sons. However, John Wiley & Sons declined to recognise these rights, asserting that, 
the merger terminated the collective bargaining agreement and any form of employee rights 
and benefits pertinent to it.178 Following its deliberation, the Supreme Court held that: 
“…[T]he disappearance  by merger of a corporate employer which has entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement with the union does not automatically 
terminate all rights of employees covered by the agreement……the successor 
employer may be required to arbitrate with union under the agreement.”179 
However, in Howard Johnson Co. v Detroit Local Joint Executive Board,180 the Supreme Court 
stated that: 
‘…[T]he real question in each of these ‘successorship’ cases is, on the particular 
facts, what are the legal obligations of the new employer to the employees of 
the former owner or their representative? The answer to this inquiry requires 
                                                          
175 The Supremacy Clause is enshrined in Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the US constitution. This clause establishes 
federal law supremacy over state law. It provides that the federal constitution and federal laws of the US, take 
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176 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
177 Ibid, at 549. 
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analysis of the interests of the new employer and employees and of the 
policies of the labor laws in light of the facts of each case and the particular 
legal obligation that is at issue, whether it be the duty to recognize and bargain 
with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty to arbitrate, 
etc.’181 
Therefore, from the observations above, it may be submitted that establishing whether a 
collective agreement survives the restructuring process and is therefore adopted by the new 
employer is determined on a case by case basis, but not guaranteed. It is dependent on the 
nature of the obligations the new employer is assuming and the interplay between labour law 
policies on the continuity of the employment relationships and federal bankruptcy law’s policy 
for the continuity and survival of the financially struggling business undergoing bankruptcy 
reorganisations.182Where state labour law objectives conflict with those of federal bankruptcy 
law, the courts have often tipped the balance toward the survival of the company undergoing 
reorganisation rather than the continuity of inherited obligations arising out of collectively 
bargained agreements.183  
Moreover, under the successorship doctrine, the successor employer’s main responsibility to 
the predecessor’s union and collectively bargained agreements is maintaining the duty to 
bargain but not a mandatory adoption of the agreements entered into by the predecessor. 
Where the successor employer adopts the predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, 
the successor employer does so voluntarily.184 
Therefore, as a result of the Supremacy Clause,185 it would not only be difficult for a state court 
in Delaware to mandate for the continuity of collective bargaining following a business sale or 
transfer, but would be deemed unconstitutional, as such a mandate would be contrary to the 
policies and objectives inherent in the US Congress’ enactment of the NLRA. 
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U.S. 272 (1972); Fall River Dyeing & Fishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
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The US Congress’ enactment of the NLRA in 1935 was to mainly implement a form of industrial 
democracy between employer companies and employees through collective bargaining at 
federal level. It would imply that although state laws may have provisions mandating collective 
bargaining between employer companies and employees at state level, provisions on collective 
bargaining under NLRA (1935) if invoked, would take precedence as the NLRA is a federal 
legislation. Therefore, provisions under the NLRA would be at federal (national level) not state 
level.186  
A bankruptcy filing, however small, presents its own problems which may not only affect 
immediately attached stakeholders like employees, but may also cause significant local 
disruptions, especially to a particularly small community in a state, such as Delaware. It is 
however notable that not all Delaware incorporated companies are active in Delaware, as such 
a state might have provided some incentives for companies to be incorporated in Delaware in 
anticipation of benefits such as job creation and generation of local revenue.187 However, the 
state may not enjoy such benefits because while the company is incorporated in Delaware, it 
operates elsewhere, maintaining only some kind of administrative office in the state. 
Therefore, the impact of failures of companies registered in a state may not be great in many 
cases and it may be that greater impacts are on communities in states other than the state of 
incorporation. 
3.5 Bankruptcy Venue Forum Shopping – An Impediment to Employee Participation 
The Bankruptcy Venue Statute188 and the Bankruptcy Code189 afford a large debtor190 with 
almost unlimited choice as to where to file a petition for bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy 
Venue Statute, a debtor may file for bankruptcy where it is incorporated, where its principal 
place of business or assets is located, or, in a state where there is a pending case against its 
affiliate, general partner or partnership. This virtually unlimited choice may be viewed as an 
                                                          
186 Omari S. Simmons, ‘Delaware’s Global Threat’ (2015) 41 J. Corp. L. 217. 
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(51D) (A) (2012). Please note that this amount is subject to periodic adjustment by the Judicial Committee of the 
United States. 
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encouragement to debtor companies to choose a bankruptcy court or state, where they would 
project a better outcome than in other states where the filing might be made, which may be 
termed as bankruptcy venue forum shopping.191  
Bankruptcy venue forum shopping may be seen as an impediment to employees during 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings as it not only affects employee participation in the 
bankruptcy proceedings of their debtor employer, but also undermines employee protection. 
Bankruptcy forum shopping encourages cross-state filing which, if analysed, may benefit the 
filing debtor company more than other stakeholders, such as employees. The effect of this 
cross-state filing is that, access to information regarding the debtor employer’s case, which 
would enable meaningful participation for employees, may be compromised.  
Because of the cross-state filing, employees may not be able to gain first-hand information 
about the state and the court of filing by their debtor employer. It may be the case that by the 
time affected employees track down the location of the state and court of filing, most decisions 
regarding the debtor company’s debts and claims may have been taken.192 This may leave 
employees in a compromised position, compared to other stakeholders and key players in the 
bankruptcy process, such as the debtor company, its lawyers and post-petition secured 
lenders.193 
In addition, even where employees locate the state and court of filing, the distance from their 
state of domicile and the state of filing may hinder meaningful participation due to costs and 
time (duration) of the petition hearing. Some Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions involve long and 
protracted negotiations which may turn out to be costly to an average employee to pursue 
compared to other stakeholders such as trade creditors with huge claims to pursue. This may 
turn out to be a form of employee shut out, which casts doubt as to whether cross state filing 
is contemplated by the debtor employer to escape the problems at home.194  
                                                          
191 The term forum shopping is used here, to denote the fact that, unless in an involuntary bankruptcy filing, the 
debtor company that chooses to file for bankruptcy, has a choice as to venue and state of filing. 
192 Lynn. M. LoPucki & J. W. Doherty, ‘Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendancy’ (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1387. 
193 Ibid. 
194 See, D K. Goldman, ‘Venue in Complex Bankruptcies in the Wake of Volkswagen: Ammunition to Keep 
Defendants from Remote Venues in Adversary Proceedings?’ Hous. Law. (Jan - Feb 2010) at 22. 
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The almost unlimited choice of venue of filing by the debtor employer may be challenged under 
the principles of ‘justice and convenience’ of all stakeholders upon request by a stakeholder 
with an interest in the debtor company’s bankruptcy case.195 However, the stakeholder must 
prove to the bankruptcy court with evidence that a better venue which would serve the 
interests of all stakeholders is available, if the judge is to consider the request.196  
This is because venue choice discussions are not part of the bankruptcy hearing process. 
Provided the debtor company’s choice of venue meets the threshold encapsulated in the 
Bankruptcy Venue Statute above, a presumption usually arises in favour of the debtor 
company’s venue choice.197 Moreover, research on this issue indicates that it is only in small 
bankruptcy cases198 as opposed to big cases that venue choices have been changed by 
bankruptcy courts.199  
Most largely traded corporations in the US that have filed for bankruptcy have indulged in 
some form of forum shopping practices, either as to venue or state of choice. For example, 
General Motors (GM)200 that was incorporated in Delaware with headquarters in Detroit - 
Michigan filed for bankruptcy in New York. New York is a state that is about 650 miles from 
Detroit, Michigan. Although GM’s choice of filing for bankruptcy in New York might have been 
inspired by the Southern District of New York bankruptcy court’s expertise in handling large 
bankruptcy cases,201 GM had almost 200 branches all over the US with only one affiliate in New 
York. This was a Harlem dealership that it used to initiate one of the largest bankruptcies in the 
US bankruptcy history.202     
                                                          
195 28 U.S.C. s.1412. 
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200 In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R 463, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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General Motors’ choice of venue for filing met the threshold in the Bankruptcy Venue Statute 
above, and was therefore legal. However, to an ordinary employee, it may turn out to be unfair 
and inequitable, as filing for bankruptcy in New York, would make it difficult for employees left 
in Detroit, to pursue their claims as bankruptcy proceedings are opened in a different state. It 
would not only be costly for employees to meet commuting and accommodation costs if they 
chose to attend the court hearing in New York but their voices and access to information would 
be interrupted due to the level of inconveniences involved.203 
3.5.1 Bankruptcy Venue Forum Shopping – A Disregarded SOS Call? In re WorldCom Inc., 
The effect of bankruptcy venue forum shopping as an impediment to employee participation 
and involvement in bankruptcy reorganisations had earlier been witnessed in In re WorldCom 
Inc.204 WorldCom was one of the largest communications companies in the US. Its 
headquarters were in Mississippi although it relocated to Virginia after being bought by MCI in 
2003.205 Faced with financial difficulties, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in the Southern 
District of New York bankruptcy court in 2002. It emerged from bankruptcy with $5 billion in 
debt and $6 billion in cash. However, most of its stakeholder claims, especially, those of 
employees who had been dismissed shortly before filing for bankruptcy, remained unpaid.206 
Employee claims, such as for pre-petition wages, severance pay, and other employment 
related benefits and interests remained unsettled, despite the fact that a huge sum of money 
was set aside to settle various claims arising from WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing.207 While pre-
petition bondholder claims were paid $0.36 on the dollar and stocks in the new company, 
employee claims were largely left unsettled and employees felt hugely shut out of the 
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204 In re WorldCom Inc., 346 F. 2d 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2004). 
205 See, Background Document on the WorldCom/MCI Bankruptcy, WORLDCOM/MCI STOCKHOLDER WEBSITE at, 
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bankruptcy proceedings. This prompted WorldCom’s dismissed employees to seek avenues to 
voice their concerns in pursuit of their claims.208 
With limited options of getting involved in the bankruptcy proceedings, the employees set up 
an advocacy group – “ex WorldCom5100”209 that represented a majority of ex-employees. The 
group used an internet website to serve as an online meeting venue to mobilise, organise and 
devise informal ideas on how best to pursue their claims successfully or seek representation in 
New York.210  
From an analytical point of view, WorldCom’s decision to file for bankruptcy in New York, would 
arguably, make it difficult for employees (in Mississippi) to meaningfully pursue their claims 
against their debtor employer in New York. This is one of the bankruptcy cases that highlighted 
the effect of bankruptcy venue forum shopping to employees in pursuing their interest against 
the debtor during bankruptcy proceedings in the US.211  
It may be noted that one of the most important procedural rights in adjudication is the right to 
either be represented or to present evidence on one’s own behalf, where the subject matter 
of adjudication is of concern to that individual, class or group.212 However, venue forum 
shopping in bankruptcy reorganisations often silences employee voices and their ability to 
meaningfully pursue their claims against their debtor employer. This is especially where filing 
for bankruptcy, is in a state far away from the company’s principal state of business, as 
witnessed in re WorldCom above. 
Moreover, bankruptcy venue forum shopping is usually to the benefit of the debtor employer. 
This is because the debtor employer’s bankruptcy proceedings may not be interrupted or 
slowed down by overlapping employee interests, as would be the case, where bankruptcy 
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proceedings were heard in the local bankruptcy court.213 The effect of such practices is that, 
certain legal principles, such as “proximity” to key parties involved in the case and “equality” 
of treatment of all stakeholders involved in the case which would lead to “fairness” and 
“justice” are, not only disrupted, but usually sidestepped.214   
Although it has been noted that the US Congress is aware of these problems especially the 
employees’ lack of equal participation in terms of adequate access to information on their 
employer’s bankruptcy process largely precipitated by cross – state filing in contrast to other 
stakeholders involved in the process such as the DIP.215 This is an area of law that is in need of 
reform as the current bankruptcy venue statutes and procedures tend to create a system that 
often fails to recognise or involve employees in their debtor employer’s bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
There is a need to balance the federal – state law division, bridge the widening gap between 
these two jurisdictions and reward stakeholders, such as employees who contribute to the 
going concern value of their employer’s business. Very often employees find themselves less 
protected by state laws when bankruptcies strike. Their interests are treated under generalised 
federal bankruptcy laws yet the business culture and practice in their local states may be 
different from other states. For instance, the business culture and practices, in light of the 
lending market and mobility of capital in New York, might be completely different from that in 
Delaware.216  
3.6 Conclusion 
In the US, employee claims in bankruptcy are usually in respect of wages, salaries and other 
benefits attached to their employment relationships with their employers, which are usually 
of small amounts compared to interests of other big and secured creditors. In view of this 
limitation, doubt has been cast as to whether employees’ involvement in the bankruptcy 
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process would be of any significance in terms of advantages to employees.217 However, the 
counter argument to this assertion is that participation rights of affected stakeholders in 
bankruptcy, irrespective of the size or value of their claims ought to be based on the principles 
of fairness, equality and justice. This is because employee claims would have greater 
significance, if we look at creditors by headcount, rather than by value.    
The economic rationale for this argument is implicit in the contention that, at the beginning of 
their employment, employees are usually paid low wages but as they continue with the 
employment relationship, their skills and dependency on their employer grows, together with 
mutual expectations, such as continuity of employment, in the form of job security. As a result 
of continued longer service and better skills, employee salaries tend to increase towards the 
ends of their careers.218 However, during bankruptcy reorganisations or business transfers, 
these accrued benefits are less protected and the employees stand to lose out most, as the 
skills developed over the years may be firm-specific skills, which may not readily add weight to 
their search for alternative employment.  
As highlighted in this chapter, the lack of uniform protection to all employees in the US private 
sector workforce is still a major concern to employment protection and the move toward 
balancing employment protection objectives with business reorganisation during bankruptcy 
proceedings in the US. The federal laws that govern the treatment of stakeholder interests 
during bankruptcy reorganisations in the US, such as Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and 
The National Labour Relations Act (1935) give primacy of protection to employees who are 
members of labour unions and collective bargaining agreements. The employment at will 
practice is another area that is need of addressing at federal level. 
In light of these concerns, there is a need to harmonise the level of protection to all employees 
in the US labour industry as a measure of uniform protection. However, to achieve this, the US 
Congress would need to enact legislation at federal level that is less dependent or preferably, 
non-dependent on trade union and collective bargaining philosophical underpinnings219 that 
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is applicable and protective of all employees, not just those that are parties to collective 
agreements or members of labour unions.  
This would mitigate the void created by the lack of uniform protection to employees in the US. 
The point of concern is that even a few US states that have legislation mandating the protection 
of employees during business sales, mergers or transfers, such as Delaware, restrict the level 
of protection to unionised employees or employees that are members of collective bargaining 
agreements. This further leaves non-unionised employees without consolidated legislative 
protection.220    
Therefore, as highlighted above, there is a level of disparity in the legislative protection to all 
employees in the US labour market during corporate insolvency.  There is also a lack of new 
legislation from the US Congress that would aim to provide a uniform model of protection to 
employees. In view of these shortcomings, the task is on US bankruptcy judges to bridge this 
disparaity in employment protection and achieve the balance needed through interpretation. 
However, judges cannot remedy the whole problem of course as the fault lies in legislation but 
they can aim towards optimal decision making in the cases that come before them. The     next 
chapter analyses the interpretative challenges to bankruptcy judges during Chapter 11 
reorganisation proceedings and how Dworkin’s approach may arguably provide a remedy.
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Chapter Four 
The Interpretative Dilemma in the US: Applying Dworkin’s 
Interpretative Approach to Remedy the Interpretative Imbalance 
during Bankruptcy Reorganisation Proceedings 
4.1 Introduction 
When the US Congress passes legislation that is intended to address a particular aspect in the 
US legal system, that legislation is usually non-prescriptive. That legislation is passed and 
brought into effect but the legislature does not provide how such legislation should be 
interpreted. This task is left to the judiciary to interpret and apply that legislation to the 
relevant legal questions before the courts.1  
The non-prescriptive character of the legislation would imply that judges have to apply the 
linguistic, systematic or purposive analyses2 to their interpretative approaches to interpreting 
and applying that legislation to the legal questions before the courts. The linguistic analysis 
may involve judges drawing on the legislative language and the criteria of reasoning to enable 
the understanding of specific statutory terms to be applied to the facts before them. 
Systematic analysis may involve judicial analysis of the conceptual or logical reasoning in past 
precedents or policy reasoning while the purposive analysis would involve analysing 
substantive legal and policy reasons behind the passing of such laws.3  
Judicial interpretation can play an integral part in addressing the debtor-creditor concerns 
during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings in the US. Bankruptcy proceedings are presided 
over by specialist bankruptcy judges in specialist bankruptcy courts in the US. Therefore, when 
the debtor employer and the employees (often with their affiliated labour unions or 
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representatives) fail to resolve their concerns and seek judicial intervention, judges are tasked 
with interpreting the laws and policies underlying the specific areas of dispute between the 
two parties, to reach a fair and equitable decision.  
However, during bankruptcy proceedings in the US, the policy objectives of business rescue, 
that is, the need to support insolvent but viable businesses to successfully reorganise their 
businesses and continue operating as going concerns, usually conflict with the policy objectives 
of employment protection and continuity. Therefore, the conflict between these two policy 
objectives arguably, creates an interpretative dilemma on the bankruptcy judges that is 
analogous to the ‘hard case’ thesis that is posited by Dworkin in the Interpretative Theory of 
Law.4  
In order to achieve a balanced approach that would enable a simultaneous pursuit of both 
policy objectives of successful business reorganisations and employment protection during 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings, without compromising the other, a balance ought to 
be made. However, this balance would arguably, best be archived through interpretation. 
According to Professor Dworkin in his Interpretative Theory of Law, law as practice and law as 
legal theory are best understood as a process of interpretation.5 According to Dworkin, when 
faced with a legal question, a judge must interpret the law in a manner that fits the legal 
context at hand because constructiveness in interpretation is the proper approach to artistic 
and literal interpretation.6 Constructive interpretation coheres with the need to make the law 
the best it can be, carrying with it, the principles of moral value. Therefore, every time a judge 
is confronted with a legal question, that judge should construct a theory of what the law is, 
that adequately fits into past relevant governmental policies underlying the passing of that law 
to make the law the best it can be.7    
However, the interpretation and application of s.1113 of the US Bankruptcy Code8 during 
bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings in the US has been the subject of inconsistent 
                                                          
4 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977) 85. 
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approaches from different bankruptcy courts.9 These inconsistent approaches, have arguably,  
failed to provide the balance needed to fairly balance the policy objectives of successful 
business reorganisations and the policy objectives of employment during bankruptcy 
reorganisation proceeding in the US as analysed in chapter three above. I am using the judicial 
approaches to interpreting s.1113 of the US bankruptcy Code to highlight these interpretative 
inconsistencies. 
I have chosen s.1113 of the Bankruptcy Code as a case study to highlight the differences in the 
judicial handling of CBA rejection motions during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings and 
how, these inconsistent approaches would arguably, be reconciled through integrity and 
constructiveness in interpretation as posited by Dworkin in his Interpretative Theory of Law. 
This is because most bankruptcy courts’ decisions in this area can be regarded as having been 
in favour of the debtor employer as the courts have tended on more occasions to approve CBA 
rejections than they have favoured employment protection and continuity.10   
Therefore, this chapter applies Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law to the judicial 
interpretation and application of s.1113 to bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings as an 
approach that would arguably, provide the balance needed to simultaneously pursue the policy 
objectives of successful business reorganisations and those of employment protection fairly, 
without compromising one or the other. The chapter examines the interpretative approaches 
to s.1113 adopted by the Second and the Third Circuit Courts of Appeal in addressing s.1113 
rejection motions by debtor employers during bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. 
The chapter proposes that by adopting Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law, especially, 
Dworkin’s ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation, bankruptcy judges may be 
able to adopt an interpretative approach that would arguably, remedy the tension between 
the policy objectives of promoting successful business reorganisations and those of 
employment protection in a balanced manner.  
                                                          
9 See for instance, the different interpretative approaches adopted by different courts in the cases of Brotherhood 
of Railways, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1975); Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
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4.2 Interpretation as a Balancing Tool 
When the debtor employer files for bankruptcy in the US, one area of concern to employees is 
whether their employment contracts and collectively bargained agreements would be either, 
modified, adopted or rejected by their debtor employer. After filing for bankruptcy, a US 
debtor employer is afforded powers to modify, assume, or reject employment contracts or 
collective bargaining agreements.11  
The power to reject, adopt or modify employment contracts and collective bargaining 
agreements by the employer has been one of the most contestable areas of the theoretical 
divide between the proceduralists and traditionalists as discussed in chapter two at 2.2.2. For 
instance, proceduralists support the use of s.365 and s.1113 by the debtor employer to reject 
or amend executory contracts where doing so would augment the value of the bankruptcy 
estate for the benefit of creditors.12 Traditionalists however, look at the debtor’s rejection and 
modification of executory contracts as pure creditor-value maximisation fundamentalism and 
question the fairness and integrity sometimes applied in the rejection and modification 
processes.13  
Dworkin argues that where a judge adopts the interpretative ideals of integrity and 
constructiveness, that judge finds a unique right answer to the legal question before him, 
rather than using judicial discretion to fill the gap.14 It may be noted that judicial use of 
discretion is one of the forms of legal positivism mainly posited by H.L.A. Hart15 that Dworkin 
strongly criticises and formed one of the famous debates in modern legal theory and 
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12 See for example, Thomas H. Jackson, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy Law: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 155; Barry E. Adler, ‘Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role 
of Insolvency Rules’ (1994) 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1107; Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business 
Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1851. 
13 Donald R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 717; 
Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 367 (Citing 
Duncan Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique’ (1981) 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387); Karen 
Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); 
William T. Bodoh & Beth Buchanan, ‘The Future of Labour Through the Prism of Bankruptcy: Ignored 
Consequences – The Conflicting Policies of Labor Law and Business Reorganization and Its Impact on Organized 
Labor’ (2007) 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 395. 
14R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.255.  
15 H.L.A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593. 
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jurisprudence between legal positivists and natural law theorists.16 Judicial discretion has also 
been a subject of contention between the traditionalists and the proceduralists as discussed 
in chapter two of this thesis at 2.2.3. 
Dworkin opines that by applying the ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation, 
a judge may be able to interpret the law based on legal principles that may fit perfectly into 
the legal context before the court to achieve a right answer to the legal question.17 This is as 
opposed to interpreting the law based on rules, which may be static in application and may not 
fit perfectly into the legal scenario at hand.18 
This is because, legal principles have been described as being flexible in application and having 
better weight than legal rules in terms of relevance to their application to legal scenarios 
before court.19 On the other hand, legal rules have been described as having an ‘open 
texture’.20 Legal rules are usually, expressed in general terms and they may be interpreted in 
different contexts and cannot be weighed against each other, which may lead to different 
outcomes.21  
Therefore, it is the notion that, to fairly adopt an approach that would balance the tension 
between employment protection policy objectives and business reorganisation policy 
objectives, the judge has to understand the rules and principles, inherent in the laws before 
the court in order to construct a theory of the law that is required to balance both policies’ 
objectives, and how to apply such law to the factual situations before the court.   
In addition to legal principles and rules, legal precedents may also be useful to the judge in 
that, they may provide the context within which past legal conflicts or concerns between 
parties were resolved. This may aid the judge to inform context on how competing legal 
questions before the court may be resolved by drawing on those legal precedents’ relative 
                                                          
16 L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and the Fidelity of Law – A Response to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630; R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977); R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 
1986). 
17 R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality’ in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. 
Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
18 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.255. 
19 , M. Bodig, ‘Rules, Principles and the Problem of the Limits of Legal Reasoning’ (2008) 2 University of Aberdeen, 
College of Arts and Social Sciences <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1318638> Accessed 
November 2016. 
20 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961). 
21 K. Kress, ‘Legal Indeterminacy’ (1989) 77 California L. Rev. 235. 
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importance to the present legal disputes.22 However, sometimes the legal precedents that are 
available to the judge may not fit into the context of the present legal questions before the 
judge and therefore, they may be considered distinguishable.      
Therefore, in the absence of compatible legal precedents, statutory interpretation may require 
that the judges revert to legal rules and principles to find a suitable approach to solving the 
legal questions before the court. This may involve for example, identifying legal rules and 
principles which would fit into the legal questions before the court that would not only fit into 
the policies underlying the passing of the law that is the subject of interpretation, but would 
also inform the judge’s reason for the decision taken.23   
According to Dworkin, the judge is able to achieve this by adopting the principles of 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation and the right answer thesis as argued in the 
Interpretative Theory of Law. These Dworkinian ideals are analysed in the discourse below. 
4.3 Judicial Interpretation Approaches to U.S.C. s.1113 
Section 1113 of the US Bankruptcy Code24 was enacted by the US Congress as a form of 
mitigating the effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.25 In this case, 
the Supreme Court held that a debtor employer may reject a CBA in circumstances where, the 
court finds that ‘equities balance in favour of rejecting such a contract’.26 The Supreme Court 
also held that a debtor employer can unilaterally alter the terms of a collectively bargained 
agreement, during the interim period that runs between the period of filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, and the time during which the order authorising rejection is entered.27 
Following this decision by the Supreme Court, there were growing concerns that employees’ 
rights to bargain collectively with their employers that are bestowed upon them by the NLRA 
193528 would be affected and rendered meaningless, if the debtor employer could reject 
collective agreements where rejection would augment the reorganisation plans of the debtor 
company during bankruptcy. Therefore, the US Congress enacted s.1113 of the Bankruptcy 
                                                          
22 R. Cross, Precedent in English Law (4th edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991). 
23 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (HUP, Cambridge 2008); William M. Landes & Richard Posner, ‘Rational 
Judicial Behaviour: A Statistical Study’ (2009) 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 775 – 831. 
24 11 U.S.C. s.1113. 
25 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984). 
26 Ibid, at 526. 
27 Ibid, at 532, 533. 
28 NLRA (1935) s.8(a)(5) and s.8(a)(1). 
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Code, as a move that would restrict the debtor employer’s ability and flexibility to reject or 
modify collective bargaining agreements.29   
This provision imposes both procedural and substantive conditions that a debtor employer 
must meet before rejecting or modifying a CBA. The provision requires the debtor to make 
proposals to the union that provide for necessary modifications before initiating negotiations 
and to ensure that all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are treated fairly and 
equitably.30 However, the judicial approach to the interpretation and application of this 
provision during CBA rejection petitions filed under s.1113 has been met with differing 
standards and approaches from different judges.31  
It should be remembered that the policies underpinning the US Congress’ enactment of s.1113 
were mainly to remedy the effects of the Bildisco decision. This was achieved by placing 
limitations on the debtor employer’s ability and flexibility toward CBA rejection and 
modifications. However, it is through the same provision that Congress left the door open to a 
debtor employer to apply to court to seek court approved rejection or modifications to CBAs 
courtesy of s.1113 (e).32  
Per s.1113 (e), a CBA rejection motion may be approved by the court where its rejection is 
essential to the continuation of the debtor’s business, or where rejection and unilateral 
changes to the terms and conditions of a CBA would prevent irreparable damage to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Moreover, after notice and hearing processes, a court may 
authorise interim changes to employee terms and conditions, wages, benefits or working 
conditions covered by a CBA under the ‘business judgment rule.’  
The business judgment rule was developed by the courts in recognition that that they are not 
better positioned than business owners or business managers to make subjective business 
decisions for insolvent businesses. They therefore vest faith in the business expertise of the 
                                                          
29 D. Rosenberg, ‘Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement – A Brief Lesson in the Use of the 
Constitutional System of Checks and Balances’ (1984) 58 Am. Bankr. L. J. 293, 312 – 21; Daniel S. Ehrenberg, 
‘Collective Bargaining Agreements under Section 1113 of Chapter 11 of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code: Resolving the 
Tension Between Labor Law and Bankruptcy Law’ (1994) 2 J. L. & Policy 55, 68. 
30 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (I) (A). 
31 For instance, see the different approaches in Brotherhood of Railways, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA 
Express, Inc., 523 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1975); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steel Workers of Am., 791 F. 
2d 1074, 1091 (3rd Cir. 1986) and Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, 816 F. 2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1987) 
discussed below.  
32 The factors and policies underlying Congressional response to Bildisco are analysed above at 3.2.4. 
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debtor / DIP to make decisions that are in the best interests of the business. Therefore, a 
debtor may reject an executory contract such as a CBA provided that the debtor shows that 
the rejection of such executory contract is to benefit the bankruptcy estate in its reorganisation 
endeavours. However, the debtor is required to obtain court approval before rejection under 
s.365 or s.1113 respectively.33   
Under the business judgment rule, bankruptcy courts presume that the debtor has acted 
prudently on an informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that the action taken is in 
the best interest of the bankruptcy estate.34 The question of whether rejection of CBA or 
employment contracts satisfies the business judgment rule is one to be decided by the 
bankruptcy court. Therefore, where the debtor employer produces credible evidence to 
support the submission that a rejection would benefit the bankruptcy estate and lead to 
successful reorganisation,35 bankruptcy court would generally approve such CBA rejection 
motions unless the court finds the debtor’s application not to be reasonably based on sound 
business judgment, but on bad faith, whim or caprice.36   
However, cognisance has to be given to the potential that the business judgment rule may be 
vulnerable to abuse or misapplication. For example, through the business judgment rule, 
employers may seek strategic use of bankruptcy filing by using Bankruptcy Code specific 
provisions such as s.362 automatic stay provisions, rejection powers in s.1113 (e), s.363 
business sales et cetera, to achieve business strategies that they may have failed to achieve 
outside bankruptcy.37 This may include for example, use of labour transformational policies 
and strategies such as labour cost reduction through rejection of employment contracts, 
moratoria on creditor enforcements or modification and termination of defined benefit 
pension plans.38  
                                                          
33 See, for example, the decision of the ninth circuit court in In re Pomona Valley Medical Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 
665, 670 (9th Cir. 2007). 
34 Ibid. 
35 In re Sun City Investments, Inc., 89 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). 
36 In re Prime Motor Inns, 124, B.R. 378, 381 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). 
37 Kevin J. Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to Their Advantage 
(University of California Press, 1999). William T. Bodoh & Beth Buchanan, ‘The Future of Labour Through the Prism 
of Bankruptcy: Ignored Consequences – The Conflicting Policies of Labor Law and Business Reorganization and Its 
Impact on Organized Labor’ (2007) 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 395, 413. 
38 See for example, In re UAL Corporation, 428 F. 3d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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For instance, in re Delta Airlines Inc.,39 Delta’s ‘Transformational Plan’ included initiatives to 
use bankruptcy to obtain cost savings in respect of pension funding, labour costs and retiree 
health cost savings. In this case, Delta’s affiliate, Comair initiated plans to reject pilots’ and 
flight attendants’ labour agreements and CBAs on the grounds that these agreements affected 
Delta’s longer term economic ability to compete in the market place.  
In granting Delta’s rejection application the court concluded that the debtor employer could 
not be expected to make commitments to the pilots and flight attendants’ job security that 
would erode the debtor’s ability to compete.40 It may be argued that this judgment and the 
judicial application of the business judgment rule may be seen as a move away from the 
Congressional policies underlying the enactment of s.1113 in the first place which was to 
preclude debtor employers from using bankruptcy as a strategic weapon in dealing with labour 
cost reduction through rejection or modification of CBAs.41  
 4.3.1 The ‘Necessary’ and the ‘Fair and Equitable’ Standards  
During s.1113 rejection proceedings, bankruptcy courts apply two standards in analysing 
whether the debtor employer has fulfilled the procedural and substantive requirements under 
s.1113 before deciding whether or not to grant a debtor company’s rejection petition. These 
standards are the ‘necessary’ and the ‘fair and equitable’ standards. Through the ‘necessary’ 
standard, judges base their examination of the debtor employer’s rejection application on 
whether the proposed rejections to employee contracts of employment or CBAs are necessary 
for the successful reorganisation of the debtor company to avoid liquidation.   
However, where bankruptcy courts apply the ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and equitable’ standards, 
they analyse whether the debtor employer’s rejection application is not only necessary for the 
successful reorganisation of the debtor employer, but whether the rejection proposals are also 
fair and equitable to all affected parties with interests in the debtor company.42  
The ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and equitable’ standards are better analysed by examining how these 
standards were applied by both the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal in the  cases of  
                                                          
39 In re Delta Air Lines, 359 B.R 468, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
40 Ibid, at 488. 
41 See, In re Century Brass Prods. Inc., 795, F. 2d 265, 272 (2nd Cir. 1986); Adventure Res., Inc. v Holland, 137 F. 3d 
786, 798 (4th Cir. 1998). 
42 Martha West, ‘Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1986) 47 Ohio St. L. J. 
65, 103. 
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Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America43 and Truck Drivers Local 
807 v. Carey Transportation Inc.,.44  In both cases, each court gave a conflicting ruling on how 
both the ‘necessary’ and the ‘fair and equitable’ standard ought to be applied in bankruptcy 
proceedings involving motions by debtor employees to reject employee collective bargaining 
agreements.     
4.3.1.1 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of America 
In Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the debtor employer sought authorisation from the bankruptcy court 
to reject all of its CBAs with United Steel Workers of America on the ground that the rejection 
was necessary to achieving its five-year reorganisation plan. The court was to deliberate on 
whether the proposed rejections were necessary for Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s reorganisation 
success. 
After examining Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s submissions, the court found that Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
had satisfied the requirements and conditions in s.1113 and in light of the then critical state of 
the US Steel industry and the company’s deep financial difficulties, the rejections were 
necessary for Wheeling-Pittsburgh to maintain its labour stability during the proposed five-
year reorganisation plan.45 The court further found that although Wheeling-Pittsburgh did not 
provide clauses to upward labour rate adjustment in case it rebounded financially during the 
reorganisation period, all parties were, treated fairly and equitably.46  
 
More notably, in reaching its conclusion, the court drew significantly on the legislative history, 
the language of the statute and the sequence of events leading to the final version of the 
statute. This included examining the statements from the legislators that were most involved 
in the passing of the statute with regard to the meaning of the term ‘fair and equitable’.47 For 
example, the court analysed Congressman Morrison’s views on the meaning of ‘fair and 
equitable’. Congressman Morrison was of the view that: 
‘Language that requires assurance that “all creditors, the debtor and other 
affected parties are treated fairly and equitable”,… would ensure that where 
                                                          
43 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1986). (Hereafter referred 
to as Wheeling-Pittsburgh). 
44 Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987) (hereafter referred to as 
Carey Transportation) 
45 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3rd Cir. 1986), 977-79. 
46 Ibid, at 979-80. 
47 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986) 1086, 89. 
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the trustee seeks to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement would ensure 
covered employees do not bear either the entire financial burden … or a 
disproportionate share of that burden…’48 
 
 The court also explore Senator Parkwood’s statement49 where he was of the view that: 
‘…[t]o ensure fairness and equitableness for all creditors, the debtor 
and other affected parties, the focus for cost cutting must not be 
directed exclusively at unionised workers’50  
This was to prohibit the rejection of CBAs merely because the court deemed the rejection to 
be equitable to other affected parties, particularly creditors.51 The court therefore defined the 
term ‘necessary’ during the proceedings to mean that the proposed rejections were ‘essential’ 
to preventing the debtor company from requiring liquidation.52  
 
The court concluded that the ‘necessary’ element of the standard was ‘conjunctive’ with the 
requirement that the proposals for CBA rejection treated all of the affected parties fairly and 
equitably, otherwise it would defeat the Congressional policy of remedying the Bildisco 
standard which was not sensitive to the national policy goals of favouring collective bargaining 
between employers and employees.  
 
4.3.1.2 Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation Inc.,   
In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation Inc.,53 Carey Transportation filed a proposal 
to modify its collective bargaining agreements pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1113(b)(1)(A) post-
petition. The proposal was designed to achieve annual savings of $1.8 million for each of the 
next three fiscal years in light of its reorganisation plan. However, the central issue in the Court 
of Appeal was whether the proposed modifications were necessary to Carey Transportation’s 
reorganisation success.  
 
                                                          
48 Ibid, at 1087 – 88. 
49 130 CONG. REC. H7496 (daily ed. June 29 1984). 
50 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986) at 1087, 
89. 
51 Ibid, at 1081. 
52 Ibid, at 1089. 
53 Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987).  
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In addition, the court had to deliberate as to whether the proposed modifications treated all 
parties fairly and equitably, and whether the balancing of the equities clearly favoured 
rejection of the collective bargaining agreements. The court approved Carey Transportation's 
application to reject the CBAs by holding that Carey Transportation had met its burden of 
proving compliance with the procedural and substantive standards set forth in the statute.54  
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the Southern 
District of New York bankruptcy court's ruling that all parties were participating "fairly and 
equitably" in the attempt to save the debtor company from liquidation.55 Interestingly, is the 
fact that the Second Circuit Court of Appeal departed from applying the ‘necessary’ element 
of the rejection standard on its own and instead, adopted the ‘necessary’ and the ‘fair and 
equitable’ standards conjunctively. The court did not support the view of interpreting the term 
‘necessary’ as in Wheeling-Pittsburgh where it was construed to mean that the proposed 
rejections were ‘essential’ to preventing the liquidation of the debtor company.   
The court based the interpretation of the term ‘necessary’ on the statutory text itself and 
interpreted the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and equitable’ separately. The court’s reasoning 
was that the requirement that the rejection proposals were necessary to prevent the debtor 
company from facing liquidation placed on the debtor company the burden of proving that its 
proposals for rejection were made in good faith and contained necessary but not minimal 
changes that would enable the debtor company to complete the reorganisation process 
successfully.56 
4.4 Balancing the Interpretative Inconsistencies through Dworkin’s Interpretative Approach 
From the discussion above, it may be concluded that there exists no definitive and binding 
standard to guide bankruptcy judges in applying the required standard in s.1113 rejection 
proceedings. Judges in s.1113 rejection proceedings may be guided by the evidence adduced 
by the parties to the litigation beforehand in deciding whether to apply the ‘necessary’ 
standard on its own as was the case in Carey Transportation by the Second Circuit Court of 
                                                          
54 In re Carey Transportation, Inc., 50 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, at 90. 
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Appeal, or to apply the ‘necessary’ and the ‘fair and equitable’ standards conjunctively as the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal did in Wheeling-Pittsburgh. 
It should be remembered that prior to the decision in Bildisco, the courts applied a strict 
standard test in deciding CBA rejection cases. This was the decision from the Court of Appeal 
in Brotherhood of Railways, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.,57 where the court 
held that; 
“[I]n view of the serious effect which rejection has on the carrier’s employees, 
rejection should be authorised only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of 
the two evils and that unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will collapse 
and employees will no longer have their jobs.”58 
This was the standard test that was supported by the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) 
as it balanced both the interests of the debtor employer and the employees. However in 
Bildisco, this standard was rejected by the Supreme Court holding that the standard was 
unacceptably narrow and fundamentally at odds with the policies of ‘flexibility and equity’ of 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.59 The effect of this new approach, as adopted in 
Bildisco is that bankruptcy courts are not guided by a single binding model or approach in 
applying the rejection standards. This has arguably led to inconsistent approaches adopted by 
bankruptcy judges in applying the rejection standards as discussed above. 
By analysing the court’s application of the ‘necessary’ test on its own as was the case in Carey 
Transportation, it could be concluded that decisions on whether a proposal for rejection is 
‘necessary’ to the successful reorganisation of the debtor employer may be determined by the 
court without considering whether it is ‘fair and equitable’ to employees and their affiliated 
labour unions.  
In Wheeling-Pittsburgh above, the court interpreted the term ‘necessary’ as being conjunctive 
with the requirement that the proposal for rejection treated all of the affected parties fairly 
and equitably.60 The court drew significantly on the legislative history, the language of the 
                                                          
57 Brotherhood of Railways, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
58 Ibid, at 172. 
59NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 523 (1984) at, 525. 
60Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steel Workers of Am., 791 F. 2d 1074, 1091 (3rd Cir. 1986) at 1089.  
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statute and the sequence of events leading to the final version of s.1113.61 It may be noted 
that this approach by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal would fit into Dworkin’s ideals of 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation to reach the right answer. By the court 
interpreting the term ‘necessary’ as ‘essential’, it was to ensure that the rejection was not only 
necessary but essential to its successful reorganisation otherwise the debtor employer would 
be liquidated and apart from having the CBA rejected, employee jobs would also be lost 
permanently.  
However, in Carey Transportation, the court departed from this standard on the ground that 
the term ‘necessary’ should not be construed as essential by adding elements of fairness and 
equity as established in Wheeling-Pittsburgh. The court based its interpretation of the term 
‘necessary’ on the statutory text itself and interpreted the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and 
equitable’ separately.62 
The court’s reasoning was that the requirement that the rejection proposals were necessary 
to prevent the debtor employer from liquidation placed on the debtor company the burden of 
proving that its proposals for rejection were made in good faith and contained necessary but 
not minimal changes that would enable the debtor company to complete the reorganisation 
process successfully.63 However, it should be remembered that this is the very essence of the 
policy underlying the enactment of s.1113. Part of the requirement of the debtor employer’s 
rejection application is to show that negotiations have been held with employee 
representatives and unions in a fair and equitable manner.64  
 
This would arguably, be seen as a move away from the policy of ensuring fairness in the 
treatment of the diverse stakeholder interests.  The court in Carey Transportation may be 
construed as paying more regard to the debtor employer’s reorganisation prospects than the 
effect such proposed rejections would have on employees such as changes to their expected 
compensations already negotiated with their labour unions.  
 
                                                          
61 Please see 3.2.4 above where factors and policies underlying the legislative history and the sequence of events 
leading to the enactment of s.1113 are analysed. 
62 Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, 816 F. 2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1987) at 88 – 90. 
63 Ibid, at 90. 
64 See 11 U.S.C. s.1113 (b) (1) (A). 
94 
 
The difference between interpreting the term ‘necessary’ in conjunction with the elements of 
‘fairness and equity’ as articulated in Wheeling-Pittsburgh may mean both the debtor 
employer’s interests and the employees’ interests are balanced on the principles of fairness 
and equity which may be seen as a form of a balanced approach – an approach that would be 
achieved through applying constructiveness and integrity to the judicial approaches in 
interpreting rejection motions.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may submitted that the tension between corporate rescue policy objectives 
inherent in insolvency laws and employment protection policy objectives inherent in 
employment laws in the US has existed for decades but it is yet to be remedied. This tension is 
to a large extent, influenced by the inconsistencies in the interpretative approaches adopted 
by bankruptcy judges as highlighted above. However, the same tension may be remedied 
through interpretation.   
The tension between the provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that seek to support bankruptcy 
reorganisation65 and the provisions in labour laws that seek to protect employees and their 
rights during corporate insolvency66 has not gone unnoticed.67 The US Congress is still silent 
on the interpretation and application of s.1113 to bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. To 
date, there has been no new legislation passed on the interpretation and application of s.1113 
despite a significant number of inconsistent judgments from bankruptcy courts on its 
interpretation and application to bankruptcy proceedings. In the absence of new legislation 
from the Congress, the onus is on the bankruptcy judges, to find the right approach and 
balance both labour policies and bankruptcy policies through interpretation.  
However, as highlighted above at 4.3.1, the interpretative inconsistencies as exemplified by 
the Second and Third Circuit Courts discussed above do not help to remedy the imbalances in 
                                                          
65 See generally, provisions such as s.362, s.363, s.1113, s.1114 among other provisions. These provisions are 
broadly discussed in chapter 5 (discussing general US bankruptcy law). 
66 For example, see, NLRA (1935) s.8 (a) (5) and s.8 (a) (1). 
67 See for example, Clyde W. Summers, ‘The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and the 
Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will’ (1984) 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1082, 
1085; Christopher D. Cameron, “How ‘Necessary’ Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate 
of Collective Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section 1113” (1994) 34 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 841, 869; S.F. Befort, ‘Labour and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment’ (2001) 43 B. C. L Rev 460, 355-375. 
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the legislative provisions that aim to support employment protection and business rescue 
during bankruptcy proceedings.  
Therefore, it is the argument that to achieve the balance needed in the interpretative 
approaches to address both employees’ and employers’ interests fairly during bankruptcy 
proceedings, Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law would provide the remedy. As 
discussed above, Dworkin’s ideals such as constructive interpretation of the laws, rules and 
principles, coupled with the need to maintain the integrity of the law, would inform a balanced 
approach for a judge to adopt while interpreting s.1113 rejection applications by debtor 
employers. 
As posited by Dworkin, a judge guided by legal principles and policies underlying the passing of 
that law, would constructively achieve a right answer that would not only conform to fairness 
but would also uphold the integrity of the law. This would help to remedy the tension between 
insolvency law policy objectives and employment law policy objectives during bankruptcy 
proceedings. Therefore, in the absence of a definitive binding approach on the interpretation 
and application of s.1113 and other relative provision of the Bankruptcy Code such as s.365 
(power by the debtor employer to reject executory contracts) and s.362 (power by a debtor 
employer to restrict employee actions by invoking moratoria protection upon filing for 
bankruptcy), Dworkin’s interpretative approach would provide a better guiding alternative.  
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Chapter Five 
Employee Protection during Relevant Transfers in the UK: TUPE 
Regulations and their Impact on Employment Protection and Business 
Rescue 
 5.1 Introduction 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employments) Regulations1 were brought into 
force to implement the Acquired Rights Directives (ARD)2 in the UK.  The purpose and scope of 
TUPE Regulations is to afford a degree of protection to employees of businesses or 
undertakings that are the subject of a ‘relevant transfer’3 from their employers (transferors) 
to new buyers (transferees) in the UK. This is a form of social protection to employees from 
unfair employer prerogatives that the European Union (EU) sought to mitigate.4 This is because 
the ARD did not only seek to safeguard employees’ interests and rights during business sales 
and relevant transfers but also sought to strike a fair balance between the interests of the 
                                                          
1 Hereafter referred to as TUPE Regulations. The original TUPE Regulations to be transposed into UK law were the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794). TUPE Regulations (1981) 
were amended by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) 
following consultations by the then Department for Trade and Industry (now the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS)) for reform. TUPE Regulations (2006) were also amended in 2014 following 
consultations by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, by The Collective Redundancies and the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 which effectively came into 
force on 31 January 2014 (save for extended employee liability information and consultation provisions that 
effectively took effect on 1 May 2014 and 31 July 2014 respectively). 
2 The original ARD to be transposed into UK law was Directive 77/187/EC of 14 February 1977 on the 
approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. Directive 77/187/EC was transposed 
into UK law by the Transfers of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794) (also 
known as TUPE 1981). However, Directive 77/187/EC was amended by Directive 98/50/EC to further strengthen 
the safeguarding of employees’ rights during business sales and transfers of undertakings. Directive 98/50/EC was 
also amended by Directive 2001/23/EC which was transposed into UK law by the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) (also known as TUPE 2006).   
3 A ‘relevant transfer’ is defined under TUPE (2006) Regulations as a transfer of an undertaking, business or part 
of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer to another person where there is a 
transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity. See, TUPE (2006), Regulation 3 (1) (a). 
4 C. Brewster and P. Teague, European Social Policy and its Impact on the UK (Institute of Personnel Management, 
London 1989); J. Armour and S. Deakin, ‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the 
Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 International Review of Law and Economics, 443, 463. 
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employees and their employers (business owners) as was affirmed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in Alermo-Herron and Others v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd.5 
In Alermo-Herron and Others v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd,6 the CJEU held that the ARD required a 
balance between employee and employer interests and that due weight was to be given to the 
principle of freedom of contract as a result of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes and 
recognises the freedom to conduct a business.  
In Alermo-Herron, the CJEU was of the view that under the freedom of contract, ’[t]he 
transferee must be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is 
party and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its 
employees with a view to its economic activity’.7  Thererefore, the ARD aims to strike a fair 
balance between the interests of employees and employers by ensuring that the transferee is 
in a position to make adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations.8 
However, the transposition of the ARD through the TUPE Regulations into UK law altered the 
way in which employment relations on corporate insolvency, which were hitherto executed 
based on common law principles, operate in the UK. It should be remembered that under the 
common law provisions, that is, prior to the TUPE Regulations being implemented in the UK,  a 
business sale or transfer terminated all existing employment contracts.9 This was because the 
common law notion of a contract for employment was based on the understanding or 
agreement between the employer and the employee both of whom agreed on what was 
expected of each other.10  
                                                          
5 Case C-499/04 [2006] ECR 1- 2397. (The facts of this case are not discussed as they are normatively outside the 
scope of this chapter). However, see; J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers 
of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-426/11 Alermo-Herron and 
Others v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 42 ILJ 434. 
6 Case C-499/04 [2006] ECR 1- 2397. 
7 Ibid, at paragraphs [32]-[33], [35]. 
8 Ibid, at paragraph [25]. 
9 See Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014. 
10 J. McMullen, ‘Atypical Transfers, Atypical Workers and Atypical Employment Structures – A Case for Greater 
Transparency in Employment Issues’ (1996) 25 (4) ILJ 286, 307; J. Armour and S. Deakin, ‘Insolvency and 
Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 International Review of 
Law and Economics, 443, 463. 
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The seminal decision and jurisprudence enacted in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated 
Collieries11 by the House of Lords (HL) constituted the long standing principle that the 
employee’s right to choose for himself whom he would serve was the main difference between 
a servant and a serf. Therefore, reversing the Court of Appeal’s (CA) decision in Nokes, the HL 
established that: 
‘[A] free citizen, in the exercise of his freedom, is entitled to choose the 
employer whom he promises to serve, so that the right to his services cannot 
be transferred from the employer to another without his assent’.12 
 
Therefore, at common law, and following the above decision, it was an established rule in 
practice that whenever there was a sale of a business or transfer of an undertaking, the 
contracts of employment of affected employees were effectively terminated. This was due to 
the fact that their contracts of employment could not be transferred to another employer 
without their consent.13   
This common law position was however greatly affected by the introduction of TUPE 
Regulations into UK employment legislation to regulate relevant transfers and, also, to protect 
the rights of employees in such situations.  It is therefore, the position in the UK today that 
where an undertaking is sold or transferred from one owner to another and falls within the 
context of a ‘relevant transfer’, TUPE Provisions would apply and both the transferor (old 
employer) and the transferee (new employer) would be required to comply with the 
substantive and procedural provisions of the TUPE Regulations.14  
Failure by both the transferor and the transferee to comply with the TUPE provisions during 
relevant transfers may lead to various claims, such as claims for unfair dismissals or unlawful 
variations to contract terms and conditions of employment being initiated by the affected 
                                                          
11 [1940] 1014 AC; [1940] 3 All ER 549. 
12  [1940] AC 1014 (Viscount Simon LC) 1020.  
13  See the Court’s reasoning in Bolwell v Redcliffe Homes Ltd [1999] IRLR 485. 
14 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 
260; J. McMullen, “Restructuring and TUPE” ILJ (2012) 41(3) 358 – 362. 
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employees which may in turn lead to financial compensation or other remedies granted to 
affected employees by employment tribunals or courts.15  
This chapter discusses and analyses the TUPE Regulations and their impact on corporate rescue 
and employment protection in the UK. Where a relevant transfer of an insolvent but viable 
business is subject to TUPE Regulations, both employment law and insolvency law have distinct 
objectives that they set out to achieve. While the main objective of employment law is to 
safeguard the rights and interests of employees, such as the continuity of the employment 
relationship between the debtor employer and the employees, insolvency laws would prioritise 
the rescue of the insolvent but viable company as a going concern, or more realistically the 
rescue of its business, which Sir Keneth Cork referred to as the preservation of the commercial 
enterprise.16 
Substantively, the objectives of employment protection on the one hand, conflict with the 
objectives of insolvency law on the other hand. Consequently, this creates a tension between 
the objectives pursued by employment law and insolvency law. The chapter analyses this 
tension that TUPE Regulations create between both areas of the law during relevant transfers. 
The chapter argues that this tension, as highlighted by case law in this chapter, on the 
intersection between TUPE Regulations’ employment protection provisions, and TUPE 
Regulations’ employer protection measures has not helped to achieve the balanced needed 
between both employee protection and business rescue during relevant transfers.  
 
This chapter argues that a balance between the two objectives of employment protection and 
corporate rescue is needed if both objectives are to be pursued alongside each other. This 
balance would arguably be achieved through an interpretative solution, by using Dworkin’s 
interpretative approach to law as a remedy. 
5.2 The Scope of Employee Protection under TUPE Regulations 
Although the TUPE Regulations seek to protect various aspects of employment protection 
during relevant transfers in the UK, however, the main areas of employee protection that 
                                                          
15 J. McMullen, ‘Atypical Transfers, Atypical Workers and Atypical Employment Structures – A Case for Greater 
Transparency in Employment Issues’ (1996) 25 (4) ILJ 286, 307; J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): 
Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2009) 29 (4) ILJ 395, 402. 
16 Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (1982) [Cmnd 8558], para.193. 
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impact on corporate rescue policy objectives mainly centre on three major pillars of protection. 
The first pillar of protection is the automatic transfer provisions enshrined in TUPE regulation 
4 which automatically transfers employees’ rights, obligations and liabilities to the new buyer 
(transferee) unless the employee(s) objects to the automatic transfer. The second pillar of 
protection is the protection from unfair dismissal of employees by their employers because of 
the transfer. This is enshrined in regulation 7(1). The third pillar of protection is the protection 
from variations to employees’ contract terms and conditions of employment, collective 
agreements and other employment related benefits because of the transfer pursuant to 
regulation 4(4).  
These three areas of employee protection will be the focal point of analysis in this chapter due 
to their impact on other TUPE provisions that seek to balance the rights of employers and 
employees during relevant transfers such as regulation 7(2) (the ETO exceptions), regulation 
4(5) (permissible variation) among other provisions. 
5.3 The Automatic Transfer Provision under Regulation 4 of TUPE 2006 
The automatic transfer provision under regulation 4 of TUPE 2006 is one of the key pillars of 
protection that TUPE Regulations bestow onto employees during relevant transfers in the UK. 
By virtue of regulation 4(1) and (2) of TUPE 2006, in the context of a relevant transfer, all 
affected employees’ contracts of employment, rights and liabilities arising out of their 
employment are automatically transferred to the new buyer (transferee)17 unless the 
automatic transfer is objected to by the affected employee.18  
Therefore, the contracts of all employees that are employed in the business ‘immediately 
before the transfer’19 are by default, automatically transferred to the transferee with the same 
terms and conditions of employment as they originally had with their previous employer. The 
                                                          
17 TUPE (2006) regulation 4(1) and (2). 
18 TUPE (2006) regulation 4(7). Where an employee objects to the automatic transfer, that employee’s 
employment contract would be terminated as a result of the relevant transfer and that employee will not be 
treated for any purpose as having been dismissed by the transferor courtesy of regulation 4(8) of TUPE (2006). 
19 TUPE 2006, regulation 4(3). See also, the reasoning in Secretary of State for Employment v Spence [1986] ICR 
672, where the Secretary of State for Employment refused to pay unfair dismissals claims of employees who had 
been dismissed three hours before the relevant transfer. As the transferor was insolvent to settle claims for 
redundancies, the Secretary of State for Employment was refusing to pay on the grounds that the employees 
were employed before the transfer, therefore, liability had passed onto the transferee. However, both the ET and 
EAT held in favour of the employees.  
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employees’ contracts of employment will have effect as if they were originally entered into 
between them and the transferee.  
However, the automatic transfer provision in regulation 4 does not afford transferred 
employees new contractual benefits that they were not originally entitled to under their 
original employment contracts with the transferor. This was confirmed by the CA in Jackson v 
Computershare Investor Services Plc.20 In this case, Mrs Jackson had been transferred to the 
respondent’s company via a TUPE transfer in 2004. When she was made redundant in 2005, 
Mrs Jackson claimed enhanced severance pay which was only available to employees who had 
joined the company prior to the TUPE transfer in 2004. The CA held that TUPE Regulations did 
not give additional rights to an employee, other than the rights that the employee was entitled 
to prior to the TUPE transfer.21 
However, despite the language and text of regulation 4 (1) and (2), that is, the mandate to 
safeguard employees’ security and continuity or employment during relevant transfers in the 
UK, there are a number of concerns that have been raised in relation to the scope and 
application of regulation 4 to relevant transfers. These concerns for example, range from a lack 
of clear specification of the automatically transferrable liabilities to the consequences and 
effects that such liabilities have on business owners’ flexibility to effect business decisions that  
have an effect on insolvency outcomes.22 These concerns are analysed below. 
5.3.1 The Automatic Transfer of Rights and Liabilities 
A relevant transfer automatically transfers all of the transferor’s rights, powers, obligations and 
liabilities attached to the transferring employees’ contracts of employment.23 The transferee 
cannot cherry-pick the liabilities to inherit from the transferor.24  The automatic transfer of the 
transferor’ liabilities is mandatory.25 Therefore, the rights, obligations and liabilities of the 
                                                          
20 Jackson v Computershare Investor Services Plc [2007] EWCA Civ. 1065 (CA).  
21 [2007] EWCA Civ. 1065 (CA), at [28], [31]. 
22 J. McMullen, ‘An analysis of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ [2006] ILJ 
113; J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2009) 29 (4) ILJ 395; J. 
McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 (3) ILJ 364.  
23 TUPE (2006) Regulation 4(2) (a). 
24 This notion was emphasised in Stirling District Council v Allan [1995] ICR 1082. 
25 The mandatory transfer of the transferor’s liabilities to the transferee was confirmed by the ECJ in case C-
362/89 D’Urso v Ercole Marelli Ellectromeccanica Generale SPA [1991] ECR 1-4105, at [20].  
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transferor existing on the ‘date of the relevant transfer’26 automatically transfer to the 
transferee.   
However, regulation 4(2) does not provide clear categories of the liabilities that should 
automatically be transferred to the transferee. At EU level, the ECJ through various case law 
has established that both contractual liabilities and non-contractual liabilities can transfer as 
long as these existed before the relevant transfer took place.27  However on the UK national 
level, the absence of clarity from regulation 4(2) on the nature or categories of the liabilities 
that should automatically transfer has meant that the task of providing guidance on the 
categories of the liabilities that should automatically transfer has been assumed by the UK 
courts and tribunals. Therefore, through a number of judicial authorities,28 the courts and 
tribunals have given rulings indicating that contractual and non-contractual liabilities that 
precede a relevant transfer are capable of passing to the transferee courtesy of regulation 4(2). 
Contractual liabilities are the type of liabilities that may be expressly or impliedly attached to a 
contract of employment. These may include for example, liabilities arising from an 
employment contract, salary and wage liabilities, liabilities arising from collective bargaining 
agreements, liabilities for unfair dismissals effected by the transferor before a relevant 
transfer, etc. These liabilities, if subsisting on the date of the relevant transfer are automatically 
transferred or inherited by the transferee.29 Contingent and unknown liabilities such as claims 
for work related injuries or illnesses such as asbestos related illnesses that are unknown at the 
time of the TUPE transfer but manifest after the transfer are also capable of passing to the 
transferee.30  
Non-contractual liabilities however, are the type of liabilities that are not expressly or impliedly 
attached to an employment contract. These may include for example, liabilities arising from 
                                                          
26 This point was further emphasised by Balcombe LJ in Secretary of State for Employment v Spence and Others 
[1986] ICR 651. The mandatory automatic transfer provisions in regulation 4(2) (a) put into effect the intentions 
of Art. 3(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC which confirms that the employer’s rights and obligations existing at the date 
of the transfer automatically transfer to the transferee. The date of the transfer was held to be the date on which 
the transferor’s responsibility for carrying on the business of the entity transferred shifts from the transferor to 
the transferee. See, Celtec Ltd v Astley [2005] IRLR 647. 
27 See Case 135/83 Abels v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metallindustrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie [1985] ECR 
469; Arie Botzen and others v Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV (Case 186/83) [1985] ECR 519, para 16. 
28 See cases, such as Jefferies v Powerhouse Retail Ltd [UKEAT 1328]; Whent v T. Cartledge Ltd [1997] IRLR 153; 
Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group Ltd [2001] ICR 197; Martin & Others v South Bank University [2004] ICR 1234. 
29 Celtec Ltd v Astley [2005] IRLR 647. 
30 Martin & Others v South Bank University [2004] ICR 1234, ECJ. 
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tortious claims such as for acts of omission, breach of statutory duties or torts of negligence 
committed by the transferor prior to the relevant transfer taking place.31 Liability for injuries is 
a tortious employers’ liability but there is an implied contractual term that the employer will 
care for the employees’ health and safety.32  
In Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group Ltd33 (a conjoined hearing with Martin v Lancashire 
County Council34 by the CA) the automatic transfer of tortious liabilities to a transferee 
following a relevant transfer was considered by the court. The claimant had had an accident 
and suffered injuries some years before the relevant transfer of the business took place. Years 
following the transfer, the claimant filed a claim for negligence and breach of statutory duties 
that led to the accident and injuries suffered under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957. The court 
had to give a ruling on whether liabilities in tort were ‘under and in connection’ to the contract 
of employment and who would be the correct defendant (the transferor or the transferee) to 
the claim before the court.  
The court held that the duty of care to the employee arose out of the employment contract. 
The court also held that the transferee was liable and was therefore, the correct defendant as 
regulation 4 transferred liability for acts, omissions and torts of the transferor to the 
transferee. Therefore, the transferee was not exempted from personal injury claims of the 
transferred workforce. 
In Martin v Lancashire County Council,35 the claim for a personal injury against the transferee 
was initiated by the claimant some two years (in 1995) following the relevant transfer (in 1993). 
Both cases, Martin and Bernadone may be viewed as typical examples that highlight the impact 
and effects of TUPE Regulations (in this regard, regulation 4(2)) and how these effects have 
contributed to the tension between the policies underlying employment protection and the 
need to boost corporate rescue through the sale of insolvent but viable businesses in the UK.  
Where employees have a wider scope of initiating tortious claims against the transferee years 
following the transfer courtesy of the automatic transfer of contingent and unknown liabilities, 
                                                          
31 Per the reasoning of Peter Gibson LJ in Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group Ltd [2001] ICR 197 below. 
32 Per the reasoning in Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group Ltd [2001] ICR 197 CA; Martin v Lancashire County 
Council [2001] ICR 197 CA, discussed below. 
33 Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group Ltd [2001] ICR 197, CA. 
34 Martin v Lancashire County Council [2001] ICR 197, CA. 
35 Ibid. 
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potential buyers of the insolvent but viable businesses may be disincentivised from buying such 
businesses for fear of inheriting expensive unknown claims. However, where the scope for 
employees’ ability to initiate tortious claims against the transferee following a TUPE transfer is 
narrow, this may be beneficial for business rescue. Hence, the narrower, the scope of 
employment protection the wider the scope of business rescue. This point of discourse is 
further analysed below.   
5.3.2 Impact of the Automatic Transfer of Liabilities on Business Rescue  
Both cases of Martin and Bernadone highlight the technicalities that the mandatory inheritance 
of known and unknown liabilities present on both the transferor’s and the transferee’s 
flexibility to effect business decisions that would boost corporate rescue prospects to avoid 
potential liquidations for fear of breaching TUPE provisions. It is the contention that at the time 
of the relevant TUPE transfer, such contingent and unknown liabilities may not be known to 
both the transferor and the transferee or even contemplated to occur in the near future 
following a relevant transfer. However, the automatic transfer provision in regulation 4 (2) 
places a mandatory inheritance of such liabilities on the transferee.36  
Moreover, the transferor might have committed such torts, such as a breach of statutory duty 
or omission (that manifest into liabilities post-relevant transfer) several years before the 
relevant transfer was in contemplation but the transferee has to bear the burden of remedying 
the breaches in spite of having no complicity. Known contractual liabilities and the risks 
associated with such liabilities at the time of the transfer may be easier to measure and plan 
for (financially and economically) by the transferee during negotiations for the sale of the 
business.37  
However, the concern is that unknown liabilities may manifest into huge financial liabilities 
post transfer which may present a huge financial impact on the transferee which may defeat 
the very purposes the business was acquired in the first place. This is especially where post 
relevant transfer unknown liabilities are for claims for illnesses that manifest several years after 
                                                          
36 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 
260. 
37 J. McMullen, ‘Restructuring and TUPE’ ILJ (2012) 41(3) 358 – 362. 
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the relevant transfer took place such as asbestos related illnesses. Such illnesses usually affect 
a large number of workers and can also be initiated at any time.38  
Therefore, due to the possibility of inheriting unknown liabilities that may present a huge 
financial burden to the transferee, potential buyers of insolvent but viable businesses may 
become somewhat risk-averse39 to buying such businesses. This is especially in high stakes 
cases such as asbestos related businesses or chemical producing businesses. This may hinder 
rescue prospects of struggling businesses which may also affect employee jobs where insolvent 
but viable businesses are liquidated as a result of failing to obtain a buyer.  
5.4 Employee Protection from Unfair Dismissals under Regulation 7 
In addition to the automatic transfer provision discussed above, TUPE Regulations also provide 
for protecting employees from being unfairly dismissed by their employers because of a 
relevant transfer. Therefore, by virtue of regulation 7(1) of TUPE 2006, where an employee is 
dismissed either before or after a relevant transfer and the sole or principal reason for the 
dismissal is the transfer, such a dismissal is deemed to be automatically unfair.40 
Regulation 7(1) provides that: 
 “Where either before or after a relevant transfer, any employee of the 
transferor or transferee is dismissed, that employee shall be treated for the 
purposes of Part X of the 1996 Act (unfair dismissal) as unfairly dismissed if the 
sole or principal reason for his dismissal is the transfer”. 
                                                          
38 Under the Limitation Act 1980, a claim or an action for a personal injury or death is subjected to a three - year 
time frame within which to initiate a claim. However, the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 may be applied 
differently where a claim, such as for an illness that manifests itself after a long period of time is initiated. The 
claimant may not be subjected to a strict time frame of three years. In such instances, the time does not run 
against such a claim from the time the injury was suffered. Rather, time starts to run against the claimant from 
the time the illness is discovered. See, Limitation Act 1980, s.33.  
39 The term ‘risk-averse’ is used in this context to relate to a notion that a ‘risk-averse’ company is one which 
chooses to invest in business transactions with known risks that may provide low returns than unknown risks with 
higher predictable returns. See also, Glynn Lowth, Malcolm Prowle and Michael Zhang, ‘The Impact of Economic 
Recession on Business Strategy Planning in UK Companies’ (2010) 6 Research Executive Summary Series, online. 
<http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/Thought_leadership_docs/Research%20Funding/R268%20Economic
%20recession%20final%20V2.pdf> accessed January 2017. 
40 TUPE 2006, regulation 7(1). This point was further affirmed and emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Spaceright 
Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and Another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565. This case is discussed below and hereafter referred 
to as Spaceright. 
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Therefore, it may be drawn from the above provision that the overall aim of regulation 7(1) is 
to restrict employers from unfairly dismissing employees during relevant transfers to either 
make their insolvent but viable business attractive to potential buyers or dismissing employees 
and offering to rehire them on arguably new, revised or unfavourable terms.41 However, a 
dismissal may be potentially but not automatically unfair where the reasons for the dismissal 
are either for economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reasons42 entailing changes in the 
workforce.43 
This may have the effect that the restriction on employers not to unfairly dismiss employees 
because of relevant transfers may be relaxed where the employer dismisses employees for 
economic, technical or organisational reasons. For example, the employer may carry out staff 
restructuring so as to comply with the terms of a business, such as a retendering process.44 
Where this is the case, the economic, technical or organisational exception to the unfair 
dismissal presumption may be balanced against employer’s business rescue prospects.  
In addition to the above, regulation 7(1) has the mandate of ensuring that employers 
(transferors) or the appropriate owners of the businesses subject to a relevant transfer accept 
or assume liability for unfair dismissal because of a relevant transfer. This is especially where 
the dismissals were not for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in 
the workforce but were for strategic reasons such as to make the business on sale attractive 
to potential buyers.45  
However, it may be noted that despite the mandate by regulation 7(1) to protect employees 
from unfair dismissals because of the relevant transfer, the ARD also seeks to strike a balance 
                                                          
41 See, Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72 (discussed below). 
42 TUPE Regulations 2006, regulation 7(2). The ETO reasons are discussed below. 
43 For example, compare and contrast Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and Another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565 
where the transferor’s chief executive was dismissed prior to a relevant transfer to boost the sale of the business 
as the new buyer would be at liberty to hire a new chief executive of its choice and Crystal Palace F.C Ltd v. 
Kavanagh and Others [2014] IRLR 139, CA, where the dismissals were not to boost the business sale. Both cases 
are discussed below. 
44 For example, in Addison v Community Integrated Care [UKEAT/250779/11], the EAT weighed up the interval 
between the transfer and the dismissal before reaching its decision. The EAT also weighed up the real decision 
for the employer’s ETO exception to the unfair dismissal presumption, which in this case, was the need to comply 
with a retendering process otherwise, the employer (who was a care services provider) would not win back the 
tender which had the impact that the employer could be liquidated, which would affect employees’ jobs. 
45 In Spaceright, Mummery LJ held obiter that for an ETO reason to be available, the employer must have had the 
intention to make changes in the workforce and the continuation of the business as opposed to making the 
business attractive for sale. Mummery LJ at [47]. 
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between the interests of employees and business owners (transferors).46 Therefore, there is a 
need to balance the application and operation of regulation 7(1) against its possible 
consequences or effect on the transferors’ ability to effect business decisions that would 
enable successful sale of their insolvent but viable businesses. This is the need to keep the 
operation of regulation 7(1) within the bounds contemplated by the ARD. Per Briggs LJ in 
Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another:47  
‘[t]he tie-breaker which must be applied to resolve the potential conflict 
between the Insolvency Code and the TUPE regime for the protection of 
employees in the UK, is at least, regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations. It was 
designed to implement in the UK, the spirit and intendment of Art. 4.1 of the 
Directive…’48 
The job of balancing the interests of employees and employers during relevant transfers may 
therefore, be achieved through TUPE regulation 7(2) as a balancing provision, as shall be 
discussed below at 5.5. However, to achieve the balance needed between employees’ and 
employers’ interests during relevant transfers, judicial interpretation and application of 
regulation 7(2) would need to be approached in a manner that sets out to achieve this balance.  
However, the interpretation and application of regulation 7 during relevant transfers by the 
UK courts and employment tribunals has been the subject of inconsistent approaches and 
judgments, especially, where the application of regulation 7(1) is the subject of an economic, 
technical or organisational (ETO) reason entailing changes in the workforce, as an exception to 
the automatic unfair presumption of regulation 7(1) argued by the employer. Moreover, the 
recent changes to the scope of regulation 7(1) by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertaking (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 by repealing 
regulation 7(1)(b) of TUPE 2006 Regulation has further  put the application and scope of TUPE 
                                                          
46 J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection 
of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-426/11 Alermo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 
42 ILJ 434; Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘Transfers of Undertakings – Principles and Pragmatism in the CJEU’ (2014) 130 
ILJ 202. 
47 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA, discussed below. 
48 Ibid, at [24] Briggs LJ. 
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regulation 7 in the spotlight.49 The changes to TUPE Regulation 7 in the TUPE 2014 Regulations 
are discussed below at 5.7. 
5.5 Economic, Technical and Organisational (ETO) Reasons  
By virtue of regulation 7(2), some dismissals of employees before or after a relevant transfer 
may not be deemed automatically unfair provided the reason for the dismissal is an ETO reason 
entailing changes in the workforce. While such a dismissal may be potentially unfair, it may not 
be automatically unfair.50  In such instances, the dismissal is treated by virtue of s.98 (1) (b) of 
Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 as being carried out for either redundancy or other 
substantial reasons.  
Regulation 7(2) provides that: 
“This Paragraph applies where the sole or principal reason for the dismissal is 
an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the 
workforce of either the transferor or transferee before or after a relevant 
transfer” 
Therefore, regulation 7(2) where applicable, may be seen as an exception or a defence to the 
automatic unfair presumption of employee dismissals enshrined in regulation 7(1) during 
relevant transfers, provided the employer can provide that the reasons for the employees’ 
dismissals were for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the 
workforce.51 
In this perspective, regulation 7(2) may be seen as a balancing provision that may be used to 
balance both employees’ rights of protection from unfair dismissal and at the same time, 
balancing the rights of employers. This is by affording employers a ‘window of opportunity’ to 
make business decisions that would address their business needs as going concerns without 
fear of potential consequences or liabilities from employees for breach of regulation 7(1) or 
regulations 4(4).  
                                                          
49 For example, see: J. McMullen, ‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 ILJ 149; Charles Wynn-
Evans, ‘Transfers of Undertakings – Principles and Pragmatism in the CJEU’ (2014) 130 ILJ 202. 
50Per the reasoning in Meade & Baxendale v British Fuels Ltd [1998] ICR 387, (CA). 
51 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 
260; J. McMullen, ‘Restructuring and TUPE’ ILJ (2012) 41(3) 358 – 362. 
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However, it should be noted that regulation 7(2) may be used by employers strategically to 
escape liabilities arising from unfair dismissals during relevant transfers.52 It is the concern that 
an employer may use regulation 7(2) as an escape route to effect business decisions under the 
protection of ETO exceptions and those reasons may disingenuously be termed as ETO 
reasons.53 This is because the terms economic, technical or organisational reasons have no 
statutory definitions of what they are or what they may entail within the ARD or TUPE 
Regulations.  
However, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reforms (BERR) (former 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI)) and now the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills issued a guidance note on 28 June 200654 explaining what the terms economic, 
technical and organisational reasons may entail. However, the guidance did not give a 
definition of the terms but it gave an explanation of what the terms may involve, leaving the 
uncertainty unsolved. The guidance indicated that an economic reason may relate to the 
running or operations of the business. The guidance further provided that the term technical 
or organisational might include reasons relating to the nature of equipment or production 
process that the transferee operates.55    
To this effect, the courts and tribunals through a case by case basis have interpreted and 
applied the ETO reasons variedly, basing their decisions on the facts existing in the case before 
them. However, the courts’ and tribunals’ varied approaches have also not provided a binding 
legal precedent to date from which guidance may be drawn.56 This has created more tensions 
                                                          
52 Amie Jasmine Ahanchian, ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible Hand on the Economy by 
Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provisions’ (2002) 2 The Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 29, 49. 
53J. McMullen, ‘An analysis of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ [2006] ILJ 
113; see also the reasoning by the ECJ in Jules Dethier Equipments SA v Dassy & Another [1998] IRLR 226 that by 
virtue of article 4(1) ARD, a transferor may lawfully dismiss employees  for ETO reasons without facing liabilities 
for unfair dismissals.  
54 Available at< www.berr.gov.uk/files/file20761.pdf> (last accessed on 28/12/2016). 
55 Ibid, at pages 14, 15. 
56 For example, in Whitehouse v Blatchford and Sons Ltd [1999] IRLR 492, the EAT was of the view that an economic 
reason must be connected with the conduct or running of the business and not a dismissal made merely to achieve 
better returns for the undertaking being transferred. However, in Wheeler v Patel [1987] IRLR 211, the EAT had 
earlier held that the term economic must be interpreted as having the same contextual meaning as technical or 
organisational running or conduct of the business. The EAT further held that if the economic reason was not more 
than the desire to obtain an enhanced price or no more than the desire to achieve a sale, it would not be a reason 
that relates to the conduct of the business. 
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between the policies underlying employment protection and the policies underlying the rescue 
of insolvent but viable businesses during relevant transfers. 
Moreover, the effect of regulation 7(2) on the employee is that, if dismissed either before or 
after the transfer in question, the employee has to show that the dismissal suffered was 
because of the relevant transfer. The burden in this instance falls onto the employee. As for 
employers, they may be able to justify why such a dismissal took place, whether it was for 
economic, technical or organisational reasons and whether any changes in the work force took 
place. Nevertheless, a majority of the cases involving ETO interpretation have somehow been 
in favour of employers rather than employees.57 Whether this is a move to promote the rescue 
of insolvent but viable businesses through judicial intervention, is a question yet to be 
answered. 
In Ibex Trading v Walton & other,58 The EAT upheld an employer’s (administrators’) decision to 
dismiss forty employees out of the ninty employed prior to the relevant transfer. The EAT was 
of the view that because there had been no transfer in contemplation at the time of the 
dismissal, the dismissals were not connected with the transfer and therefore not unfair. The 
EAT further acknowledged that the business needed to be made attractive to prospective 
buyers as it was uneconomic.59 
ITC Limited that employed the claimants entered into administration in August 1991. The 
appointed administrators decided to downsize on the number of employees. The 
administrators also made some changes to the salaries of the non-transferring employees as a 
measure of reducing the company’s debts with a view to selling the business as a going 
concern.  Forty of the ninety employees were dismissed prior to selling the business in February 
1992. A claim for unfair dismissal was brought against the transferee but the dismissals were 
held to be for an economic reason entailing changes in the workforce and therefore not 
automatically unfair. 
It may be argued that this judgment may indicate that judges may interpret ETO reasons 
differently depending on the facts surrounding the employer’s reasons for the decisions made 
                                                          
57 See cases discussed below. 
58 Ibex Trading v Walton & Other [1994] ICR 907, EAT. 
59 Ibid, at [14]. 
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under the ETO principle. In this instance, the decision was more on the side of business rescue 
than employee protection. 
Similarly in Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v Dance and Others,60 Enterprise Managed 
Services Ltd (EMS) which had contracts for building and maintenance services with the Ministry 
of Defence inherited ex-employees of Williams Ltd following a TUPE transfer. After the 
transfer, EMS consulted with the transferred employees to change their terms and conditions 
to bring them in line with those of its existing employees. EMS failed to reach an agreement 
with the transferred employees. The transferred employees rejected the changes and brought 
a claim for unfair dismissals. The EAT overturned the ET’s decision which had stated that the 
dismissals were effected so as to harmonise the terms and conditions of the transferee 
employees with those of the existing employees so as to increase efficiency and productivity. 
The EAT held that: 
“…[s]ince it is open to an employer to effect productivity changes in 
accordance with the ordinary law, this does not become unlawful when there 
has been a relevant transfer if the reason is connected to that drive for 
productivity changes”61 
This is another judgment that gives employers a certain level of flexibility to exercise their 
business decisions. From the facts of this case, it seemed clear that the employer’s intention 
was to harmonise the terms of the transferred employees with those of the existing employees 
which may be contrary to the procedural and substantive provisions of regulation 4(4). 
Although it has been acknowledged that employers who inherit employees following TUPE 
transfers often find it difficult to manage them on different terms and conditions from their 
existing employees, as it would be administratively challenging,62 this judgment further 
                                                          
60 Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v Dance and Others [UKEAT/0200/11]. 
61 Ibid, at [20]. 
62 This point was part of the arguments presented in Hazel & Another v Manchester College [2014] IRLR 392 (CA) 
considered by Underhill LJ. The argument was that following the CA’s ruling in Berriman (Berriman principal) 
(especially, on the notion that post-harmonisation variation of contract terms and conditions does not entail 
changes in the workforce and therefore not a valid ETO reason), was unfair to employers acquiring businesses 
and inheriting different sets of terms and conditions of employment. That unless employers levelled up terms and 
conditions universally, they would be stuck with running various employment terms and conditions with all of the 
burden administratively. However, Underhill LJ robustly took the view that the effect of ARD and TUPE is that the 
rights of employees to preserve their existing terms prevail over the interests of the employer in achieving 
harmonisation. (This case is discussed below). 
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highlights the courts’ and tribunals’ ‘due-regard’ to the employers’ ETO reasons for making 
variations or dismissals during relevant transfers. 
5.6 Liability for Pre -Transfer and Post-Transfer Dismissals: Who Assumes Liability? 
By virtue of regulation 7(1) of TUPE 2006, liabilities for unfair dismissals prior to a relevant 
transfer that are automatically unfair are inherited by the transferee courtesy of the automatic 
transfer provision in regulation 4(1) and (2). The automatic transfer of liabilities to the 
transferee is however rebutted where the dismissals were for an ETO reason entailing changes 
in the workforce courtesy of regulation 7(2). In this instance, liabilities for pre-transfer unfair 
dismissals remain with the transferor. 
In Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine and Another,63 the chief executive officer Mr. Baillavoine 
was dismissed on the same day that the company (Ultralon Holdings Ltd) that employed him 
went into administration.  A month following his dismissal, Ultralon was sold to Spaceright 
Europe Ltd as a going concern. Mr. Baillavoine brought a claim for unfair dismissal on the 
ground that his dismissal was necessitated by the transfer. Therefore, it was automatically 
unfair.   
The ET and the EAT both held that Mr. Baillavoine’s dismissal was connected with the business 
sale which made it automatically unfair. However, the decision of the EAT was appealed to the 
CA. The CA further upheld the ET and EAT’s ruling that Mr. Baillavoine was unfairly dismissed 
by the transferor so as to make the business more attractive to the buyer, as the buyer would 
be at liberty to appoint a CEO of its choice following the relevant transfer.   
Although regulation 7(1) (b) (the requirement for the dismissal to be connected with the 
transfer) has now been repealed by TUPE 2014, Spaceright is good authority and a warning to 
business owners that employee dismissals prior to a relevant transfer to make the business 
more attractive to potential buyers would be deemed an unfair practice and contrary to the 
spirit and intentions of the ARD and TUPE. The dismissals would also fall into the current 
provision of regulation 7(1) in TUPE 2014 that such a dismissal would be because of the 
transfer.   
                                                          
63 Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565. 
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However, earlier in Thompson v SCS Consulting Ltd64 the EAT had held that an employee, Mr. 
Thompson who had been dismissed eleven hours before a relevant transfer took place was 
dismissed for an ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce and therefore, the dismissal 
was not automatically unfair. The EAT held in this case that the dismissal of Mr. Thompson was 
part of the need by the employer to reduce the size of the workforce as the business was 
overstaffed, inefficient and insolvent. Therefore, despite the fact that the dismissal was so 
close to the relevant transfer, it was held not to be a case of a dismissal to secure the sale of 
the insolvent undertaking. In this case, liability for the dismissal remained with the transferor.  
However, on analysing both cases above, it may be submitted that both varying decisions 
illustrate that the interpretation and application of regulation 7 to relevant transfer cases is a 
still a major challenge to courts and tribunals. For example, in Thompson, it may be argued that 
the dismissal of Mr. Thompson would, on the normal principles of regulation 7(1), be unfair 
because of its closeness to the relevant transfer. Mr. Thompson was immediately employed 
until he was dismissed on the same day the transferor went into administration. Moreover, the 
fact that the dismissal was for the need to downsize on the workforce would be contrary to 
the jurisprudence of regulation 7(1), yet the dismissal was held to be for an ETO reason, yet in 
Spaceright, the dismissal was held to be automatically unfair mainly because of its ‘connection 
with the transfer’. 
From the discussion above, it may be concluded that this area of TUPE is still proving a 
challenge both in application and interpretation to employers, employees and the courts and 
tribunals. Although the courts and tribunals ought to balance the interests of employees and 
employers in interpreting and applying economic, technical and organisational exceptions, the 
lack of a statutory definition or binding precedent in this area of TUPE is not helping to balance 
the tension between employment protection and the rescue of insolvent but viable business 
in the UK. This is an area of TUPE that Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law would help to 
balance. This point of discourse is broadly analysed in the next chapter, chapter six at 6.5.3 and 
6.5.4.     
On this note therefore, it may be submitted that the courts and tribunals in their attempts to 
balance the effect of regulation 7 on the policy objectives of employment protection and the 
                                                          
64 Thompson v SCS Consulting Ltd [2001] IRLR 801, EAT (hereafter Thompson). 
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policy objectives of corporate rescue, are relying more on the ‘reasons for the specific 
dismissals’ over the ‘ultimate objective’ of the sale or relevant transfer in interpreting and 
applying regulation 7 to relevant transfer cases. These two notions were explored by the Court 
of Appeal in Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another.65  
Crystal Palace F.C had become insolvent and was struggling to pay its bills and invoices as they 
fell due. The administrator decided to dismiss some of the employees in a bid to reduce the 
wage bill as there was no money to pay for employee wages and salaries. At the time of the 
dismissals, there were serious prospects of the club being liquidated as the possibility of selling 
the club was complicated as a result of the seperate ownership of the club and the stadium. 
There was no prospective buyer and no serious interests in purchase had been expressed. The 
administrator’s decison for the dismissals was to cut the wage bill and mothball the club in the 
hope that a buyer would be found. The dismissed employees argued that they were dismissed 
to make the club more attractive to buyers. 
The ET initially held that the dismissals were connected with the transfer but were for an ETO 
reason and therefore, not automatically unfair. The ET further stated that the administrator’s 
‘reason for the dismissals’ was to reduce the wage bill in order to continue the club and the 
‘ultimate objective’ was to sell the club. The ET’s reason was that at the time of the dismissals, 
the administrator was not contemplating selling the club as the club was faced with obstacles 
of separate ownership. This decison was appealed.  
The EAT held that the ET’s findings were untenable by stating that the adminstrator’s decison 
to mothball the club was to continue the business.66 The EAT was of the view that the possible 
conclusion was that the dismissals were for the purposes of selling the club67 which took place 
one week later, although at the time, the buyer was not known and the sale was not certain. 
The CA upheld the ET’s decision that the dismissals were connected to the transfer but for an 
ETO reason and therefore not automatically unfair. The CA drew on the formulation of 
Mummery LJ in Spaceright68 and was able to note the difference between Spaceright and 
                                                          
65 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, (CA). 
66  Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2013] IRLR 291, EAT, at [30]. 
67 Ibid, EAT, at [31]. 
68 “…[f]or an ETO reason to be available, there must be an intention to change the workforce and to continue to 
conduct the business, as distinct from the purpose of selling it. It is not available in the case of dismissing an 
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Crystal Palace. The distinction was that in Spaceright, the chief executive was dismissed to 
make the sale of the business more attractive to the buyer, as the buyer would be at liberty to 
appoint a new chief excutive.  However in Crystal Palace, the dismissal of the employees was 
not to make the sale of the club more attractive to the buyer. The dismissals were borne out 
of the fact that the business had run out of money to pay for employee wages. Continued 
employment of the dismissed employees would drive the club to liquidation. Therefore, the 
dismissals were required and “unquestionably entailed changes in the workforce”69 
It may therefore be noted that the relevance of the CA’s decision in Crystal Palace in relation 
to the application of regulation 7 to relevant transfers is its distinction of the ‘reasons for the 
dismissals’ and the ‘ultimate objective’ of the employer (transferor). The CA concluded (as did 
the ET) that the sale would often be the ‘ultimate objective’ of the employer but the effective 
‘reason for the dismissal’ may be the reduction of the workforce in the meantime to keep the 
business as a going concern in which case, changes to the workforce may pass for an ETO 
reason. 
However, the EAT’s conclusion that the dismissals were for the purposes of selling the club 
should not be overlooked despite the fact the CA held the dismissals to be for an ETO reason 
entailing changes in the workforce. It should be remembered that in most businesses, labour 
is one of the biggest costs of production or service provision.70 Therefore, where employers 
are faced with financial difficulties, labour is often the first point of production costs reduction 
to be contemplated.71  
However, the judgment in Crystal Palace and the repeal of regulation 7 (2) (b) by the TUPE 
Regulations 2014 have narrowed the scope of employment protection from unfair dismissals 
during relevant transfers as discussed below at 5.7. Moreover, the introduction of new 
regulation 4(5A) by the TUPE Regulations 2014 which makes changes to the employees’ 
                                                          
employee to enable the administrators make the business of the company a more attractive proposition to the 
prospective of a going concern. Mummery LJ, in Spaceright at [47]. 
69 Per Maurice Kay LJ in Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA, at [14]. 
70 Lester C. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, (W. Morrow & Co, New York 1996); J. E Stiglitz, ‘Employment, Social 
Justice and Societal Well-being’ (2002) 141 Int’l Labour Rev. 9 -29. 
71 Oliver Hyams, Employment Aspects of Business Reorganisation (OUP, Oxford 2006); R M. Hynes, 
‘Reorganizations as Redemption’ (2011) 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 183. 
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workplace location to fall among factors that ‘entail changes in the workforce’ has further 
narrowed employee protection during relevant transfers.  
It may be remembered that prior to the TUPE 2014 changes, TUPE 2006, regulation 7 provided 
that: 
‘’7(1) Where either before or after a relevant transfer, any employee of the 
transferor or transferee is dismissed, that employee shall be treated for the 
purposes of Part X of the 1996 Act (unfair dismissal) as unfairly dismissed if the 
sole or principal reason for his dismissal is; 
(a) the transfer itself; or 
(b) a reason connected with the transfer that is not an economic, technical or 
organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce.’ 
However, under TUPE 2014, regulation 7(1)(b) has been repealed. Therefore, an employee can 
no longer claim for unfair dismissal against an employer on the ground that the reason for his 
or her dismissal was connected with the transfer that was not for economic, technical or 
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce. The changes to regulation 7 are 
discussed below. 
5.7 Regulation 7 under TUPE 2014 Changes  
Prior to the changes to the TUPE 2006 brought by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)(Amendment) Regulations 2014,72 it was a 
requirement of regulation 7 (1) (a) and (b) that a dismissal would be automatically unfair where 
the reason for the dismissal is the transfer, or a reason ‘connected with the transfer’, that is 
not an ETO reason entailing changes in workforce.73 However, TUPE 2014 amended  regulation 
7(1)(b) so that it is no longer sufficient for the dismissal to be ‘connected with’ the transfer in 
establishing if the dismissal was automatically unfair or not. In effect, regulation 7(1)(b) has 
now been repealed by TUPE 2014.  
On the backdrop of the changes to regulation 7(1), employees were already subject to a 
‘qualifying test’ in terms of qualification period required to claim unfair dismissal from their 
                                                          
72 Hereafter cited as TUPE 2014 for short. 
73 TUPE 2006, regulation 7(1) (a) and (b).  
117 
 
employers in case of a relevant transfer. Employees are required to satisfy a two year qualifying 
period, before a claim for unfair dismissal pursuant to regulation 7(1) may be made. This may 
be seen as being unfair to employees, especially those that may not have completed a two 
year period of employment with their employer during which a TUPE relevant transfer takes 
place.74  
Their employment relationship that is being terminated may be an employee’s only source of 
livelihood. If that employment is unfairly terminated and employees are not rewarded any 
compensatory damages because they have not been in that employment continuiously for two 
years, this may leave them in an unfavourable position. This would be in contrast to their 
colleagues that are able to satisfy the two year qualification period, and therefore, awarded 
some form of compensation for the loss of their jobs.  
In addition, continuity of employment (for the purposes of regulation 7(1)) may be affected 
where there are breaks in employment which may affect the mutuality of obligation between 
the employee and the employer.75  Similarly, under ERA 1996, such as s.94, an employee has 
a right not to be unfiarly dismissed by the employer but there is a qualification requirement 
under s.108 for an employee to have been employed for two years prior to the dismissal before 
that employee may be qualified to initiate such a claim against the employer.  
In light of the concerns highlighted above in relation to the application of regulation 7 to 
relevant transfers, it may be submitted that a balance in the pursuit of both employers’ and 
employees’ interests during relevant transfers is needed. Per Briggs LJ,76 there is a need to 
contain regulation 7 within its parameters, if both policies underlying employee protection 
during relevant transfers and those of boosting corporate rescue as intended by both the ARD 
and TUPE are to be pursued simultaneously. This is because, as discussed above at 5.5, 
                                                          
74 However, in Milligan & Another v Securicor Cleaning Ltd [1995] IRLR 288, EAT, the EAT allowed unfair dismissal 
claims of some employees that had not completed the two years qualifying period with their employer to stand 
relying on the second part of Art. 4.1 of the 1977 Directive. The EAT however, was very specific that any such 
exception would have to be specifically identified by the Court. 
75 Carmichael & Another v National Power Plc., [1999] ICR 1226 (HL). However, continuity is preserved where gaps 
between employments are related to the machinery of the transfer. See, Macer v Abafast Ltd [1990] IRLR 477 
(HL). 
76 Per Briggs LJ, ‘…[t]he tie-breaker which must be applied to resolve the potential conflict between the Insolvency 
Code and the TUPE regime for the protection of employees in the UK, is at least, regulation 7 of the 2006 
Regulations. It was designed to implement in the UK, the spirit and intendment of Art. 4.1 of the Directive…’ Briggs 
LJ in Crystal Palace at [24]. 
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regulation 7(2) ought to be approached as a balancing provision between the interests of 
employees and employers but its application to relevant transfers has so far failed to achieve 
the balance needed. 
 Case law from the courts and tribunals on the interpretation and application of regulation 7(2) 
has highlighted a significant number of inconsistent judgments, which has not been helpful in 
balancing both policy objectives. This is an area of TUPE Regulations that Dworkin’s 
interpretative approach to law may help to address by informing an interpretative approach 
that may arguably, help to achieve the balance needed in pursuing both employers’ and 
employees’ interests during relevant transfers. The interpretation and application of regulation 
7(2) to relevant transfers in light of Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law is discussed in 
the next chapter at 6.3 and 6.5. 
5.8 Protection from Contractual Terms and Conditions Variation  
During relevant transfers, employees are protected from having their terms and conditions of 
employment varied by the transferor or transferee where the reason for the variation is the 
transfer.77 This pillar of employee protection was affirmed by the ECJ in the case of Foreningen 
AF Arbedjsldere I Denmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall78 which serves as the founding authority in 
relation to prohibiting employee contractual terms and conditions variation by employers 
before and after a relevant transfer.  
The ECJ held in this case that an employment relationship may be altered with regard to the 
transferee to the same extent as it could have been for the transferor, provided the reason for 
the amendment is not the transfer itself.79 The provision in regulation 4(4) is to ensure that 
employees enjoy the same terms and conditions of employment post-transfer as they did pre-
transfer. 
Regulation 4(4) provides that: 
“Subject to regulation 9, in respect of a contract of employment that is, or will 
be transferred by paragraph (1), any purported variation of the contract shall 
be void if the sole or principal reason for the variation is the transfer.” 
                                                          
77 TUPE 2006, regulation 4(4). 
78 [1988] IRLR 315 ECJ and hereafter referred to as (Daddy’s Dance Hall). 
79 Ibid, at [33]. 
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However, despite the protection from variation to employee contracts pre-and post-relevant 
transfer, there is no statutory timescale within regulation 4(4) upon which an employer may 
or may not vary employment terms and conditions. The wording in regulation 4(4) places a 
prohibition on variations post transfer but does not give a specific timeframe within which such 
a prohibition on variation applies. This has meant that the scope of application of this provision 
has been decided by the courts and tribunals on a case by case basis.  
However, these judgments highlight the lack of a single binding approach to be adopted by 
courts and tribunals in dealing contractual variations during relevant transfers. This further 
highlights the challenges that courts and tribunals face in interpreting and applying ETO 
reasons80 to facts before the courts and tribunals as the employer often has a wider scope 
within which to devise an ETO reason to justify the need for the variation or harmonisation of 
contractual terms and conditions. This has not helped ultimately to balance both the policy 
objectives of employment protection on the one hand and the policy objectives of corporate 
rescue on the other.81 
For example, in London Metropolitan University v Sackur & Others,82 the transferee University, 
London Metropolitan University (LMU) had been formed following a merger of two 
universities. After the merger, LMU proposed to harmonise the terms and conditions of 
employment contracts and started negotiations with employees. The negotiations broke down 
and LMU imposed new terms and conditions. A claim for an unfair dismissal resulting from 
unlawful contractual variations was initiated against the transferee two years after the 
transfer. The ET found for the dismissed employees, holding that the dismissals were borne 
out of a variation (harmonisation) of contract terms following the transfer. At the EAT, the 
transferee’s ETO defense was rejected as the harmonisation attempt did not entail changes in 
the work force.  
                                                          
80 The ETO exceptions are broadly discussed above at 5.5. 
81 S. Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 260; 
J. McMullen, ‘Restructuring and TUPE’ ILJ (2012) 41(3) 358 – 362; J. McMullen, ‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) 
Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 ILJ 149. 
82 London Metropolitan University v Sackur & Others [UKEAT/0286/06]. (Hereafter London Met). 
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However, in Ralton v Havering College of Further and Higher Education,83 the EAT held that 
additional factors, such as economic, technical or organisational reasons, may influence the 
employer to make business decisions, such as pay structural changes and may rely on these 
reasons as a ground to vary contract terms and conditions. 
In this case, three college lecturers were employed on terms effected by a collective bargaining 
agreement between the local authorities and their recognised trade unions. Some of the 
employees were on fixed term contracts and upon expiry of those contracts, they were offered 
new contracts but on new terms in accordance with the College’s terms and conditions. Some 
accepted the terms and promotion while others rejected them. An action was later brought 
against the employer for unfair contractual variations following a relevant transfer.  
The main focus of the EAT in this case was to establish whether the changes to the terms of 
employment were as a result of the transfer which would render the variations invalid. The 
EAT held that as a requirement of the ARD on the automatic transfer of the employment 
relations, the lecturers would transfer on their existing terms and conditions. However, the 
college had the flexibility to offer new terms and conditions on promotions or renewals of fixed 
term contracts because some additional factors in the education sector, such as the demand 
for courses, need for promotions, et cetera would influence business decision. 
From these two judgments, it may be submitted that despite the need to protect employees 
from unfair variations to their contract terms following a relevant transfer, the need to protect 
businesses to enable them to make changes so that they may operate successfully has not 
been overlooked by the Judges.84 Very often, an employer’s attempts to harmonise terms and 
conditions of employment involve changes to employees’ term and conditions of 
employment.85 When affected employees reject these harmonised terms and conditions, 
claims for unfair dismissal or constructive dismissal precipitated by the changes to their 
employment terms and condition may be initiated by the employees. However, TUPE 
                                                          
83 Ralton v Havering College of Further and Higher Education [2001] IRLR 743, EAT. (Hereafter Ralton). 
84 For example, see cases such as; Thompson v SCS Consulting Ltd [2001] IRLR 801, EAT; Spaceright Europe Ltd v. 
Baillavoine and another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565; Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72; Crystal Palace 
F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, (CA). 
85 Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v Dance and Others [UKEAT/0200/11]; Smith & Ors v Trustees of Brooklands 
College [2011] UKEAT 0128/0509]; Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72.  
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Regulations offer employers a broader scope within which to justify the reasons for the 
variation or harmonisation of contract terms and conditions via the ETO exception route.86  
In London Met, although the claimants based their claim on unfair dismissal by the employer, 
it may be argued that their unfair dismissal claim was occasioned by the variation to their 
contractual terms and conditions through harmonisation. In Ralton, the claim was based on 
unfair variation to contract terms and conditions. However, despite both cases being initiated 
on different grounds, they both highlight the technicalities and challenges presented by TUPE 
Regulations especially on the interpretation and application of the ETO exceptions to 
contractual variations during relevant transfers.  
The relevance of certain provisions, such as regulation 7(2) that provides employers with a 
degree of flexibility to justify their reasons for the need to vary contract terms and conditions 
for either economic, technical or organisational needs of their businesses has meant that 
business owners are not over burdened by TUPE Regulations from operating successfully.87 
In addition to the lack of a specified timeframe upon which contractual variations may be 
justified discussed above, TUPE Regulations allow some other variations to contractual terms 
and conditions to be agreed under what is termed as ‘permissible variations’ under regulation 
4(5) of TUPE 2006. These permissible variations are discussed below. 
5.8.1 Permissible Variation under Regulation 4 
Regulation 4(4) may not prevent an employer from varying employment contract terms and 
conditions where there are economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in 
the workforce as reasons for the variations provided the variations are agreed between the 
employer and the employee.88  
Regulation 4(5) of TUPE 2006 provides that: 
                                                          
86 S. Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 260; 
J. McMullen, ‘Restructuring and TUPE’ ILJ (2012) 41(3) 358 – 362; J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General 
Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-
426/11 Alermo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 42 ILJ 434.  
87 S. Hardy and Richard W. Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL 336, 378; F. Baumann, ‘On Unobserved 
Worker Hetrogeneity and Employment Protection’ (2010) 29 (2) E.J L & E 155, 175. 
88 TUPE 2006, regulation 4(5). 
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‘‘Paragraph (4) shall not prevent an employer and his employee whose contract of 
employment is, or will be transferred by Paragraph (1) from agreeing a variation of that 
contract if the sole or principal reason for the variation is: 
(a) a reason connected with the transfer that is an economic, technical or 
organisational  reason entailing changes in the workforce  
(b) a reason unconnected with the transfer.’’ 
From the substantive reading of this provision, it may be construed that this provision aims at 
affording a certain degree of flexibility to employers to be able to negotiate with employees to 
agree to certain contractual variations through peaceful measures. This would be a form of 
encouraging entrepreneurial relations between the employer and the employees which would 
be a welcome provision given the tension that exists between employment protection policy 
objectives and corporate rescue policy objectives during relevant transfers.89  
However, note ought to be taken of the possibility that employers may use this flexibility 
afforded via regulation 4(5) for strategic purposes to vary contract terms and conditions. 
Employers often have stronger bargaining powers than employees, especially during industrial 
negotiations between employers and employees.90 Moreover, most cases involving 
negotiations between employers and employees during relevant transfer variations to contract 
terms and conditions have been in favour of employers.91 
 In addition, regulation 4(5) (b) of TUPE 2006 has now been amended by TUPE 2014. The new 
Regulation 4(5) of TUPE 2014 provides that: 
“(5) Paragraph (4) does not prevent a variation of the contract of employment 
if—  
                                                          
89 S. Hardy and Richard W. Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL 336, 378; F. Baumann, ‘On Unobserved 
Worker Heterogeneity and Employment Protection’ (2010) 29 (2) E.J L & E 155, 175. J. McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation 
of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 (3) ILJ 364. 
90 J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2000) 29 ILJ 395, 402. 
91 See cases, such as Nationwide Building Society v Benn & Others [UKEAT/0273/09/JOJ]; Ralton v Havering College 
of Further and Higher Education [2001] IRLR 743 EAT; Hazel and Another v Manchester College [2014] IRLR 392, 
CA. 
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(a) the sole or principal reason for the variation is an economic, technical, or 
organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce, provided that the 
employer and employee agree that variation; or  
(b) the terms of that contract permit the employer to make such a variation.” 
Therefore, the new regulation 4(5)(b) of TUPE 2014 now affords an employer power to vary an 
employee’s contract where the terms of the contract permit the employer to do so, which has 
further given an employer an edge over an employee during negotiations for variations of 
contract terms and conditions during relevant transfer.  
5.8.2 Permissible Variation during ‘Relevant Insolvency Proceedings’  
In addition to agreed permissible variations to contracts terms above, other variations to 
contract terms and conditions are permissible during relevant transfers where the objective is 
to safeguard jobs and continuity of employment under regulation 9.92 However, the variation 
should only be carried out if it would safeguard ‘employment opportunities’ by ensuring the 
survival and continuation of the business where the transferor is subject to ‘relevant insolvency 
proceedings’ as defined under regulation 8(6) of TUPE 2006. 
Relevant insolvency proceedings are the types of insolvency proceedings that have been 
instituted not with a view to the liquidation of the business assets of the company and which 
are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner under regulation 8(6) of TUPE 2006.93 
Relevant insolvency proceedings are defined under regulation 8(6) as: 
“…insolvency proceedings that have been opened in relation to the transferor, 
not with the view to the liquidation of the business assets and which are under 
the supervision of an insolvency practitioner.” 
In light of the substantive and procedural provisions of regulation 8(6), corporate rescue 
processes, such as administration may be termed as ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ as these 
rescue processes are instituted with the aim of saving the company as a going concern and not 
the liquidation of the assets of the company,94 even if this is not often the outcome in 
                                                          
92 TUPE 2006, regulation 9(1). 
93 Regulation 8(6) of TUPE 2006.  
94 For example, see IA 1986, Sch. B1, para.3(1) that sets out the hierarchical objectives of the administration 
proceedings, the first being the rescue of the company as a going concern. See also, Oakland v Wellswood [2009] 
EWCA Civ. 1094; OTG v Barke & Ors [2011] IRLR 272; Key2 Law (Surrey)LLP v De’ Antiquis [2011] EWVA Civ. 1564. 
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practice.95 Therefore, TUPE provisions, such as the automatic transfer of the employment 
relationships under regulation 4 and the protection from unfair dismissals because of a 
relevant transfer under regulation 7(1) apply to these relevant insolvency proceedings. 
In this context, any variations to employees’ terms and conditions by the employer are deemed 
invalid.  The variations would only be valid if there is an agreement between the appropriately 
recognised representatives of the employees or specially elected employee representatives 
with their recognised trade unions. The agreement must be recorded in writing, signed copies 
and guidance given to the affected employees.96 
5.8.3 Variation to Contract Terms and Conditions post TUPE 2014 Changes 
The amendments to the TUPE Regulations 2006 in 2014 have changed the way, through which 
protection to employees from having their contractual terms and conditions, varied by their 
employers before and after a relevant transfer is currently approached by employers, courts 
and tribunals.97    
As a recap, regulation 4(4) of TUPE 2006 provided that any purported variation to an 
employee’s contract would be void where; (a) the sole or principal reason was the transfer 
itself or (b) a reason connected with the transfer that was not an ETO reason entailing changes 
in the workforce. 
However, by virtue of the TUPE 2014 amendments, regulation 4(4)(b) (the requirement for the 
variation to be connected with the transfer) to render it void has been repealed. Therefore, 
regulation 4(4) of TUPE 2014 provides that; 
‘Subject to regulation 9, any purported variation of contract of employment 
that is, or will be, transferred by para (1), is void where the sole or principal 
reason for the variation is the transfer.’ 
                                                          
95 For example, see S. Frisby, “Report on insolvency outcomes - The Insolvency Service” at 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.p
df> accessed December 2017.  
96 TUPE 2006, regulation 9(5)(a) –(b). 
97 J. McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 (3) ILJ 364; J. McMullen, 
‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 (2) ILJ 149. 
125 
 
Therefore, with effect from 31 January 2014, a variation to an employment contract is only 
void where the sole or principal reason for the variation is the transfer. A variation by the 
employer, is no longer void where it is for a reason connected with the transfer that is not an 
ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce as was the case under TUPE 2006 regulation 4 
(4)(b).  
In light of this change to regulation 4(4), it may be analysed that this change narrows the scope 
of application of regulation 4(4) to relevant transfers as compared with the scope originally 
under the TUPE 2006 Regulations. This is because, reasons, such as changes to the working 
patterns, working hours or conditions of employment that may be ‘connected with’ the 
contract of employment that is subject to a relevant transfer that would be argued to be 
‘connected with’ the transfer by employees are no longer relevant to render such variations 
invalid.  
As a result, this has arguably, presented employers with a broader scope within which they can 
devise circumstances under which variations to employment contracts may be justified than 
was the case prior to the 2014 amendments. For example, a loss of a tendering proposal, 
reduction in projected profits or changes in market trends may arguably, be used by an 
employer to justify contractual variations despite the fact that such changes would have 
exhibited a degree of ‘connection with’ the transfer which would have rendered such 
variations void.98 
In Hazel v Manchester College,99 Manchester College tendered for contracts to provide 
offender learning in prisons thereby acquiring 1,500 employees via a TUPE transfer. This was 
in addition to almost 2000 other employees already working in the offender learning and 3000 
employees in other departments in the College. Following the transfer, the College sought to 
restructure employees’ contracts on grounds of public funding cuts, especially in the offender 
learning service and other hidden costs. The other ground was that employees in the offender 
learning service were on different terms and conditions to the rest of employees in other 
                                                          
98 For example, see, London Metropolitan University v Sackur [UKEAT/26/06]; Abellio London Ltd (formerly Travel 
London Ltd) v Musse & others [2012] IRLR 360; Meter-U Ltd v Ackroyd [2012] IRLR 367. 
99 Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72; [2014] IRLR 392 CA. 
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departments which was administratively challenging and risked equal pay claims from other 
employees. 
There were proposals by the College for staff to sign new contract terms and conditions. 
Employees that would reject the new proposed variations would be dismissed and offered re-
engagement on new terms and conditions. The claimants objected to the changes. They were 
dismissed and brought a claim against the College. 
The EAT’s100 earlier ruling that the dismissals (orchestrated by the proposed contractual 
variations) were automatically unfair was upheld by the CA.101 The CA followed the formulation 
in Berriman v Delabole Slate102 and held that the phrase ETO entailing changes in the workforce 
was part of the ETO reason.103 Therefore, the dismissals followed by re-engagement of another 
would not constitute a change in the workforce.  
However, earlier in Smith v Trustees of Brooklands College,104 the EAT had held that a decision 
by the employer to vary contract terms and conditions following a relevant transfer to rectify 
a pay anomaly was not invalid and therefore did not contravene the provisions of regulation 
4(4). Four teaching assistants from Spelthorne College had transferred to Brooklands College 
via a TUPE Transfer. At Spelthorne College they worked part time hours but were paid a full 
time salary and also enjoyed the same benefits as full time staff. Brooklands proposed 
variations to salary terms and conditions so as to align them with the sector at large. The 
variations were to the material detriment of the transferred teaching assistants. They brought 
an action for unlawful variations to their salary terms and conditions. They also argued that 
‘but for’ the transfer these variations would not have happened. 
The EAT held that the contractual variations could have been done at any time irrespective of 
the TUPE transfer. It was an attempt to rectify a pay anomaly. It was the genuine belief by the 
                                                          
100 Hazel & Another v The Manchester College [UKEAT/0642/11/RN] EAT, at [59]. 
101  Hazel v Manchester College [2014] IRLR 392, CA at [6] (Underhill LJ). 
102 Berriman v Delabole Slate [1985] ICR 546. CA. ‘A change in the terms and conditions of employees who are 
continuing in employment cannot be a change in the workforce. A change in the workforce means a change in 
the number or composition of the workforce’. 
103 Per Underhill LJ, Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72; [2014] IRLR 392 CA., at [15]. 
104 Smith v Trustees of Brooklands College [EAT/0128/11]. 
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decision maker (the employer) that the four teaching assistants had been mistakenly paid at a 
different rate which was out of step with the rest of the employees in the same sector.  
HHJ McMullen held obiter that, the ‘but/for’ test, in other words, ‘…the contention by the 
claimants that ‘but for the transfer, their pay structure would not have been varied…’” by their 
employer’ was not the correct test to apply in such a case. Rather, ‘what was in the mind of 
the employer.’105 If the ‘but for’ test was to be applied, it would imply that ‘but for the transfer’, 
the four teaching assistants’ pay would not have been reduced by the employer. HHJ McMullen 
further opined that the question would be; what was the reason that caused the employer to 
reduce the pay?  
However, the decision in Brooklands may be seen as a policy decision by the EAT to let 
employers take business decisions that would benefit their businesses’ restructuring and 
continuity prospects without fear of burdensome transfer liabilities. The judgment further 
highlights the different approaches through which the courts and tribunals interpret and apply 
employers’ ETO reasons for effecting contractual variations pre and post relevant transfers, 
which has attracted some varied commentaries.106 
However, despite the inconsistencies in the judgments above, it may be submitted that the 
changes brought by the TUPE 2014 to regulation 4, especially, on the requirement for an ETO 
reason to entail ‘changes in the workforce’ has somewhat narrowed the scope of protection 
for employees on the one hand, and widened the scope for employers on the other.  
The effect of this change in the scope of employment protection is that, the narrower the scope 
of employment protection provisions, the less the potential liabilities on the employer 
(transferor) and prospective buyer of the business (transferee). Although this would be good 
for corporate rescue as insolvent but viable business may be more attractive to potential 
buyers due to fewer potential liabilities, however, narrowing the scope of protection to 
employee would arguably, create further imbalances between employment protection and 
corporate rescue.107  
                                                          
105 Ibid, HHJ McMullen, at 28.  
106 See J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights 
Direct’ (2003) 22 Int. Rev. Law. Econ. 443, 463; J. McMullen, ‘Restructuring and TUPE’ (2012) 41(3) ILJ 358 – 362. 
107 J. McMullen, ‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 (2) ILJ 149. 
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In addition to changes brought about by the TUPE 2014, TUPE 2014 Regulations have 
incorporated a new regulation 4(5A) which provides that ‘changes in the workforce’ now 
include changes to the place where employees are employed or carry out their work. More 
still, agreed variations to workplace changes between the employer and employee following a 
relevant transfer would no longer be void.108  
Regulation 4(5A) states that: 
‘’(5A) In paragraph (5), the expression “changes in the workforce” includes a 
change to the place where employees are employed by the employer to carry 
on the business of the employer or to carry out work of a particular kind for 
the employer (and the reference to such a place has the same meaning as in 
section 139 of the 1996 Act.’’ 
Although this may be seen as a move by the TUPE Regulation to consolidate a form of industrial 
democracy by encouraging employers and employees to negotiate and agree to certain 
contractual variations, such as to workplace concerns following relevant transfers, however, 
TUPE 2014 may have inadvertently widened the ‘pool’ of factors that may entail changes in the 
workforce that may weaken the protection to employees from contractual variations before 
and after relevant transfers that the ARD originally intended.109  
Contractual variations are also permissible where the terms of the contract allow the employer 
to make such variations pursuant to regulation 4(5)(b). However, it is worth noting that 
permissible variations  as prescribed in regulation 4(5) require the ETO reasons for the variation 
to entail chnages in the workforce, otherwise, a mere variation to the contractual terms and 
conditions, such as changes to employees’ title110, without changes in the actual number of 
employees or changes in the activities would be void.111  
                                                          
108 TUPE 2014, regulation 4 (5A). 
109 Professor Albert Dicey’s observations on law’s unintended outcomes may be a guiding principle here. Professor 
Dicey observes that, ‘[t]he beneficial effect of state intervention, especially in the form of legislation are indirect, 
immediate, and so to speak, visible, whilst its evil effects are gradual, indirect and lie out of sight…’ see, Albert V. 
Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England in the 19th Century, Richard Vande Wetering (ed.) (New Liberty Fund 
Book, Indianapolis, 2008) 257-58. 
110 For example, see Green v Elan Care Ltd [UKEAT/0018/01] where the court held that a change (demotion) in 
title from a senior manager to a senior carer did not entail changes in the workforce. 
111 Per Underhill LJ, Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72; [2014] IRLR 392 CA, at [15]. 
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As a consequence, genuine cases of dismissals or redundancies resulting from changes to 
workplace locations are no longer automatically unfair and employees may not be able to 
initiate claims against their employers in this regard as was the case under TUPE 2006. 
Moreover, it is a concern that where an employer fails to agree voluntary variations to work 
place changes with employees, the employer may arguably, be able to devise an ETO reason 
to justify the need for changes to employees’ workplace locations due to the widened scope 
of regulation 4(5) (a) and such variations may not be held to be ‘connected with’ the transfer 
as this requirement is no longer applicable.112  
In addition, the widened scope of regulation 4(5A) may persuade employers to insert variation 
clauses, such as to workplace locations into employment contracts and may use such variation 
clauses to justify contractual variations before or after relevant transfers.113 Moreover, new 
regulation 4(5A) may be construed as being in contrast with regulation 4(9) of TUPE 2006 which 
states that ‘…[w]here a relevant transfer involves or would involve a substantial change in 
working conditions  to the employee’s material detriment,… that employee may treat the 
contract of employment as having been terminated …and the employee shall be treated …as 
having been dismissed by the employer.’114  
By analysing regulation 4(9) of TUPE 2006 above, one may infer that where an employer 
executes a contractual variation such as a variation to an employee’s workplace location to 
that employee’s material detriment, that employee would be at liberty to initiate a claim 
against that employer for constructive dismissal where the sole or principal reason for the 
variation is the transfer per TUPE 2006.115 However, this protective provision of TUPE 2006 is 
substantively weakened by regulation 4(5A).116  
The term ‘changes in the workforce’ as stated under regulation 4(5A) TUPE 2014 now includes 
a ‘change to the place where employees are employed by the employer to carry on the 
                                                          
112 Bateman v Asda Stores Ltd [UKEAT/0221/09]. 
113 See for example, Bateman v Asda Stores Ltd [UKEAT/0221/09] where the staff handbook contained a clause 
that the company (Asda) ‘reserved the right to review, revise, amend or replace the contents of the employees’ 
handbook from time to time reflecting the changing need of the business’. Asda used this clause to impose a pay 
structure on its employees without further consent from them. 
114 See, TUPE 2006, regulation 4(9). 
115 See cases such as Tapere v South London and Maudsley NHS Trust [2009] IRLR 972; Abellio London Ltd (formerly 
Travel London Ltd) v Musse & others [2012] IRLR 360; RR Donnelley Global Document Solutionss Group Ltd v (1) 
Besagni and (2) NSL Ltd [UKEAT/0397/13]. 
116 Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘Transfers of Undertakings – Principles and Pragmatism in the CJEU’ (2014) 130 ILJ 202. 
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business of the employer or to carry out work of a particular kind for the employer’. Therefore, 
a change to a work location by an employer whether it is to the employees’ material detriment 
or not may not provide sufficient grounds for an employer to treat that employment contract 
as terminated and claim constructive dismissal as it was under regulation 4(9) of TUPE 2006.117   
5.8.4 Contractual Variations on Collective Bargaining Incorporated Terms and Conditions 
In addition to the above, employee contracts of employment whose terms and conditions have 
been incorporated from collective bargaining agreements may be varied by the employer 
following a period of one-year post-relevant transfer by virtue of regulation 4(5B) of the TUPE 
2014 Regulations. This provision allows for contractual variations to terms and condition even 
where the reason for the variation is the transfer itself118 provided that the relevant time 
period has elapsed. 
However, the variation is subject to a condition that the rights and obligations in the 
employees’ contracts should not be less favourable to the employees than would be following 
the variations if considered altogether.  Nevertheless, this provision may be seen as being in 
contrast with the provisions of regulation 4(4) on the protection from non CBA contractual 
variations before and after the transfer. This is because, regulation 4(4) does not contain 
provisions on prescribed timeframes within which an employer may vary contractual terms 
and conditions following a relevant transfer. Employees enjoy the protection in regulation 4(4) 
indefinitely unless the variations are for ETO reasons entailing changes in the workforce.119 
From the provisions of regulation 4(5B), it is a concern that employees’ contractual terms and 
conditions derived from collective bargaining agreements may be vulnerable to variations by 
their employer. Where this is this case, it would be a form of creating a ‘two-tier’ level of 
protection categories; employees on general non-CBA incorporated terms contracts and those 
on CBA incorporated terms contracts. In view of this prospect, employees on CBA incorporated 
terms contracts would be on lesser protection than their counterparts which may weaken the 
                                                          
117 J. McMullen, ‘TUPE, Variation of Employment Terms and the ETO Reason’ (2014) 43 (3) ILJ 364; J. McMullen, 
‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 (2) ILJ 149. 
118 TUPE 2014, regulation 4(5B). 
119 Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘Transfers of Undertakings – Principles and Pragmatism in the CJEU’ (2014) 130 ILJ 202; 
J. McMullen, ‘TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 (2) ILJ 149. 
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notions underlying the policies for collective bargaining and trade union movement in the UK 
as a form of industrial democracy. 
5.9 Conclusion 
By analysing the TUPE Regulations during relevant transfers in the UK, it may be concluded that 
TUPE Regulations were brought into force to serve a dual purpose. The first purpose is to 
safeguard the rights of employees during relevant transfers. The second purpose is to regulate 
the facilitation of relevant transfers. TUPE Regulations may achieve this by mitigating the effect 
that relevant transfers may present to the interests of employers and the interests of 
employees during relevant transfers.120 However, these two purposes of TUPE Regulations are 
in conflict with each other, if both purposes are pursued simultaneously.121 
TUPE provisions, such as regulations 4(1) and 4(2) on the automatic transfer of employment 
relationships, rights and liabilities, regulation 4(4) on the prohibition on employers unfairly 
varying contractual terms and conditions and regulation 7(1) on employee protection from 
unfair dismissals because of relevant transfer are typical employee protection provisions.  
On the other hand, regulations, such as regulation 4(5) on agreed permissible variation, 
regulation 9(1) on permissible variation where the transferor is the subject of insolvency 
proceedings and regulation 7(2) on ETO exceptions to unfair dismissals in regulation 7(1) may 
be viewed as provisions that are aimed at empowering employers. These regulations may 
support employers to make business decisions that may enhance corporate rescue prospects 
of insolvent but viable business without being over-burdened by specific employee protection 
provisions of TUPE Regulations.122 However, very often, employer decisions, especially, the 
                                                          
120 C. Brewster and P. Teague, European Social Policy and its Impact on the UK (Institute of Personnel 
Management, London 1989); Amie Jasmine Ahanchian, ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible 
Hand on the Economy by Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provision’ (2002) 2 The Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, 29, 49; F. Baumann, ‘On Unobserved Worker Heterogeneity and 
Employment Protection’ (2010) 29 (2) E.J L & E 155, 175. 
121 J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights 
Directive’ (2003) (22) Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 443, 463; Samuel E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of 
Employment: Analysing Policies through Lens of Theories’ (2011) 32 (4) Company Lawyer 99, 113. 
122 S. Hardy and Richard W. Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL 336, 378. 
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decisions made under regulation 7(2) – ETO exceptions, may threaten employment protection 
provisions in regulations 4(1), 4(4) and regulation 7(1).123 
Therefore, it may be concluded that pursuing these dual purposes of TUPE simultaneously 
creates a tension between the policy objectives of employment protection and the policy 
objectives of encouraging and promoting the rescue of insolvent but viable businesses that the 
ARD and TUPE Regulations may have sought to achieve.124 It should be noted that very often, 
an employer’s attempt to rescue an insolvent but viable business by selling it as a going concern 
may involve the need to reduce labour costs as labour is one of the biggest costs of production 
or service provision.125 
The employer may also consider making some changes to employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment as a form of restructuring the operational structures of the business to enhance 
the chances of successfully selling the insolvent but viable business as a going concern. 
However, the employer may be constricted by the fear of potential liabilities that may arise out 
of breaching the procedural and substantive provisions of the TUPE Regulations, such as 
regulations 4 and 7(1) which are aimed at employee protection during relevant transfers.  
Moreover, the restrictions on the employer in regulations 4 and 7 may be compounded by the 
automatic and mandatory inheritance of several known and unknown liabilities on the 
transferee under regulation 4(2). The sum of all these concerns may mean that prospective 
buyers of insolvent but viable businesses may be less incentivised to acquire such businesses. 
Where this is the case, TUPE Regulations that seek to safeguard the rights of employees during 
relevant transfers may arguably be counterproductive.  
Therefore, there is a need to balance employment protection and business rescue during TUPE 
transfers to avoid a tension between employment protection and business rescue. However, 
                                                          
123 M. Sergeant, ‘Business Transfers and Corporate Insolvencies – the Effects of TUPE’ (1998) 14 (1) I L & P. 8, 11; 
Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ [2000] CFIL 
260. 
124 Amie Jasmine Ahanchian, ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible Hand on the Economy by 
Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provision’ (2002) 2 The Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 29, 49; J. Armour & S. Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2009) 
29 (4) ILJ 395, 402. 
125Lester C. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, (W. Morrow & Co, New York 1996); J. E Stiglitz, ‘Employment, Social 
Justice and Societal Well-being’ (2002) 141 Int’l Labour Rev. 9 -29. 
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as case law discussed in this chapter has demonstrated, the judicial judgments in this area have 
been quite inconsistent. Therefore, an interpretative approach would arguably, remedy these 
inconsistencies to achieve the balance needed between employment protection and corporate 
rescue during relevant transfers. This is the central argument in the next chapter, which applies 
Dworkin’s interpretative approach to the judicial interpretation of TUPE Regulations during 
relevant transfers. 
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Chapter Six 
Analysing the Impact of TUPE Regulations on Corporate Rescue 
through Interpretation: Remedying the Tension between Corporate 
Rescue and Employment Protection through Dworkin’s Interpretative 
Approach to Law 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Although TUPE Regulations have been credited for enhancing employees’ rights during 
relevant transfers in the UK,1 TUPE Regulations have also been criticised for failing to facilitate 
a balanced form of entrepreneurial freedom between employers and protection or security of 
employees during relevant transfers.2 The application of the TUPE Regulations to relevant 
transfers has been problematic and challenging to employers, courts and tribunals. This may 
be caused by the divergent policy objectives that UK insolvency law3 and employment law aim 
to achieve during relevant transfers.  
In chapter one of this thesis at 1.5, I highlighted the divergent policy objectives that both 
employment law and insolvency law aim to achieve during corporate insolvencies involving 
relevant transfers and the tension that arises therefrom. The divergence in the objectives 
sought by both employment law and insolvency during corporate insolvency is further 
examined below at 6.2 
In the previous chapter, it was established that the inconsistencies highlighted by case law on 
the judicial interpretation and application of the TUPE provisions to relevant transfers required 
an interpretative solution to remedy the identified interpretative inconsistencies. This is 
                                                          
1 J. McMullen, ‘An Analysis of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ (2006) 
35 ILJ 113; A. Garde, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of Transfers of Undertakings’ (2002) 39 Common Market 
Law Rev. 523; V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves’ (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies, 302 – 324. 
2 S. Hardy and N. Adnett, ‘Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights: the Acquired Rights Directive and 
the EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam’ (1999) 9 Journal of European Social Policy 30; J. McMullen, ‘TUPE: Ringing 
the (Wrong) Changes – The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (2014) 43 ILJ 149. 
3 See for example, IA 1986, Schedule B1, especially Paragraph 3(1) that deals with administration proceedings in 
the UK, whose main objective is the rescue of the company as a going concern. See also, IA 1986, Part 1 which 
deals with company voluntary arrangements as a corporate rescue process. 
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because, the interpretative approaches adopted by the UK courts and tribunals in interpreting 
and applying TUPE Regulations during relevant transfers had failed to achieve the balance 
needed.   
In this chapter, it will be argued that judicial interpretation can play an integral part in balancing 
employers’ and employees’ concerns during relevant transfers in the UK. However, the 
interpretative approaches adopted by the UK courts and tribunals as a measure to balance the 
tension between the two policy objectives of employment protection and corporate rescue 
have arguably, not been effective enough. This is because TUPE Regulations, as will be 
discussed at 6.4 below, have been interpreted purposively4 and this has led to inconsistent 
judgments from the courts and tribunals which has further exacerbated this tension.  
 
The requirement for the UK courts and tribunals to follow the guidance and judicial precedents 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (formerly known as the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ))5 has also exacerbated the tension between the need to safeguard the rights 
of employees and the need to encourage and support the rescue of insolvent but viable 
businesses during relevant transfers in the UK.  
By virtue of the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972, s.3 (1), the UK, like other Members 
States of the EU is bound by the decisions of the CJEU on all matters of EU law. Consequently, 
UK courts and tribunals are required to interpret EU law and corresponding national 
legislations, such as TUPE Regulation in a manner that aligns UK law to the intentions of the 
ARD. This is the purposive interpretative approach. The requirement for a purposive 
interpretative approach on UK courts and tribunals is broadly discussed below at 6.4. 
According to Professor Ronald Dworkin in his Interpretative Theory of Law,6 law as practice 
and law as legal theory are best understood as a process of interpretation.7 Dworkin posits that 
by applying the ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation, a judge may be able 
                                                          
4 The purposive approach to interpreting TUPE Regulations by UK courts and tribunals is discussed below at 6.3. 
5 The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) is the collective term for the European Union’s 
judicial arm. The CJEU is made up of three courts: the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Court of First Instance (CFI) 
and the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). The terms CJEU or ECJ will be used interchangeably in this chapter and thesis 
in general in reference to the decisions of the EU’s highest court as most cases used in this chapter and thesis in 
general were recorded as ‘ECJ decisions’. 
6 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986). 
7 R. Dworkin, “Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality” in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. 
Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
136 
 
to interpret the law based on legal principles that may fit perfectly into the legal context before 
the court to achieve a right answer to the legal question. This is as opposed to interpreting the 
law based on rules which may be static in application and may not fit perfectly into the legal 
scenario at hand8 and the requirement for a purposive interpretation.  
It is therefore the contention that by following Dworkin’s interpretative approach, UK judges 
may be able to interpret TUPE Regulations in a manner that may arguably, remedy the tension 
between corporate rescue policy objectives and employment protection policy objectives 
during relevant transfers and the interpretative inconsistencies that have arguably, failed to 
address this tension. 
This chapter analyses the judicial approaches to interpreting TUPE Provisions during relevant 
transfers in the UK. In particular, this chapter examines the judicial approaches to interpreting 
and applying regulation 7(2) - the use of economic, technical or organisational reasons as 
exceptions to regulation 7(1) and regulation 4(4) of TUPE 2006 Regulations. The chapter also 
analyses the interpretation and application of regulation 4(7) - the right for an employee to 
object to a relevant transfer. This is to highlight the challenges that TUPE Regulations present 
to judges whilst addressing employers’ and employees’ concerns during relevant transfers.  
The chapter argues that although regulation 7(2) may have been intended to be used as a 
balancing provision between the policy objectives of employment protection and the policy 
objectives of corporate rescue during relevant transfers, it has so far failed to secure the 
balance needed. Regulation 7(2) has attracted a significant number of cases during relevant 
transfers. However, a majority of the judgments from the courts and tribunals in relation to 
regulation 7(2) have arguably, been more protective of employers than the employees that the 
ARD sought to protect during relevant transfers.9 This has arguably, not helped to balance both 
employers’ and employees’ concerns during relevant transfers. 
The chapter proposes that if a balance between the policy objectives of employment 
protection and those of corporate rescue is to be achieved during relevant transfers, Dworkin’s 
interpretative approach to law would arguably, provide a suitable framework. This would be 
                                                          
8 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.255. 
9 For example, see cases, such as Ibex Trading v Walton & Other [1994] ICR 907, (EAT); Enterprise Managed 
Services Ltd v Dance and Others [UKEAT/0200/11]; Hazel v Manchester College [2014] EWCA Civ. 72; Crystal Palace 
F.C Ltd v. Kavanagh and Others [2014] IRLR 139, (CA). 
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through the adoption of Dworkin’s ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation as 
posited in his Interpretative Theory of Law. By adopting Dworkin’s ideals above, interpretative 
challenges highlighted in the judicial interpretation of TUPE Regulations through case law 
discussed in this chapter may, arguably, be remedied or balanced.  
6.2 The Tension between Employment Protection and Corporate Rescue Objectives 
Insolvency laws and corporate rescue processes in the UK may largely be said to be creditor-
driven.10 These corporate recue processes11 and insolvency laws afford primacy of 
consideration largely to creditors in particular, secured creditors during corporate insolvency 
proceedings involving relevant transfers.12 Moreover, UK’s insolvency laws and corporate 
rescue processes have been described as the most creditor-oriented in Europe.13 These laws 
and rescue processes focus more on the recovery of creditors’ interests through collective 
rescue regimes, such as administration where possible rather than giving employee protection 
significant consideration.14 The structural and procedural set up of these laws and rescue 
processes are arguably, biased in favour of secured creditors and do not give a fair 
representation and consideration based on value and input.15 
 
When relevant insolvency proceedings involving TUPE transfers are instituted, the UK’s formal 
corporate rescue processes do not consider as paramount, the protection of employees in 
contrast to their approach to the interests of other stakeholders, such as secured creditors. It 
                                                          
10 J. Armour, A. Hsu & A. Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 
2002’ (2008) 5(2) ECFR 148, 171. 
11 Please note that formal corporate rescue processes and their impact on employment protection and corporate 
rescue are discussed in chapter one above at 1.4. 
12 For example, under administration proceedings, the IA 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(1) requires that the administrator 
considers creditors’ interest as a whole but does not specifically mention the protection of employees as a specific 
set of creditors or stakeholder. Arguably, it may be concluded that the main concern or purpose of IA 1986, Sch. 
B1, Para. 3(1) is the protection of secured creditors and the recovery of their interests. See, S. Franken, ‘Creditor 
- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law 
Review, 645, 676. 
13 Gabriel Moss, ‘Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or Liquidation? Comparisons of Trends in National 
Law – England’ (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 115. 
14 Professor Ian Fletcher has observed that ‘UK insolvency law has been unable to embrace the “American way” 
of corporate rescue, with debtor-in-possession as its core principle, but has instead, opted for a rescue model in 
which creditor interests continue to assert a dominant influence.’ See, Ian Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent 
Developments – Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements 
– The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 European Business 
Organization Law Review, 119, 151. 
15 J. Armour, A. Hsu & A. Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 
2002’ (2008) 5(2) ECFR 148, 171. 
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should be noted that TUPE provisions, such as the automatic transfer of the employment 
contracts under regulation 4 and the protection from unfair dismissals because of a relevant 
transfer under regulation 7(1) apply to relevant insolvency proceedings. Relevant insolvency 
proceedings are the types of insolvency proceedings that have been instituted not with a view 
to the liquidation of the business assets and which are under the supervision of an insolvency 
practitioner under regulation 8(6) of TUPE 2006.16 
 
By following the substantive and procedural provisions of regulation 8(6), corporate rescue 
processes, such as administration may be termed as ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ as these 
rescue processes are instituted with the aim of saving the company as a going concern.17 
Notwithstanding, these formal rescue processes may be said to be biased towards secured 
creditors’ interests rather than employment protection which does not help to balance the 
tension between corporate rescue policy objectives and employment protection policy 
objectives during corporate insolvencies involving relevant transfers.18  
 
For example, the administration procedure19 may be regarded as a collective and inclusive 
recue process. The procedure requires the administrator to serve the interests of all company 
creditors as a whole.20 However, in reality secured creditors often benefit more from this 
procedure than employees due to different levels of security held by secured creditors. It is 
the argument that during the insolvent state of the company, creditor primacy prevails over 
other interests, such as employment protection and continuity. This is also evident in the 
legislative provisions of the IA 1986, Schedule B1, Paragraph 3(1) on the hierarchy of objectives 
to be pursued by the administrator.21  
 
 
                                                          
16 Regulation 8(6) of TUPE 2006 provides that relevant insolvency proceedings are “…insolvency proceedings that 
have been opened in relation to the transferor, not with the view to the liquidation of the business assets and 
which are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner.” 
17 See cases to this effect such as Oakland v Wellswood [2009] EWCA Civ. 1094; OTG v Barke & Ors [2011] IRLR 
272; Key2 Law (Surrey)LLP v De’ Antiquis [2011] EWVA Civ. 1564. 
18 G. McCormack, ‘Rescuing Businesses: Designing an “efficient” Legal Regime’ [2009] JBL 299, 330; V. Finch, 
‘Corporate Rescue: Who is Interested?” [2012] J.B.L 190, 212. 
19 The administration process and its impact on employment protection during relevant transfers is broadly 
discussed in chapter one above at 1.4.1. 
20 IA 1986, Sch.B1, para.3(2). 
21 See IA 1986, Sch. B1, Paragraph 3(1).  
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IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 3(1) provides that: 
3(1) - The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the 
objective of 
(a) - rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) - achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or 
(c) - realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured 
or preferential creditors. 
 
It is arguable however, that none of the three hierarchical objectives of the administration 
process as set out in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule B1, considers employment protection and 
continuity as a priority. Admittedly, a successful rescue of the insolvent but viable company 
would save employees’ jobs. However, employment protection is not specifically mentioned 
as a priority objective of the administration process in the hierarchy of objectives under IA 
1986, Schedule B1, paragraph 3(1). Moreover, the administration procedure is a ‘practitioner 
in possession’ model22 with high levels of decision making by the insolvency practitioner and 
secured creditors who have more powers of influence over the procedure than employees and 
other stakeholders. Greater regard is had to the interests of creditors.23 
 
Pre-pack business sales24 are another example of a corporate rescue process used by insolvent 
but viable companies in the UK during corporate insolvencies involving relevant transfers. Pre-
packs may also be instituted with a view to selling the business or assets of the company on a 
piecemeal basis as the most feasible outcome for the company before liquidating the company 
and proceeds used to pay off creditors.25 Nevertheless, pre-pack administrations have been 
                                                          
22 V. Finch, ‘Control and Coordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25(3) Legal Studies 474, 375; G. McCormack, 
‘Rescuing Businesses: Designing an “efficient” Legal Regime’ [2009] JBL 299,330; V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: 
Who is Interested?” [2012] J.B.L 190, 212. 
23 J. Armour, A. Hsu & A. Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 
2002’ (2008) 5(2) ECFR 148, 171. 
24 Please note that pre-pack business sales are broadly discussed in chapter one at 1.4.2. 
25 S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67(2) MLR 247; R. Parry, Corporate 
Rescue (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2008) at vii. 
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credited for offering the best chance for more business rescues, maximising returns and value 
for creditors and saving jobs.26   
However, despite the above credit attributed to pre-packs by the UK Insolvency Service, there 
are ethical and social concerns, such as disenfranchisement of general unsecured creditors, 
such as employees, as a major area of cause for concern. The level of  secrecy in the dealings 
that lead up to the sale of the business and phoenix practices27 are still being echoed as areas 
that need addressing if a balance is to be achieved in addressing the interests of employees 
and employers during relevant transfers involving pre-packs.28  
 
Moreover, there are still engaging debates on what the main aim of pre-pack business sales is 
in the UK. There are still questions unanswered as to whether pre-packs are initiated to 
maximise value or returns to creditors on corporate insolvency or serving other objectives such 
as employment protection and continuity.29 There are still huge concerns that because pre-
packs are generally agreed in consultations with secured creditors such as banks and company 
directors, they take the interests of secured creditors ahead of employees’ interests.30  
 
The nature of secrecy involved and the speedy sale of the business often leave employees not 
consulted or informed of the sale on time. Although employees have protection under TUPE 
2006, particularly under regulation 13 to be consulted and given information through 
representation regarding a pre-pack business sale process by their employer, they usually 
                                                          
26 Insolvency Service, “Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report” January 2008, 
147, available at 
www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/EA02CorporateInsolvencyReport.pdf 
(accessed 10 January 2016). See also, P. Walton, ‘When is Pre-packaged Administration Appropriate? – A 
Theoretical Consideration’ (2011) 20 Nott. L. J. 12. 
27 The term ‘phoenix practices’ is used in this context to refer to the practice of business owners selling insolvent 
but viable businesses to known or connected parties during prepack administration sales. The connected or 
known parties may include former company directors or business associates. See, M. Herman, “Abuse of Pre-pack 
deals ‘Could turn Britain into an Insolvency Brothel’” Times 18 January 2010 at 36; M. Hyde and I. White, ‘Pre-
packaged Administrations Unwrapped’ (2009) 3 (2) Law and Financial Markets Review 134. 
28M. Herman, “Abuse of Pre-pack deals ‘Could turn Britain into an Insolvency Brothel’” Times 18 January 2010 at 
36; V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves’ (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies, 302 – 324. 
29 A. Kastrinou, “An Analysis of the Pre-pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area” (2008) 29(9) 
Company Lawyer 259, 263. 
30 P. Walton, ‘When is Pre-packaged Administration Appropriate? – A Theoretical Consideration’ (2011) 20 Nott. 
L. J. 12. 
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receive this information after the business sale is completed.31 This is because SIP1632 require 
that general unsecured creditors such as employees are consulted and informed of the terms 
and the reasons as to why a pre-pack was chosen as the most effective rescue procedure.33 
 
Because of this inequality in treatment of employees by the UK insolvency laws and corporate 
rescue process, the UK government, through the transposition of the ARD into UK legislation 
in the form of TUPE Regulations, sought to remedy or balance this inequality. This was to 
ensure employees’ rights such as the automatic transfer of their employment to the transferee 
(regulation 4(1)), protection from unfair dismissals because of the transfer (regulation 7(1)), 
protection from variations to contract terms and conditions (regulation 4(4)), et cetera were 
safeguarded during relevant transfers.34 
 
However, despite the availability of these employee protection provisions in the TUPE 
Regulations, TUPE Regulations also have provisions, such as regulation 7(2) that allow 
employers to either dismiss or vary employees’ contract terms and conditions during relevant 
transfers where the reasons for the dismissal or variation are either for economic, technical or 
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce.35 
 
The provisions in regulation 7(2) would effectively work as a defence or exceptions to the 
automatic and mandatory provisions of regulations 4 and 7. Therefore, regulation 7(2) would 
be seen as a balancing provision between employees’ and employers’ rights and interests 
during relevant transfers. The provisions of regulation 7(2) afford employers powers to effect 
business decisions that would aim to enhance their corporate rescue endeavours during 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 SIPs are a series of guidance papers that set out principles and procedures that insolvency practitioners should 
follow. Because they are agreed by the Insolvency Regulatory Authorities, departure from the practices they 
describe could compromise the practitioner’s status.  This could be considered by the licensing body a disciplinary 
matter. See, Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3), Statement of Insolvency Practice16: Pre-
packaged Sales in Administrations (London: R3, 2009). 
33 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’ (2008) 29(9) 
Company Lawyer 259, 263. 
34 M. Sergeant, ‘Business Transfers and Corporate Insolvencies – the Effects of TUPE’ (1998) 14 (1) I L & P. 8, 11. 
35 V. Finch, ‘Control and Coordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25(3) Legal Studies 474, 375. 
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relevant transfers without fear of burdensome liabilities arising out of breaching employee 
protection provisions, especially under regulations 4 and 7.36  
 
The interplay between TUPE Regulations’ employee protection provisions such as regulations 
4 and 7 provisions and TUPE provisions such as regulation 7(2) that aim to promote corporate 
rescue in the form of exceptions to the automatic and mandatory provisions of regulations 4 
and 7, have ended up creating tensions between the two protective policies of employment 
protection and corporate rescue inherent in the TUPE Regulations. This tension has affected 
each policy’s objectives during relevant transfers. This tension is therefore, in need of 
remedy.37  
 
UK courts and tribunals have attempted to balance or remedy this tension through an 
interpretation approach. However, these courts and tribunals have faced challenges, both 
procedural and interpretative. For example, the requirement for UK courts and tribunals to 
interpret EU law including matters of the ARD in a purposive approach as discussed below at 
6.4 has made UK courts and tribunal hand out varying judgments while interpreting TUPE 
Regulations which has not helped to remedy this tension. In addition, UK courts and tribunals 
are required to adhere to the judicial precedents and jurisprudence of the CJEU.38 These 
procedural and interpretative challenges are discussed below.  
6.3 The Interpretative Theory of Law – Ronald Dworkin  
Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of Law was introduced and analysed in chapter two at 2.4. 
However, as a recap, Dworkin writes about an interpretative approach to law as the best 
approach to interpreting the laws of a legal system.39 Dworkin observes that both law as 
practice and legal theory are best understood as processes of constructive interpretation. This 
is the form of interpretation that makes the law the best it can be, which makes it the best 
example of the form and genre to which it is taken to belong.40 
                                                          
36 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: Who is Interested?’ [2012] JBL 190. 
37 Samuel E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policies through Lens of 
Theories’ (2011) 32 (4) Company Lawyer 99, 113.  
38 Amie Jasmine Ahanchian, ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible Hand on the Economy by 
Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provisions’ (2002) 2 The Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 29, 49. 
39 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986) at 44 – 48. 
40 Ibid, at 52. 
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Dworkin argues that constructive interpretation is the proper approach to artistic and literary 
interpretation of laws. According to Dworkin, constructive interpretation is based upon the 
ability of a judge to assign a distinctive value or purpose to the object of interpretation. It is 
the value or purpose that serves as the criterion for determining whether one interpretation 
of an object is better or worse than the alternative. The purpose of the law is to justify the 
exercise of government powers.41 For example, the governmental power to enact legislation 
such as TUPE Regulations 2006 to transpose the ARD that serves to protect the rights of 
employees during relevant transfers. 
Dworkin writes that along with legal rules, legal systems also contain legal principles.42 Legal 
principles are moral propositions that are stated in, or implied by past official acts such as 
statutes, judicial decisions or constitutional provisions. Therefore, principles are part of a legal 
system that judges ought to consider where appropriate in balancing the interests of 
competing stakeholders. This is especially where the outcome of the case before the court 
appears to be contrary to relevant precedents (if any) or departs from the ‘real meaning’ or 
‘true spirit’ of the law.43  
Dworkin states that by using legal principles, a judge may be able to test a variety of theories 
regarding what the law requires in that particular field of law to reach a fair and balanced 
judgment. The judge may be able to disregard legal principles that do not adequately fit past 
official judgments, precedents or actions and consider legal principles that fit the moral vision 
that the law seeks to achieve. This would make that law the best it can be in that particular 
area.44  
Dworkin also writes about the concept of ‘integrity’ in interpretation in Law’s Empire.45 
Dworkin argues that judges should decide cases in a manner that makes the law more 
coherent, more like a product of a single moral vision. Dworkin opines that ‘judges who accept 
the interpretative ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of 
                                                          
41 Ibid, at 93, 109, 127. 
42 R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality’ in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. 
Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
43 Brian Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism’ (2000) 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1613. 
44 R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality’ in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. 
Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
45 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986), at 255. 
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principles about peoples’ rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political 
and legal doctrine of their community.’46  
Therefore, by following the concept of law as integrity, propositions of law such as the need to 
balance employment protection and corporate rescue during relevant transfers would be 
approached by a judge in a manner that conforms to the principles of fairness, equality and 
justice. These principles are part of the procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of the law.  
Law as integrity would provide an approach to judges to decide cases or approach legal 
questions before the courts in a methodological and novel manner that is structured on 
coherent principles because according to Dworkin, law must speak with one voice. This model 
of constructive interpretation of the law would therefore, express a coherent conception of 
justice and integrity.47  
Dworkin’s ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation will be analysed in light of 
the judicial interpretation and application of the TUPE regulation 7(2) and regulation 4(7) to 
relevant transfers below at 6.4 and 6.5. However, the UK courts’ and tribunals’ interpretative 
challenges are discussed first, to establish the context for the application of Dworkin as a 
remedy. 
6.4 The Interpretative Challenges faced by UK Courts and Tribunals 
Because TUPE Regulations owe their origin to the ARD, UK courts and tribunals are required to 
follow or seek guidance from the CJEU on all matters of EU law, including the ARD and TUPE 
Regulations.48 The decisions of the CJEU bind all UK courts and tribunals including the UK 
Supreme Court.49  
 
The effect of this obligation on the UK is that courts and tribunals are required to interpret EU 
law in a manner that recognises the judicial precedents of the CJEU. However, the CJEU’s 
approach to interpreting the ARD and TUPE Regulations is the purposive approach.50 The 
                                                          
46 Ibid, at 46 – 48. 
47 Ibid, at 225. 
48 By virtue of the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972, s.3 (1), the UK at the time of writing like other Members 
States of the EU is bound by the decisions of the CJEU on all matters of EU law. 
49 For example, see the reasoning by Lord Denning in Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] EWCA Civ. 14. 
50 P. Wallington & R. Lee, ‘Transfers of Undertakings: EEC Law and Judicial Creativity’ [1989] JBL 513, 518. 
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purposive approach is one rule of statutory interpretation that is grounded in the English Legal 
System, more commonly known as the ‘mischief rule’. The mischief rule is the oldest rule of 
statutory interpretation in the UK which was established in Heydon's Case.51 The rule is 
adopted by judges during statutory interpretation where there are ambiguities in the law or 
statutes. The aim is to establish the intentions of the legislature in passing the law to remedy 
the mischief or defect in the statute.52   
 
The purposive approach as adopted by the CJEU involves the need to interpret TUPE 
Regulations in a manner that aligns TUPE Regulations to the purposes that the ARD sought to 
achieve. This is to safeguard the rights of employees during relevant transfers. In effect, the 
purposive approach to interpreting TUPE Regulations involves giving TUPE Regulations a 
broader scope of interpretation where needed to ‘carve out’ the intended outcome that the 
ARD sought to address.53  
 
The requirement on the UK to adopt a purposive approach to interpreting EU law was 
emphasised by the House of Lords (HL) in Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company 
Ltd.54 In Litster, the HL observed that it was incumbent on Member States’ courts and tribunals 
to interpret TUPE Regulations in a manner that conforms to the spirit of the ARD. Lord 
Templeman observed that: 
‘…[t]he courts of the United Kingdom are under a duty to follow the 
practice of the ECJ by giving a purposive construction of Directives and 
Regulations issued with the purpose of complying with the 
Directives’.55 
 
From this observation from Lord Templeman, it may be construed that UK courts and tribunals 
have a duty to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation to 
                                                          
51 [1584] EWHC Exch J36. 
52 See cases such as Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102; Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 380 and Elliot v Grey 
[1960] 1 QB 367. 
53 S. Hardy and Richard W. Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL 336, 378; J. Armour and S. Deakin, 
‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 
International Review of Law and Economics, 443, 463. 
54 Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 113; [1989] IRLR 161. (Hereafter Litster). 
55 Ibid, at [5]. 
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interpret the ARD and TUPE Regulations in a purposive manner. This duty is binding on all 
authorities which would include the courts and tribunals of the UK.56 
 
In Litster, twelve employees that were employed by Forth Dry Dock Company were all 
dismissed by the receiver an hour before the company was sold to Forth Estuary Company. As 
a result of the dismissal, there would be no employees to transfer to the transferee and no 
liabilities would be inherited by the transferee as the dismissed employees would not be 
deemed to have been ‘immediately employed’ before the transfer took place. The dismissed 
employees brought an action for unfair dismissals on the ground that they were employed 
‘immediately before the transfer’ which the company was strongly arguing against.  
 
The HL were tasked to interpret the provision and jurisprudence of the term ‘immediately 
before the transfer’ under regulation 5(3) of TUPE 1981. Their lordships held that the 
automatic transfer under regulation 5(1) of TUPE 1981 (now regulation 4(1) TUPE 2006) not 
only applied to employees that were immediately employed before a transfer, but it also 
applied to employees that were able to show that they would have been so employed had they 
not been unfairly dismissed for a reason connected with a transfer under regulation 5(3) of 
TUPE 1981, (now regulation 4(3) of TUPE 2006). Therefore, the HL held that the reason for the 
dismissals was the transfer of Forth Dry Dock to Forth Estuary Company.57 
 
It may be noted that the HL in this case had to give regulation 5(3) of TUPE 1981 a purposive 
interpretation which did not only align it within the spirit and intendment of Article 4 of 
Directive 77/187/EC,58 but also aligned it within the jurisprudence of the ECJ’s reasoning in the 
case of P. Bork International A/S v Foreningen af Arbejdslederen i Danmark.59 Therefore, by 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 113; [1989] IRLR 161, at [24]. 
58 Article 4.1 of Directive 77/187/EC provided that ‘The transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business 
shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee. This provision shall not stand 
in the way of dismissals that may take place for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes 
in the workforce’. 
59 P. Bork International A/S v Foreningen af Arbejdslederen i Danmark [1989] IRLR 41 (hereafter P. Bork). In this 
case, the ECJ held that it was for the national courts to make the necessary appraisal of facts, in the light of criteria 
laid down by the court, in order to establish whether or not the Directive is applicable. See, Paragraph [19] of the 
judgment. The ECJ further held that Article 1(1) of Directive 77/187/EC was to be interpreted as being applicable 
to a relevant transfer where the employer had given notice bringing the lease to an end which had the effect of 
terminating employee jobs. The owner however, retook possession of the undertaking and later sold it to a third 
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following the decision in Litster, UK courts and tribunals, while addressing matters relating to 
relevant transfers, ought to adopt a purposive interpretation of TUPE Regulations to ensure 
that their decisions do not conflict with the intended purposes of the ARD, which is mainly to 
protect the interests of employees during relevant transfers.60  
 
However, it may be submitted that sometimes, UK courts’ and tribunals’ adoption of the 
purposive approach in interpreting TUPE provisions during relevant transfers has been faced 
with both procedural and interpretative challenges. This is especially where the ARD does not 
provide prescriptive guidance on how certain provisions within it ought to be transposed into 
national laws of Member States.61 Other interpretative challenges have been witnessed where 
the CJEU has not provided binding precedents to Member States where certain aspects of the 
ARD are the subject of interpretation, rather, leaving Member States to find proper ways of 
solving such interpretative challenges.62 
 
For example, when the CJEU was approached by the German Federal Labour Court to give a 
ruling on the effect of objection to the contract of employment where an employee had 
exercised a right to object to the transfer in Katsikas v Konstantinidis,63 (discussed below), the 
CJEU left this matter to national courts of Member States to decide. In Katsikas the ECJ gave 
an opinion that the legal effect of an employee’s objection to the automatic transfer and the 
fate of that employee’s contract of employment was a matter for each Member State to 
determine. 
 
In this case, Katsikas worked as a cook in a Greek restaurant in Germany which was sold to 
Mitossis. Katsikas refused to work for the new owner Mitossis. This resulted in Katsikas being 
                                                          
party who shortly afterwards brought the business back into operation without changing its identity. See 
paragraph [20] of the judgment. 
60 This point was emphasised by judges in Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 
113; [1989] IRLR 161, at [5].  
61 J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection 
of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-426/11 Alermo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 
42 ILJ 434. 
62 S. Hardy and Richard W. Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL 336, 378; S. Laulom, The European Court 
of Justice in the Dialogue on Transfers of Undertakings: A Fallible Interlocutor in Labour in the Courts, National 
Judges and the ECJ, (edited by S. Sciarra) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
63 Katsikas v Konstantinidis [1993] IRLR 179. (Hereafter Katsikas). 
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dismissed by the transferor (Konstantinidis). Katsikas initiated a claim for accrued unpaid 
wages and compensation arising from his dismissal. The transferor (Konstantinidis) argued that 
he was no longer Kastikas’ employer. This was a consolidated action that involved other cases 
relating to employees’ objections to transfer to new buyers (transferees).64 
 
The claimants were relying on Article 613a of the German Civil Code which provided that 
‘where a part of an undertaking is transferred by a legal transaction to another owner, the 
objection of a person employed in that part of the undertaking prevents the transfer to the 
transferee of his employment and the employment relationship continues following the 
objection’. These concerns were referred by the German Federal Labour Court to the ECJ for a 
ruling on whether an employee may validly object to a transfer and whether that employee’s 
employment relationship continues following that objection.  
 
The ECJ held that it was not the ARD’s purpose to ensure that continuity of the employment 
relationship between employees and transferors where employees did not wish to remain in 
the transferee’s employment. However, despite the ECJ’s ruling that an employee can legally 
object to a transfer to a transferee, the ECJ did not commit itself on ruling on the effect of 
objection on the employee’s contract of employment with the transferor. This aspect was left 
to Member State’s courts and tribunals to deliberate in accordance to their respective national 
laws.65  
A similar situation arose in the UK on the right to object to a transfer and the effect such a 
rejection may have on the objecting employee’s contract of employment. However, the UK 
court faced interpretative challenges as the provision in TUPE Regulations 2006 that dealt with 
an employee’s right to object to a transfer was not elaborative on the effect of the objection 
                                                          
64 Grigorios Katsikas v Angelos Konstantinidis (C-132/91); Uwe Skreb v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paetz & Co. Nfl. GmbH 
(C-138/91) and Günter Schroll v PCO Stauereibetrieb Paetz & Co. Nachfolger GmbH (C-138/91), [1992] ECR I-6577, 
[1992] EUECJ C-132/91. 
65 Sylvaine Laulom opined that because of the possibility that the varying nature and sensitivity of dismissal laws 
of the Member States may present some implications on the employees’ exercise of the right to object to a 
transfer, the ECJ may have been persuaded by this possibility and therefore refrained from making any attempts 
to harmonise national law provisions on the effect of the right to object by employees. See, S. Laulom, The 
European Court of Justice in the Dialogue on Transfers of Undertakings: A Fallible Interlocutor in Labour in the 
Courts, National Judges and the ECJ, (edited by S. Sciarra) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 173.  
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on the employee’s contract of employment. This was in the case of New ISG Ltd v Vernon and 
Others66 discussed below.  
 
6.4.1 The Purposive Interpretative Challenge: 
 Judicial Interpretation of Regulation 4(7) The Right for Employees to object to a Transfer 
Following the ECJ’s failure in Katsikas to provide a binding ruling in relation to the treatment 
of an employee’s contract of employment where the employee has objected to a transfer, a 
UK court was tested on the same issue in the case of New ISG Ltd v Vernon and others67 
(discussed below). Under TUPE Regulations 2006, an employee is afforded a right to object to 
a transfer, where such an employee does not wish to continue to work for the transferee 
following a relevant transfer. This right is embedded in regulation 4(7) of TUPE 2006. 
 
Regulation 4(7) provides that: 
‘Paragraphs (1)68 and (2)69 of Regulation 4 shall not operate to transfer the 
contract of employment and rights, powers, duties and liabilities  under or in 
connection with it of an employee who informs the transferor or transferee 
that he objects to becoming employed by the transferee’. 
 
It follows therefore, from regulation 4(7) that an employee who wishes not to be involved in 
the automatic transfer of his employment to the new buyer (transferee) has a right to object 
to such a transfer.70 This is especially where the employee expects that by rejecting an 
automatic transfer of his employment to the transferee there may be a chance of being 
retained by the transferor where the transferor’s business is not wholly transferred to the 
transferee.71 However, the effect of an employee’s right to object to a transfer is a matter that 
is not adequately guided by either the CJEU or the TUPE Regulations in the UK.72  
 
                                                          
66 New ISG Ltd v Vernon and Others [2008] IRLR 115. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Paragraph 1 of regulation 4 automatically transfers the employment relationship to the transferee. The 
‘relevant transfer shall not operate to terminate’ an employment. 
69 Paragraph 2 of regulation 4 automatically transfers the transferor’s rights, duties, and liabilities in relation to 
the employee to the transferor. 
70 Per the ruling of the ECJ in Katsikas v Konstantinidis [1993] IRLR 179, ECJ.  
71 On this perspective, see New ISG Ltd v Vernon and Others [2008] IRLR 115 (discussed below). 
72 J. McMullen, ‘The “Right” to Object to Transfer of Employment under TUPE’ (2008) 37 (2) ILJ 167, 177. 
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In New ISG Ltd v Vernon and Others,73 the UK High Court was tasked to give a ruling on whether 
an employee can legally object to a transfer after a relevant transfer has been completed. In 
this case, the transferor (New Infrastructure Services Group Ltd) had gone into administration 
and the administrators sold part of the business to New ISG Ltd. The employees (those affected 
by the transfer) were not informed of the identity of the transferee until after the transfer was 
completed. However, this was arguably contrary to the legal principle that decision making 
should be made upon the basis of informed consent or dissent. The employees were also not 
informed of their right to object to the transfer to the new buyer if they so wished. After the 
transfer was completed, affected employees were informed by the administrator that they had 
been transferred to UK Rail Services Ltd (UK Rail), a parent company to New ISG Ltd.74  
 
UK Rail was a known company to some of the affected employees and the company was not 
well thought of by these employees. Some of the employees had indicated prior to the transfer 
that they would not work for UK Rail if it were to acquire their employer’s business. Therefore, 
following the transfer, all of the affected employees resigned from their jobs with immediate 
effect and took employment with ESS Recruitment Ltd which was a known competitor to UK 
Rail. Moreover, these employees had prior to joining ESS Recruitment solicited some of New 
ISG Ltd’s clients, an action that was prohibited by the post-termination restrictions / covenants 
in their employment contracts prior to the transfer.75  
 
New ISG argued that the resigned employees were bound by the post-termination restrictions 
/ covenants as they had validly transferred to New ISG via a relevant transfer as they had not 
objected to the transfer. However, the employees argued that because they were not informed 
of the identity of the transferee until after the transfer, they were not in a position to exercise 
the right to object. The employees asked the court to ‘purposively’ interpret their right to 
object to the transfer under regulation 4(7). They argued that this would allow them to be 
treated as having objected to the transfer after it had been completed on the ground that the 
                                                          
73 New ISG Ltd v Vernon and Others [2008] IRLR 115. (Hereafter New ISG Ltd).  
74 Ibid, at [22]. 
75 Ibid, at [24]. 
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identity of the transferee was not disclosed to them until after the transfer had been 
completed.76  
 
The High Court held that in circumstances such as these, (where the identity of the transferee 
was not disclosed), employees had validly objected to the transfer even though their objection 
had been made after the transfer had been completed. Therefore, their contracts of 
employment had not transferred to New ISG Ltd. Consequently, New ISG Ltd could not enforce 
post-termination restrictions / covenants on the employees.77 
 
However, this ruling may serve as an indication that the purposive interpretation of TUPE 
Regulations may be vulnerable to abuse or manipulation by both employers and employees 
seeking the protection of the ARD. In this case, it may be noted that employees benefited from 
the purposive interpretation of regulation 4(7) by the High Court to release themselves from 
the post-termination restrictions / covenants in their employment contracts which would 
otherwise be binding on them.78 
 
6.4.2 The Impact of the Court’s Decision on Regulation 4(7) 
In the UK, the treatment of an employee’s employment contract in a case where the employee 
has objected to a transfer is governed by regulation 4(8) TUPE 2006. Regulation 4(8) provides 
that; 
‘Subject to paragraphs (9)79 and (11)80, where an employee so objects, the 
relevant transfer shall operate so as to terminate his contract of employment 
with the transferor but he shall not be treated for any purpose as having been 
dismissed by the transferor’ 
 
                                                          
76 ibid, at [22], [23]. 
77 New ISG Ltd v Vernon and Others [2008] IRLR 115, at [87]. 
78 See also, Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Padiachy [1998] IRLR 504; Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) 
Ltd v Lister [1998] IRLR 700 where employees successfully argued that the new restrictive covenants agreed with 
their employer following a relevant transfer involved changes to their material detriment and were therefore 
invalid. The employees were paid to agree to these new changes. Nonetheless, they were invalid as they were to 
their material detriment. 
79 Paragraph 9 of regulation 4 affords an employee a right to treat an employment contract as terminated where 
the transfer involves a substantial change in the employee’s contract of employment to his material detriment. 
80 Paragraph 11 of regulation 4 gives an employee power to terminate an employment contract without notice of 
acceptance to an employer’s repudiatory breach of an employment contract. 
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From the procedural and substantive provision of regulation 4(8) above, it may be inferred that 
the ARD and TUPE Regulations sought to afford employees that are the subject of a relevant 
transfer some freedom to choose whether or not to work for the transferee following a 
relevant transfer.81 However, the effect of regulation 4(8) may imply that the contract of 
employment for the objecting employee is treated as being terminated by reason of rejection, 
neither by the transferor nor the transferee.82 
 
Both regulations 4(7) and 4(8) are silent as to the manner or form that an employee’s objection 
should take. Although the provision of regulation 4(7) states that an employee may inform the 
transferor or transferee of his objection, the format or timeframe within which an objection 
may be made is not elaborated. Questions remain unanswered as to whether an objection 
made by mere expression of unhappiness with the transfer,83 an employee’s activities of trying 
to secure alternative employment or attempts by an employee to negotiate a redundancy 
package84 may all pass for forms of objection by an employee.  
 
With these questions unanswered by regulations 4(7) and 4(8), it may be difficult for the 
employee to establish with certainty, the exact circumstances under which he may choose to 
exercise the right to object to a transfer. Moreover, if the protection afforded an employee 
under regulation 4(7) is compared to the protection afforded to the same employee via 
regulation 4(9),85 the protection under regulation 4(9) may outweigh the protection under 
regulation 4(7). This is because, the employee exercising a right under regulation 4(9) to resign 
because of a substantial change to his working conditions that is to his material detriment may 
                                                          
81 J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection 
of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-426/11 Alermo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 
42 ILJ 434.  
82 J. McMullen, ‘The “Right” to Object to Transfer of Employment under TUPE’ (2008) 37 (2) ILJ 167, 177. 
83 For example, see, Ladies Health and Fitness Clubs v Eastmond [UKEAT94/03] (Unreported). 
84 See, Hay v George Hansen [1996] IRLR 427. 
85 As a recap, regulation 4(9) affords an employee a right to treat an employment contract as terminated where 
the transfer involves a substantial change in the employee’s contract of employment to his material detriment. 
See cases, such as Nationwide Building Society v Benn & Others [UKEAT/0273/09/JOJ]; Tapere v South London and 
Maudsley NHS Trust [2009] IRLR 972. 
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have a claim for constructive dismissal from the transferor unlike an employee that exercises 
a right to object to a transfer under regulation 4(7).86  
 
At the same time, an employee exercising his right to treat his contract of employment as 
terminated without notice by his employer because of his employer’s repudiatory breach of 
contract under regulation 4(11) has better protection than an objecting employee under 
regulation 4(7). Under regulation 4(11), an employee who treats his contract of employment 
as being terminated by reason of a repudiatory breach by his employer is not prevented from 
initiating a claim for constructive dismissal against his employer.87  
 
Prior to New ISG Ltd, the EAT had held in Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Cook88 that 
an employer could not prevent an automatic transfer of employees’ contracts by simply 
refusing to inform employees of the identity of the buyer (transferee). This is the same view 
that the House of Lords had reached in North Wales Training & Enterprise Council Ltd v Astley 
and Others89 while applying the guidance from the ECJ in Celtec v Astley.90  
 
The guidance from the ECJ in Celtec was that employees are automatically transferred from 
the transferor to the transferee regardless of what had been agreed between the parties to 
the transfer process and regardless of whether employees understood what was happening. 
The ruling in Celtec may be said to be in conflict with the ruling in New ISG Ltd and it is contrary 
to the principle that decision making should be based on informed consent or dissent. Where 
employees are not given sufficient information to make informed decisions, it would be unfair 
to employees as it would impact on their abilities to make informed decisions on whether to 
object to the transfer or not.  
This would also be contrary to Dworkin’s ideals of constructiveness and integrity in 
interpretation as discussed below at 6.5.3. This is because Dworkin observes that constructive 
                                                          
86 J. McMullen, ‘The “Right” to Object to Transfer of Employment under TUPE’ (2008) 37 (2) ILJ 167, 177. See also, 
Tapere v South London and Maudsley NHS Trust [2009] IRLR 972; Abellio London Ltd (Formerly Travel London Ltd) 
v Musse & Ors [2012] IRLR 360. 
87 Tapere v South London and Maudsley NHS Trust [2009] IRLR 972. 
88 Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Cook [1997] IRLR 150. 
89 North Wales Training & Enterprise Council Ltd v Astley and Others [2006] UKHL 29 (HL). 
90 Celtec v Astley [2005] IRLR 647 (hereafter Celtec).  
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interpretation is based upon the ability of a judge to assign a distinctive value or purpose to 
the object of interpretation.91 It is the value or purpose that serves as the criterion for 
determining whether one interpretation of an object is better or worse than the alternative.92 
Therefore, the information asymmetry between the transferor / transferee and employees 
would be to the employees’ detriment and would present challenges to a judge’s 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation.   
The ARD affords Member States power to introduce laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions that are more favourable to employees during relevant transfers.93 However, in 
view of the challenges presented by regulations 4(7) and 4(8), these regulations may not be 
categorised as being favourable to employees during relevant transfers. The lack of clarity 
within regulations 4(7) and 4(8) and the absence of proper guidance from the ARD and the 
CJEU case law under which an employee may exercise the right to object further remains a 
cause for concern.94 
 
It is an indication that an interpretative solution such as a change in the approach to 
interpreting TUPE Regulations is needed such that a form of a binding threshold or precedent 
is formulated to guide judicial interpretation of TUPE regulations. This approach or threshold 
may be formulated by adopting Dworkin’s Interpretative approach to laws as discussed below 
at 6.5.3.95  
 
UK judges ought to balance the interest of employees and employers during relevant transfers, 
without moving away from purposive interpretation of TUPE Regulations.  This may be 
achieved by judges adopting an interpretative approach that is not only purposive but carries 
with it the ideals of constructiveness and integrity as posited by Dworkin in his Interpretative 
Theory of Law. If Dworkin’s approach is adopted, it may lead to fair and balanced judgments 
                                                          
91 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986), at 52. 
92 Celtec v Astley [2005] IRLR 647 at 93, 109, 127. 
93 See, Directive 2001/23/EC, Article 8 which states that; ‘This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States 
to apply or introduce laws, regulations, or administrative provisions which are more favourable to employees’. 
94 Paul Davies, ‘Opting Out of Transfers’ (1996) 25 ILJ 247; J. McMullen, ‘The “Right” to Object to a Transfer under 
TUPE’ (2008) 37(20 ILJ 169, 177. 
95 See also, Hamiisi J. Nsubuga ‘The Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law: Remedying the Theoretical 
Limitations in the Traditionalist and Proceduralist Perspectives on Corporate Insolvency’ (2017) Vol.61 Issue (5) 
International Journal of Law and Management (Forthcoming, December 2017). 
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from UK courts and tribunals which may remedy the tension between corporate rescue and 
employment protection policy objectives of TUPE Regulations and Insolvency laws of the UK. 
This point is further explored at 4.5.6 below.  However, judicial approach to the interpretation 
and application of regulation 7(2) is considered first. 
 
6.5 Judicial Interpretation of Regulation 7 (2) – The ETO Exceptions 
The term ‘economic, technical and organisational reasons’ arises from regulation 7(2) of TUPE 
Regulations 2006. These terms or provisions may be used by employers as exceptions to the 
application of regulation 7(1) and regulation 4(4) of TUPE Regulations 2006 during relevant 
transfers to justify employee dismissals or variations to contract terms and conditions during 
relevant transfers.96 
 
Because of the requirement for UK courts and tribunals to interpret matters of EU law, 
especially, TUPE Regulations in a purposive manner to give effect to the intentions of the ARD, 
UK courts and tribunals, have presided over a large number of cases in relation to ETO 
provisions. However, these cases have produced inconsistent judgments. The big number of 
cases and inconsistencies may arguably, be attributed to the technical and procedural 
challenges within TUPE Regulations which may be traced back to the original ARD that the 
TUPE Regulations transposed into UK legislation.97  
 
In the UK, the first point of interpretative challenge to note in relation to regulation 7(2), is the 
absence of a statutory definition of the terms economic, technical or organisational reasons 
within TUPE Regulations. The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR) now the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) offered a guidance report 
that tends to explain what these terms may entail.98 However, the guidance does not give a 
                                                          
96 Please see chapter five, at 5.5 where the ETO provisions are broadly analysed. 
97 For example, the original ARD Directive 77/187/EC was the subject of various criticisms from EC Member States 
because of its lack of flexibility in relation to its transposition into national laws of the Member States and its 
application to relevant transfers. The lack of flexibility of the ARD had resulted in a number of referral cases to 
the ECJ from Member States and a high number of conflicting judgments being witnessed in Member States courts 
and tribunals. See, a report by the UK Department of Employment summarising a report by Prof. Dr. Rolf Birk, 
‘Contracting Out in the Context of the Provisions of Community Law and National Laws relating to the Transfer of 
Undertakings’. House of Commons Deposited Papers, Ref. HINF 94/1363. 
98 This guidance is available at www.berr.gov.uk/files/file20761.pdf, (last accessed on 28/12/2016).  
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definition of these terms. Rather, it gives an explanation of what the terms may involve, leaving 
the uncertainty unsolved.99  
This has meant that UK courts and tribunals have interpreted and applied ETO reasons during 
relevant transfers on a case by case basis which has led to inconsistent judgments. Moreover, 
it is a substantive and procedural requirement that for the ETO exceptions under regulation 
7(2) to be fully invoked, the ETO exceptions must entail changes in the workforce of the 
employer.100  
 
6.5.2 Entailing Changes in the Workforce 
‘Entailing changes in the workforce’ is part of the procedural and substantive requirements of 
regulation 7(2) that must be satisfied by the employer if the ETO defence is to be effective. The 
employer’s reasons for dismissing employees or changing employees’ contract terms and 
conditions would be void where no changes were entailed in the employer’s workforce. In 
essence, ‘entailing changes to the workforce’ is the effect of the economic, technical or 
organisational reasons adopted by the employer.101  
However, the term ‘entailing changes in the workforce’ neither has a statutory definition under 
the TUPE Regulations nor in the ARD. Like the terms, economic, technical and organisational 
reasons, the courts and tribunals have through their adjudication tried to interpret what the 
term might mean or may involve.102  
For example, in Berriman v Delabole Slate,103 the Court of Appeal (CA) observed that a change 
in the workforce was part of the ETO reason that must be satisfied if the ETO exception is to 
be invoked. The employer’s plan must be to achieve changes in the workforce and must be an 
objective of the plan not a consequence. The CA emphasised that the term required changes 
                                                          
99 For example, the guidance indicated that an economic reason may relate to the running or operations of the 
business. The guidance further provides that a term technical or organisational might include reasons relating to 
the nature of equipment or production process that the transferee operates.  
100 Per Mummery LJ in Spaceright, “…[f]or an ETO reason to be available, there must be an intention to change 
the workforce and to continue to conduct the business, as distinct from the purpose of selling it. It is not available 
in the case of dismissing an employee to enable the administrators make the business of the company a more 
attractive proposition to the prospective of a going concern”, at [47]. 
101 See, Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and Another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565, discussed above in chapter five. 
102 See cases such as Berriman v Delabole Slate [1985] IRLR 305; Wheeler v Patel [1987] IRLR 211; [1985] ICR 
546Whitehouse v Blatchford and Sons Ltd [1999] IRLR 492; Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and Another [2011] 
EWCA Civ. 1565. 
103 Berriman v Delabole Slate [1985] IRLR 305; [1985] ICR 546. 
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in the numbers of employees in employment or to their functions. Therefore, mere changes in 
the identity of employees may not constitute changes to the workforce as long as the overall 
numbers and functions of the employees remain the same.104  
In Green v Elan Care,105 The claimant’s role was changed from a senior manager’s role to a 
senior carer following a relevant transfer involving the care home that employed her. This was 
following the transferee’s restructure of the care home’s senior management team. The 
claimant objected to the new role as it meant a demotion to her title. She initiated an unfair 
dismissal claim against her employer. The EAT held that the dismissal was for an organisational 
reason that entailed changes in the employer’s workforce due to the management structural 
changes. 
However, despite this ruling by the EAT to this effect, there had been no changes in the overall 
workforce in terms of numbers or a reduction in or addition to the workforce. The EAT rejected 
the claimant’s contention that there had been no changes in the workforce. The EAT concluded 
that: 
“… [w]hile a minor change in the functions of one employee or a small number 
of employees in a large workforce might not be sufficient, considering the 
workforce as a whole, to amount to a change in the workforce, in our judgment 
where the steps taken by the employer involves a real change in the functions 
in a substantial or key area of the work force, it is open to a tribunal to find 
that changes in the workforce are entailed.”106 
Similarly in Nationwide Building Society v Benn & Others,107 the EAT rejected a claim for unfair 
dismissals from employees who had resigned from their jobs following variations to their 
employment terms and bonus entitlements being downgraded. This was following a relevant 
transfer that took employees of Portman Building Society (PBS) to Nationwide Building Society 
(NBS). The employees claimed that variations to their employment terms and downgrading of 
                                                          
104 See also the EAT reasoning in Crawford v Swinton Insurance Brokers Ltd [1990] IRLR 42, EAT, where it held that 
to determine whether there was a change in the workforce, it required a consideration of the workforce as a 
whole not just sections. 
105 UKEAT/18/01/0403 (hereafter Elan Care). 
106  Ibid, at 25.   
107 Nationwide Building Society v Benn & Others [UKEAT/0273/09/JOJ]. (Hereafter Nationwide). 
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their bonus entitlements did not entail changes (particularly numbers) in the workforce. The 
EAT, rejecting the employees’ claims for unfair dismissal observed that: 
 “…[t]he term ‘entailing changes in the workforce’ did not imply that the 
dismissals must entail changes in the entirety of the workforce. Therefore, the 
dismissals were for an organisational reason”.108 
From the observation in both cases above, it may be submitted that the EAT’s rulings in both 
Elan Care and Nationwide are exemplary of the UK courts’ and tribunals’ willingness to 
purposively interpret ETO terms during relevant transfers in order to keep their interpretation 
of TUPE Regulations within the spirit and intentions of the ARD. The judgments are a further 
indication that although the ARD and TUPE Regulations seek to protect employees’ rights 
during relevant transfers, TUPE Regulations should however, not be seen as a ‘weapon’ used 
by employees to restrict employers from effecting economic, technical or organisational 
structural changes to their businesses that may enhance their going concern prospects which 
in turn may lead to employment security and continuity.109  
Therefore, regulation 7(2) should be used as a balancing provision between the interest of 
employees and the interest of employers during relevant transfers. However, it may be 
submitted that judicial approaches to interpreting and applying regulation 7(2) to solving 
employers’ and employees’ concerns during relevant transfers have so far failed to reach the 
balance needed. The varying judicial approaches to interpreting and applying regulation 7(2) 
were recently tested in the Court of Appeal case of Crystal Palace F.C Limited and Another v 
Kavanagh and Others.110  
This case is the subject of detailed analysis below. In particular, the case will be analysed in 
light of Dworkin’s interpretative approach. This is to examine whether, Dworkin’s approach to 
interpretation if adopted by the ET, EAT and CA, would have led to a better and balanced 
outcome for both employees and employers in all of the three hearings. 
                                                          
108 Ibid, at [7]. 
109 J. McMullen, ‘Atypical Transfers, Atypical Workers and Atypical Employment Structures – A Case for Greater 
Transparency in Employment Issues’ (1996) 25 (4) ILJ 286, 307; J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General 
Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case C-
426/11 Alermo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 42 ILJ 434.  
110 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA. [Hereafter Crystal Palace]. 
159 
 
6.5.2 (a) Crystal Palace F.C Limited and Another v. Kavanagh and Others – A Recap 
Crystal Palace F.C had gone into administration and the appointed administrator dismissed the 
claimant employees on the grounds that the football club had run out of money to pay for 
employee wages. At the time of the dismissals the football club was facing serious prospects 
of becoming liquidated as it had become insolvent. The administrator claimed that he 
dismissed the claimant employees in a bid to cut the wage bill to continue running the football 
club on skeleton staff in the hope that a buyer would be found. The dismissed employees 
brought a claim against the football club on the ground that their dismissals were connected 
with the transfer and were for the purposes of selling the football club. 
 
The employment tribunal (ET) held that although the dismissals were connected with the 
transfer, they were however, for an economic reason that entailed changes in the workforce. 
Therefore, the dismissals were not automatically unfair by reason of regulation 7(1).  The ET 
drew a distinction between the administrator’s ‘reason for the dismissal’ which was to ‘reduce 
the wage bill’ in order to continue running the football club and the administrator’s ‘ultimate 
objective’ which was the sale of the football club.111 The ET therefore, concluded that the 
administrator did not dismiss the employees to make the sale of the football club more 
attractive. The football club had genuinely run out of money to pay for staff wages and salaries. 
The intention was to run the football club on a ‘skeleton staff’ in the hope of selling the football 
club in the future.112  
 
The ET decision was appealed to the EAT. However, the EAT did not agree with the ET’s 
conclusions above. The EAT was of the view that the ET’s finding that the administrator’s 
reason for the dismissal was to continue running the football club was untenable and 
ambiguous.113 The EAT’s conclusion was that the dismissal of the employees by the 
administrator was for purposes of selling the football club although at the time there was no 
serious buyer in contemplation.114 The EAT observed that dismissing a proportion of 
employees to reduce the wage bill in the hope that a buyer would be found, who in fact bought 
                                                          
111 Kavanagh and others v Crystal Palace F.C (2000) Ltd and Others [2013] IRLR 291, EAT, at [8]. 
112 Ibid, at 8. 
113 Ibid, at 30. 
114 Ibid, at 31. 
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the football club a week later, may closely be linked to the administrator’s ultimate objective 
which was the selling of the football club, rather than the desire to continue running the 
football club as a going concern.115   
The EAT drew a distinction between a dismissal necessitated by the desire to entail changes in 
the workforce, which would pass for an ETO exception, and a dismissal as ‘part and parcel of a 
process’ for the purposes of selling the business which may not be covered by an ETO 
exception.116 The EAT drew on Mummery LJ’s formulation in Spaceright117 in their distinction. 
As a recap of Mummery LJ’s formulation in Spaceright, his Lordship held that for an ETO reason 
to be available to an employer, the employer must have had the intention to make changes in 
the workforce and to continue operating the business as opposed to making the business 
attractive for sale.118  
However, the EAT observed that a dismissal by the employer as ‘part and parcel of a process’ 
to sell the business should not be covered by an ETO exception. In the EAT’s observations, the 
administrator’s reasons for the dismissal could only point to one conclusion. This was the 
ultimate objective of selling the football club. Therefore, the dismissals would not pass for an 
ETO reason so they would be automatically unfair.119  
The EAT judgment was also appealed to the CA. The CA was not in agreement with the EAT’s 
observations above as it restored the ET’s original ruling that the dismissals were for an ETO 
reason that entailed changes in the workforce.120 According to the CA, the dismissals were 
necessitated by the desire by the administrator to cut the wage bill to continue running the 
business.121  
However, Briggs LJ observed that this case (Crystal Palace) had raised some fundamental issues 
about the interaction between two statutory regimes of TUPE and insolvency. The TUPE regime 
that protects employees on transfer of an undertaking and the insolvency regime 
(administration in this case) that aims to rescue an insolvent but viable business that would 
                                                          
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, at 26. 
117 Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565. 
118 Ibid, at 47. 
119 Kavanagh and others v Crystal Palace F.C (2000) Ltd and Others [2013] IRLR 291, EAT, at 31. 
120 Ibid, at 8. 
121 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, at [31]. 
161 
 
save jobs where the business is sold as a going concern.122 Interesting to note, his Lordship 
observed that: 
‘…[i]n the context of insolvency, dismissal of employees is a principal method 
by which administrators can achieve the economies necessary to “maximise” 
the period before a lack of resources compels closure and to make the 
business more attractive to buyers.’123 
From the observation from Briggs LJ above, it may be construed that judges are aware of the 
potential conflict that arises between the two protective regimes of TUPE and Insolvency law 
during relevant transfers. Each protective regime seeks to protect its principal objective. TUPE 
Regulations protecting employees while insolvency law seeking to protect business rescue and 
continuity. The observation above is also a further indication that the courts and tribunals are 
aware that sometimes business owners may try to dress up a dismissal under the guise of ETO 
exceptions.124  
The courts and tribunals try to balance or remedy these potential conflicts and tension through 
interpretation. However, as this case and other cases around regulation 7(2) and TUPE in 
general suggest, inconsistent outcomes have been reached by different courts and tribunals 
which has not solved the need to achieve a balance between the two protective regimes and 
their policy objectives. 
6.5.3 Dworkin’s Interpretative ideals of Constructive and Integrity as a Remedy 
Dworkin writes about constructiveness125 and integrity126 as two factors in judicial 
interpretation that would aid a judge to reach a right answer127 to the legal question before 
the court. Constructive interpretation would involve analysing past government actions, 
judicial judgments with the ratio decidendi, and legislative statutes to draw up a theory of what 
the law is or ought to be in answering the legal question before the court.128  
                                                          
122 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA at 18. 
123 Ibid, at 22. 
124 See also, Dynamex Friction Ltd and Another v Amicus and another [2008] EWCA Civ. 381. 
125 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986) at 44 -48. 
126 Ibid, at 255. 
127 Dworkin claims that all or almost all legal questions have a unique right answer, even the hardest of cases. See, 
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: G. Duckworth, 1977) 85. The Right Answer Thesis as posited by 
Dworkin is discussed in chapter two above at 2.4. 
128 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.52.  
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Dworkin observes that in making the law or an area of the law the best it can be, the judge 
must consider the criteria of ‘fit and ‘moral value’ in assessing whether the legal principles 
before him can lead to the right answer to the question before the court.129 This is especially 
where the law is unsettled or inconsistent with the answer to the legal question before the 
court. This is because some legal principles would fare better on the ‘fit’ criterion while others 
would do better on the ‘moral value’ criterion. The ‘fit’ criterion may involve legal principles 
that fit into the purposes underlying the passing of the law and would inform a decision that is 
parallel to the law. The ‘moral value’ category may involve principles that would aim to ensure 
moral fairness or equity in the law that is subject to application to specific areas or legal 
questions.130  
Legal principles that hold moral value of the law not only fit into the law at hand, but also carry 
with them the ideals of fairness and reasonableness to the demands of competing 
stakeholders. For example, legal principles on the ‘moral value’ of law would inform a judge’s 
analysis of the law in establishing that law’s moral vision for the legal question before the court. 
For instance, should the availability of an economic reason to justify an employee’s dismissal 
be invoked at the slightest opportunity by an employer even where there are other viable 
options to address a company’s financial difficulties? Would it not be fair and reasonable to 
exhaust other options where possible before effecting a dismissal because the laws states so? 
Therefore, by devising a theory that compares these legal principles (on both the ‘fit’ and the 
‘moral value’ criteria), a judge may be able to choose the legal principles that have better 
weight to fit both into the ‘fit and moral value’ criteria. This model of constructive 
interpretation of the law would express a coherent conception of justice and integrity.131 This 
may be seen as a form of a decision-making process that is consistent with the spirit and 
intentions of the policies underlying the principles of fairness and justice.132 
It should be noted that in reaching the decisions in Crystal Palace, both the EAT and CA, in 
addition to interpreting the provisions of regulation 7(1) and 7(2) of TUPE 2006 purposively, 
also applied the formulation of Mummery LJ in Spaceright on the application of ETO reasons 
                                                          
129 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986) at 228 -258. 
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131 Ibid, at 225. 
132 R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality’ in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. 
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during relevant transfers. However, both the EAT and CA reached varying conclusions despite 
both the CA and the tribunals (ET and EAT) purposively interpreting regulation 7.133   
As a recap, the formulation by Mummery LJ in relation to the application of ETO reasons was 
that: 
 ‘[f]or an ETO to be available, there must be an intention to change the 
workforce and to continue conducting the business as opposed to the purpose 
of selling it. It is not available in the case of dismissing an employee to enable 
the administrators make the business of the company, a more attractive 
proposition to prospective transferees of a going concern.’134 
By following this formulation and applying it to the facts before it, the EAT in Crystal Palace 
concluded that the administrator’s decision to dismiss a proportion of the workforce and 
mothball the football club in the hope that a buyer would be found could only point to one 
conclusion. This was to sell the football club as the ultimate objective which could not have 
been for an ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce.135  
However, the CA after analysing the formulation of Mummery LJ in Spaceright above 
concluded that Mummery LJ’s observations were made in a fact-intensive case of Spaceright. 
The CA therefore distinguished the facts in Crystal Palace from the facts in Spaceright. The 
distinction was that in Spaceright, the dismissals were made to attract the buyer as the buyer 
would be able to appoint a new chief executive of its choice. However, the dismissals in Crystal 
Palace were not to attract the sale of the football club but were necessitated by need to avoid 
liquidation.136 Therefore, the CA observed that the EAT had given more weight to the concept 
of ‘mothballing’ the club in reaching its conclusion that the dismissals were for the sale of the 
football club.137  
                                                          
133 See Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, at [9] – [10] where the CA judges 
were discussing the relevance of Mummery LJ’s formulation in Spaceright and how it influenced the judgment of 
the EAT that the CA departed away from.  
134 Spaceright Europe Ltd v. Baillavoine and another [2011] EWCA Civ. 1565, at 47. 
135 Kavanagh and others v Crystal Palace F.C (2000) Ltd and Others [2013] IRLR 291, EAT, at [12]. 
136 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA, at [28]. 
137 Per Maurice Kay, Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, at [14]. 
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6.5.4 Judicial Balancing of Policy Objectives – in light of Dworkin 
According to Dworkin, ‘judges who accept the interpretative ideal of integrity decide hard 
cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about peoples’ rights and duties, the 
best constructive interpretation of the political and legal doctrine of their community.’138 
Constructiveness and integrity in interpretation would present judges and policy makers with 
the advantage to reflect on whether the law is serving the purposes for which it was intended 
to serve. If inconsistent with the current desired demands of fairness, equality and justice to 
the interests of stakeholders, that law may be subjected to change or reform. The weaknesses 
in that particular law would have been exposed through constructiveness and integrity in 
interpretation.139  
The decision of the ET, as supported and reinstated by the CA and that of the EAT highlight the 
interpretative challenges and technicalities involved in applying TUPE Regulations to relevant 
transfers. The decisions further highlight how the purposive approach to interpreting TUPE 
Regulations by UK courts and tribunals may lead to different judgments which have not helped 
to address the tension between corporate rescue and employment protection policy 
objectives during TUPE transfers in the UK.140 
It may be submitted that the decision of the EAT above would be more protective of employees 
than the decisions of ET and CA respectively. It is the concern that the ET’s decision and that 
of the CA were based on the distinction between the administrator’s ‘reason for the dismissal’ 
and the administrator’s ‘ultimate objective’. Although the factors leading to the activities that 
necessitated the dismissals were interpreted purposively, the distinction formulated by the ET 
                                                          
138 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986), at 255. 
139 It should be noted that both the ARD and TUPE Regulations have already been subjected to changes. The 
original directive, Directive 77/187/EC was amended in 1998 by Directive 98/50/EC to further strengthen 
employee protection. Directive 98/50/EC was also amended by Directive 2001/23/EC which is the current 
directive that was transposed into UK legislation by TUPE Regulations (2006). The original TUPE Regulations to be 
transposed into UK law TUPE Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794) which were amended by TUPE Regulations 2006 
(SI 2006/246). TUPE Regulations (2006) were also amended in 2014 by The Collective Redundancies and the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 to arguably, align TUPE 
Regulations to the ARD. For a similar discourse on TUPE Regulations and the ARD, please see chapter five.  
140 Hamiisi J. Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 4(1) 
NIBLeJ 4. 
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and followed by the CA may not have given the necessary weight to the need to safeguard the 
rights of employees during relevant transfers as required by the ARD.141  
It is the argument that if indeed, the administrator’s reason for the dismissals was to continue 
running the football club as a going concern, it is questionable why the administrator did not 
consider other cost cutting mechanisms as opposed to dismissing the employees in question. 
Why did the administrator not consider selling some of the playing staff (footballers) as a cost 
reduction strategy? On occasion, UK courts and tribunals have tended not to interfere in the 
business decisions made by an employer, especially in non-TUPE business sales and transfers 
where the business decisions are for ‘sound business reasons’.142 However, whether the 
administrator’s decisions for the dismissal would pass for a ‘sound business reason’ remains a 
moot point.143  
The sale price of a professional footballer may arguably, be of greater return (in terms of 
generating income) than the income obtained from dismissing administrative members of 
staff. The income obtainable from the sale of a professional footballer may arguably, sustain a 
football club for some considerable period as a going concern as opposed to dismissing non-
playing staff whose annual salaries may constitute a fraction of the costs of maintaining a 
professional footballer.144 
There may be sense in the argument that continued operation of a football club would mainly 
depend on winning football matches and retaining good footballers. This may safeguard the 
football club against other losses of revenue, such as from fans who may stop attending 
football matches. However, the fact that the administrator may not have considered the 
                                                          
141 Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, CA, at [13 - 14], [28]. 
142 For example, in Catamaran Cruisers v Williams and others [1994] IRLR 384, the ET held that an employer’s 
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143 Charles A. Wynn-Evans, ‘TUPE and Mothballs – Crystal Palace FC Ltd and Another v Kavanagh and Others’ 
(2014) 43(2) ILJ 185. 
144 See for example, Daniel Taylor, ‘Leeds United is the Story of How Not to Run a Football Club’ The Guardian 
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possibility of selling some of the footballers as a cost saving measure may cast further doubt 
into the administrator’s reasons for the dismissal. This may echo the argument that on 
corporate insolvency, employers find employee dismissals as a soft target for costs reduction. 
With the availability of statutory protection, such as in regulation 7 (2) in the form of a shield 
to potential unfair dismissal claims, employment protection may be compromised.145 
Therefore, the possibility that the administrator in Crystal Palace did not consider other cost 
cutting mechanisms than employment termination would raise questions as to whether the 
administrator used regulation 7(2) disingenously. Legal principles such as fairness and 
reasonableness may have been overlooked by the administrator. Questions of whether 
invoking TUPE provisions for own protection would be fair, reasonable and would conform to 
the ‘moral value’ that commercial morality would demand may have been overlooked by the 
administrator. This is why Dworkin’s ideals of weighing up legal principles that would conform 
to the ‘fit and moral value’ would help to balance the potential unfairness in the use of TUPE 
Regulations for own protections by both the employers and employees.146  
For instance, when Portsmouth Football Club filed for administration in 2010, the joint 
administrators acknowledged that the football club’s main monthly expenditure was in respect 
of football players’ wages. Therefore, the joint administrators undertook necessary measures 
to reduce this expenditure. This was through selling and loaning some of the footballers to 
other football clubs.147  
Therefore, in light of this perspective, the EAT’s observations that the administrator’s reasons 
for the dismissals were for the sale of the football club, ought to be given some weight. This 
may be supported by the fact that the football club was sold a week later following the 
dismissals of the employees. With the ET and CA departing from the observations of the EAT, 
it casts doubt as to whether the ET’s and CA’s purposive interpretation of the administrator’s 
                                                          
145 P. A. Gibbs, ‘Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: The Relative Importance of Corporate Governance, 
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‘reasons for the dismissal’ and the administrator’s ‘ultimate objective’ took the intentions of 
the ARD into consideration.148  
Prior to the CA’s decison in Crystal Palace, the CA had in Dynamex Friction Ltd and Another v 
Amicus and Another149 held that in determining the reasons for the dismissal, what counts 
most is the ‘thought process of the decision maker’. In this case, the CA was tasked to give a 
ruling on whether a dismissal prior to a relevant transfer was for economic reasons or simply 
carried out to facilitate a business sale to escape potential liabilities. After realising that the 
company had a potential approximate liability of around three million pounds from potential 
unfair dismissal claims, Mr. Smith (the sole director of Dynamex Friction Ltd) instructed an 
administrator to file for administration, arguably to escape potential liabilities.  
Upon appointment, the administrator dismissed all of the employees that had taken part in a 
strike action on the basis that there was no money to pay for their wages.  The transferor’s 
business was sold to an ex-employee who formed a new company assisted by Mr. Smith who 
later took control of the company. The dismissed employees brought claims for unfair 
dismissals.  
The ET initially held that the dismissals were for an economic reason. However, the EAT 
disagreed and the case was appealed to the CA. The CA held that the dismissals were not for a 
reason connected with the transfer. The dismissals were for an economic reason.150 The CA 
further held that in determining the reasons for the dismissal, what counts most is the ‘thought 
process of the decision maker’. However, despite the ruling by the CA, it remained a point of 
contention that the employer (Mr. Smith) had contemplated a sale of the business through an 
administrator to escape potential unfair dismissal liabilities.151 
By giving regard to the ‘thought process of the decision maker’ (the administrator), the CA was 
of the view that the decision maker (the administrator) dismissed the employees for lack of 
money to pay wages. Therefore, for the CA, the reason for the dismissal was not the impending 
                                                          
148 Charles A. Wynn-Evans, ‘TUPE and Mothballs – Crystal Palace FC Ltd and Another v Kavanagh and Others’ 
(2014) 43(2) ILJ 185. 
149 Dynamex Friction Ltd and Another v Amicus and another [2008] EWCA Civ. 381. (Hereafter Dynamex). 
150 Ibid, at [62]. 
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or prospective transfer but the reason was purely economic, necessitated mainly by the poor 
cashflow state of the company at the time.152   
The decision of the CA was a majority decision, with Lawrence Collins LJ dissenting. His Lordship 
gave a statement which if followed, may support the argument that by using the purposive 
approach to interpreting TUPE Regulations especially the ETO exceptions under regulation 
7(2), judges give too much attention to activities that fall within the ETO exceptions rather than 
balancing the reasons for the dismissals.153  
Collins LJ observed that if TUPE stood alone, he would agree that it was appropriate to focus 
on the thought process of the person who made the decision to dismiss. However, taking into 
account a purposive construction in light of the ARD, rather than looking only at the motives 
of the person who effected the dismissals, it would be relevant if the tribunals were to find 
that Mr. Smith stage-managed the administration and used the administrator as his unwitting 
tool to regain the business without having to pay liabilities for unfair dismissal claims.154  
Although a majority of the judges were not persuaded by this approach, it may be seen as a 
school of thought that if adopted, would balance the policy objectives of corporate rescue 
while also offering the social employment protection to employees during relevant transfers 
that the ARD sought to achieve. Collins LJ’s observations above would echo Dworkin’s ideals of 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation as two fundamental factors that may aid a 
judge to reach a right answer to the question before the court.155   
The point of concern is that judges in Crystal Palace and Dynamex Friction above relied too 
much on the employers’ reasons for the dismissals. It is the contention that by the judges in 
Crystal Palace relying on the disticntion between the administrator’s ‘reasons for the dismissal’ 
and the administrator’s ‘ultimate objective’ they may have been constructive but may not have 
taken the ideal of integrity into consideration. Integrity would ensure that fairness and 
reasonableness into the administrator’s reasons to dismiss employees is given consideration 
alongside a constructive analysis of the facts surrounding the activities that led to the 
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dismissals. This would be the interpretative approach that Dworkin posits that  would express 
a coherent conception of justice and integrity.156  
6.6 Conclusion  
The tension between corporate rescue and employment protection policy objectives during 
relevant transfers has been a major challenge to the UK Courts and tribunals since TUPE 
Regulations were enacted into UK law, giving effect to the ARD. This tension has to a larger 
extent been created by the purposive interpretation of TUPE Regulations and the provisions of 
the ARD adopted by UK Courts and tribunals. This tension can however, be remedied through 
an interpretative solution to achieve the balance needed to pursue the policy objectives of 
corporate rescue and employment protection simultaneously.  
Competing policy objectives of rescuing insolvent but viable businesses and those of 
protecting, and promoting employment within the ARD and TUPE Regulations are not totally 
incompatible.157 Where business rescue is pursued successfully, it saves jobs and promotes 
continuity of employment. However, the problem arises where these policy objectives conflict 
with each other during relevant transfers. This is because both policy objectives are difficult to 
achieve simultaneously, rather, a compromise ought to be made. 
 
However, as discussed at 6.4, the requirement for UK Courts and tribunals to interpret TUPE 
Regulations purposively, as a form of aligning TUPE Regulations to the intentions of the ARD, 
has created futher problems and challenges. In a bid to interpret TUPE Regulations purposively 
by the UK Courts and tribunals, inconsistent judgements have been witnessed which have not 
been helpful in trying to balance employment protection and corporate rescue objectives 
through interpretation. On other occasions, the CJEU, has not provided binding judgments to 
Member States on how to approach certain provisions relating to EU law, especially, the ARD.   
Therefore, as highlighted in this chapter, Dworkin’s interpretative approach, if adopted by UK 
judges in interpretating and applying TUPE Regulations to relevant transfers, may arguably, 
provide an approach that would achieve the balance needed. Dworkin’s ideals of 
constructiveness and integrity in interpretation should be adopted and used as the criteria for 
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devising a theory or threshold upon which factual arguments before the court are analysed 
and applied to relevant laws and policies applicable in that particular area of law. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes this research project and the original contribution to knowledge made 
by this research project. The chapter also highlights the findings of this thesis. Particularly, the 
chapter concludes how Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law has been applied to several 
aspects impacting on employee protection and corporate rescue in both the US and the UK in 
this thesis.  
The chapter also offers some observations from the comparative aspect of this research 
project, highlighting the significant jurisdictional similarities and differences that impact on 
corporate rescue and employment protection during corporate insolvency. The chapter 
concludes the normative justification in this thesis for the need to pursue both policy objectives 
of employment protection and business rescue fairly, in both jurisdictions, as a measure of 
balancing both policies’ objectives to remedy the tension that corporate insolvency creates 
between the two policies’ objectives.  
7.2 Research Insight 
The thesis centred on the rights of employees on corporate insolvency in the UK and the US. 
Normatively, the thesis focused on how employees’ rights and interests may be balanced with 
employers’ rights through interpretation during corporate insolvencies.  
In chapter one, the thesis introduced the concepts of corporate rescue and employment 
protection in both the UK and the US, highlighting how both employment protection policy 
objectives and corporate rescue policy objectives conflict with each during corporate 
insolvency. The chapter also gave a brief introduction of the legislative structures and 
corporate rescue and reorganisation processes that both jurisdictions prescribe to regulate the 
employer-employee relationships during corporate insolvency.  
As analysed in chapter three under US law and chapter five under UK law, the rationale for a 
fair and a balanced approach to both policy objectives of employment protection and business 
rescue is premised on the contention that compromising either of the policies’ objectives at 
the expense of the other may create dire consequences for both policies’ objectives.  
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The research established in chapter five that where employers are unable to rescue their 
businesses because of restrictive employment protection provisions within TUPE Regulations 
and the business is therefore liquidated, employees that TUPE Regulations seek to protect may 
end up losing their jobs as a consequence of the failed business rescue attempts by their 
employers. On this note, both business rescue and employment protection policy objectives 
would have been failed which may not be good for the economy as a whole. TUPE Regulations 
would be counterproductive in this perspective.  
In chapter two, this thesis analysed how the theoretical perspectives of the traditionalist and 
the proceduralist theoretical schools may influence the insolvency laws and policies of a legal 
system in addressing the debtor-creditor relationships on corporate insolvencies in the UK and 
the US.1 Particularly, the chapter analysed how the traditionalist perspectives may provide 
fairer approaches to factors that should be taken into account on corporate insolvency than 
the theoretical perspectives of the proceduralists. However, after a thorough examination of 
both theoretical schools’ perspectives on corporate insolvency law, this chapter established 
that neither of the theoretical schools provided satisfactory approaches to how insolvency laws 
of a legal system should approach extant stakeholder interests fairly on corporate insolvency.  
The chapter established that the proceduralists provide clear answers to the factors that 
should be taken into account during corporate insolvency. However, applying these 
proceduralists’ perspectives to corporate insolvencies would arguably, create a degree of 
unfairness to extant stakeholders as a group. This is because proceduralist perspectives on 
corporate insolvency give primacy to creditor value maximisation, which mainly benefits 
secured creditors who already enjoy priority, with powerful bargaining powers over other 
stakeholders, such as employees.   
The chapter established that the traditionalist perspectives on the other hand, provide fairer 
factors to be taken into account on corporate insolvency, but traditionalists do not provide 
how such factors should be applied to corporate insolvencies. For example, traditionalists 
believe that as part of the rehabilitation and reorganisation processes on corporate insolvency, 
                                                          
1 Hamiisi J. Nsubuga ‘The Interpretative Approach to Bankruptcy Law: Remedying the Theoretical Limitations in 
the Traditionalist and Proceduralist Perspectives on Corporate Insolvency’ (0000) Vol.61 Issue (5) International 
Journal of Law and Management (Forthcoming, December 2017). 
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redistribution and modifications to stakeholder non-insolvency interests and rights that are 
involved in the insolvency process may be desirable, where doing so would serve the interests 
of all stakeholders and preserve the company from liquidation.2  
From this perspective, this would be beneficial for all stakeholders as a group, including 
employees. However, traditionalists do not provider clear answers on how redistribution and 
changes to the laws inside insolvencies would be applied. Professor Warren has conceded to 
this limitation. She writes that; 
‘[w]hile I hope that it is useful to have distinguished the policymaking thrust of 
state collection law from that of bankruptcy and to have identified the 
distributional rationale of bankruptcy,… I have not offered a single-rationale 
policy that compels solutions in particular cases. I have not given any answers 
to specific statutory issues.’3 
On the same point of theoretical discourse, proceduralists see redistribution and changes to 
non-insolvency stakeholder rights and interests as a gateway of using bankruptcy filing for 
strategic gains. Proceduralists are of the view that changing certain labour protection laws and 
policies inside bankruptcy may incentivise some debtor companies to file for bankruptcies to 
gain the advantages and protections that bankruptcy filings afford that debtor company. 
Proceduralists are of the view that this would amount to bankruptcy abuse and it would be a 
form of weakness within a legal system.4   
This chapter therefore established that the lack of clear answers from the traditionalist 
perspectives, and the potential unfairness in the proceduralist perspectives presented forms 
of limitations on both theoretical schools’ perspectives which would arguably be remedied by 
the adoption of Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law. This chapter established that the 
traditionalist theoretical school would provide fairer factors to the interests of employees and 
other stakeholders in general in contrast to the proceduralist theoretical school. Moreover, 
the prevailing interpretation of s 1113 would also reflect a proceduralist viewpoint. 
 
                                                          
2 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 793 – 797. 
3 Ibid, at 795. 
4 Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L. J. 573, 599 at 591. 
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7.3 Comparative Analysis and Theoretical Framework – The Answer to my Research Question 
By adopting a theoretical analysis that is, Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, this thesis 
examined the tension between corporate rescue laws and employment protection during 
corporate insolvency in the US and the UK and how this tension may be remedied or balanced. 
The thesis focuses on the US and the UK as they are both common law jurisdictions and it was 
established that they share a form of similar objectives when dealing with debtor-creditor 
relationships during corporate insolvency.  
The thesis established that both countries’ corporate insolvency laws, policies and processes 
set out to achieve the same goal: to offer companies in financial difficulties a chance to either 
reorganise their business affairs to enable them to continue operating as going concerns, or 
support them through a liquidation process in an orderly and controlled manner where 
corporate rescue is not achievable.5 
However, the thesis also established that there were fundamental differences between the UK 
and the US corporate insolvency laws and employment laws that govern the employer - 
employee relationships during corporate insolvency proceedings. These differences were born 
out of the differences in the business, political and social cultures inherent in both jurisdictions 
that are attuned to the contention that ‘while US law is pro-debtor law, UK law is pro-creditor 
law’6 which has attracted various debates on both sides of the Atlantic.7  
The key findings of the thesis were that although both jurisdictions had provisions in their 
insolvency laws that seek to balance the debtor – creditor (employer – employee) concerns 
during corporate insolvency, a majority of the provisions in these insolvency laws were more 
protective of corporate rescue than employment protection. Moreover, corporate rescue laws 
                                                          
5 See for example, IA 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(1) (C); Bryant P. Lee, ‘Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C 
363 to Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations’ [2009] Columb. Bus. L. Rev. 520, 
524. 
6 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo- American Evaluation’ (2007) 56 (3) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 515, 551; see also, the joint H M Treasury / DTI Report, ‘A Review of Company Rescue 
and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms’ (May 2000) 38 – 41. 
7 E. Warren & J. L. Westbrook, ‘Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy’ (1999) 73 Am. Bankr. L. J. 
499, 553; C. E. Vance & P. Barr, ‘The Facts and Fictions of Bankruptcy Reform’ (2003) 1 De Paul Bus. & Com. L. J. 
361, 410; G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo- American Evaluation’ (2007) 56(3) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 515, 551; L. Qi, ‘Availability of Continuing Financing in Corporate 
Reorganisations: the UK and US Perspective’ (2008) 29 Company Lawyer 162, 167. 
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and processes inherent in both jurisdictions highlighted a level of disparity between corporate 
rescue and employment protection objectives during corporate rescue.  
For example, the thesis argued in chapters three and four that some of the provisions in the 
US Bankruptcy Code, such as s.362, s.365 and s.1113 offered more protection to business 
reorganisation /rescue imperatives than employment protection. In the UK, the thesis 
established that corporate rescue processes such as administration considered the rescue of 
the company as a going concern as the main objective.8 Although successful rescue of the 
company as a going concern may save jobs, employment protection is not a specific objective 
of administration.9 However, certain employee claims such as claims for unpaid wages, 
accrued holiday pay, maternity and paternity benefits are treated as preferential debts on their 
employer’s insolvency.10 
Collective bargaining and labour union movement are key aspects of employment protection 
in both jurisdictions.   In the US for example, it was established that collective bargaining and 
the labour union movement were the historical bedrock to employee protection, participation 
and representation in the US labour industry (as analysed in chapter three at 3.2).  However, 
collective bargaining and labour union movement only covered a small percentage of 
employees in the US with a majority of workers in the upstream US labour market being non-
unionised and therefore not covered by collective bargaining agreements.11      
Moreover, labour union movement and collective bargaining in both jurisdictions were 
analysed as being in a steady decline in membership and influence for years. As highlighted in 
chapter four at 4.3 the ability by the debtor to reject collective bargaining agreements where 
rejection would help prevent irreparable damage to the bankruptcy estate highlighted a 
degree of inequality in the balance between business reorganisation and rescue and 
employment protection policy objectives during bankruptcy reorganisations in the US.   
In addition to the above, a lack of a binding process to which bankruptcy courts are bound in 
interpreting and applying s.1113 to CBA rejection motions further highlighted the imbalance 
                                                          
8 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para.3(1)(a). 
9 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 3(1). 
10 IA 1986, Sch. 6. 
11 For instance, see a news release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, on 26 
January 2017 which highlighted a massive decline in labour union memberships in the US in 2016 and recent 
years at, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm> (November 2017). 
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between corporate rescue and employment protection objectives during corporate rescue in 
the US. Moreover, as analysed in chapter three at 3.2, in the US, statutory protection against 
employee discharge was substantially low and the employment-at-will practice largely 
prevailed.12  
However, the thesis established that in the UK, although union membership highlighted a 
steady decline over the years,13  there was uniform protection to all employees during 
corporate insolvency. The impact of TUPE Regulations14 was to consolidate a uniform approach 
to employee protection during transfers of businesses and undertakings. TUPE Regulations 
impose a uniform and structured approach to the treatment of employee interests and 
benefits during transfers of businesses in the UK.15 Therefore, as established in chapter five at 
5.2 (on the scope of employment protection under TUPE Regulations), employment protection 
is the core policy objective of the TUPE Regulations.  
However, it was also established that over emphasising the protective provisions of 
employment protection under TUPE may constrict corporate rescue by making it difficult for 
employers to make business decisions that would enhance their businesses’ rescue prospects. 
Where corporate rescue fails due to restrictive employment protection provisions within TUPE 
Regulations, it may lead to job losses in which case TUPE Regulations would be 
counterproductive. 
The other key finding was that interpretation may be used as a remedy or a balancing tool to 
resolve the tension between corporate rescue and employment protection during corporate 
insolvency in both jurisdictions.  More specifically, in light of the imbalance between corporate 
rescue and employment protection objectives precipitated by the tension between both 
                                                          
12 See L E. Blades, “Employment – at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer 
Power” (1967) 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404; Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P. 2d 25 (Cal. 
App. 1959). 
13 For example, see reports released by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on 31 May 
2017 and the Office for National Statistics on 13 September 2017 at See, Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, ‘Trade Union Membership 2016: Statistical Bulletin’ available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-union-statistics-2016> ; Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
‘Statistical Bulletin: UK Labour Market September 2017’ at 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletin
s/uklabourmarket/september2017> (accessed November 2017). 
14 Please see TUPE Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794), TUPE Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) and TUPE Regulations 
2014 (SI 2014/16). TUPE 2014 are broadly discussed in chapters five and six above.  
15 TUPE Regulations (2006), Regulation 4. 
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policies’ objectives, the thesis established that this tension or imbalance may be remedied by 
applying Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law as a guiding tool in both jurisdictions.  
This was because Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of Law is built upon the ideals of 
constructiveness16 and integrity17 as two factors in judicial interpretation that would aid a 
judge to reach a right answer18 to the legal question before the court. Constructive 
interpretation would involve analysing past government actions, judicial judgments with the 
ratio decidendi, and legislative statutes to draw up a theory of what the law is or ought to be 
in answering the legal question before the court.19 Law as integrity would aim to keep the 
ideals of justice and fairness in the legal process. The thesis therefore applied Dworkin’s theory 
to both jurisdictions to highlight how the balance may be reached.  
For example, in the US as analysed in chapter four at 4.3.1, it was established that bankruptcy 
judges apply two standards in s.1113 rejection proceedings. These are the ‘necessary’ and the 
‘fair and equitable’ standards. Under the ‘necessary’ standard, judges base their examination 
of the debtor employer’s rejection application on whether the proposed rejection to CBAs are 
necessary for the successful reorganisation of the debtor company to avoid liquidation.  
However, under the ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and equitable’ standard, judges analyse whether the 
debtor employer’s rejection application is not only necessary but also fair and equitable for the 
successful reorganisation of the debtor employer and all affected parties with interests in the 
debtor company.20   
However, bankruptcy judges are not bound by either of the standards. As discussed in chapter 
four at 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 which compared and contrasted the judicial application of these 
standards in the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal in the cases of  Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America21 and Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey 
                                                          
16 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA, HUP, 1986) at 44 -48. 
17 Ibid, at 255. 
18 Dworkin claims that all or almost all legal questions have a unique right answer, even the hardest of cases. See, 
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: G. Duckworth, 1977) 85. The Right Answer Thesis as posited by 
Dworkin is discussed in chapter two above at 2.4. 
19 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.52.  
20 Martha West, ‘Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1986) 47 Ohio St. L. J. 
65, 103. 
21 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1986). (Hereafter referred 
to as Wheeling-Pittsburgh). 
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Transportation Inc.,22 It was established that the lack of a single binding standard to be adopted 
by judges in s.1113 rejection cases presented challenges and potential conflicting outcomes.   
The concern was that where judges applied the ‘necessary’ standard in s.1113 rejection 
motions, much regard was given to the necessity of saving the debtor’s business by allowing 
the rejection or modification of the CBAs in order to augment the debtor’s business 
reorganisation prospects. Questions of equity and fairnessness to employees whose CBAs are 
either rejected or modified although considered, may not be given the same level of regard.  
However, where judges applied the ‘fair and equitable’ standard, the need to rescue or 
reorganise the debtor’s business would be balanced with the ideals of fairness and equity to 
employees whose CBAs are being rejected or modified. Therefore, by applying Dworkin’s 
interpretative approach, the ‘necessary’ and ‘fair and equitable’ standard would be the ideal 
standard as it would fit into the constructiveness and integrity ideals of interpretation as 
posited by Dworkin and it would lead to fair outcomes for employees as opposed to the 
‘necessary’ standard. 
In the UK, the thesis established that the interpretation and application of TUPE Regulations 
during business sales and relevant transfers presented its own challenges. This was especially 
in the application of the economic, technical and organisation exceptions under regulation 7(2) 
(as analysed in chapter six at 6.5) as a balancing regulation between corporate rescue and 
employment protection. For example, the interpretative challenges were analysed using the 
case of Crystal palace in light of the ET, EAT to the CA decisions. In this case, the football club 
had gone into administration and the appointed administrator dismissed the claimant 
employees on the grounds that the football club had run out of money to pay for employees’ 
wages and to continue running the club in the hope of finding a buyer to sell it as a going 
concern (full facts of the case at 6.5.2).  
The ET held that the dismissals were connected with the transfer but for an economic reason 
that entailed changes in the workforce. The ET’s decision was supported and upheld by the CA. 
However, the EAT was of the opinion that the dismissal was for purposes of selling the football 
club which was therefore unfair. Both the EAT and CA in addition to interpreting the provisions 
                                                          
22 Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987) (hereafter referred to as 
Carey Transportation). 
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of regulation 7(2) purposively, they also applied the formulation of Mummery LJ in Spaceright23 
on the application of ETO reasons during relevant transfers. However, both the EAT and CA 
reached different conclusions.  Therefore, the thesis established that the difference in the 
judicial outcomes between the EAT and ET / CA would be balanced through the application of 
the ideals of constructiveness and integrity in interpretation to find the right balance as 
analysed in chapter six at 6.5.4. 
7.3.1 Would Dworkin’s Approach fit into the UK Legal Structure? 
It may be argued that in the UK, particularly, in the field of insolvency law, there have not been 
specific hard cases that are analogous to Dworkin’s hard case thesis that would arguably, 
warrant the application of Dworkin’s hard case thesis as a remedy. This is because in the UK, 
in contrast to the US, bankruptcy judges are more involved in a greater range of decisions 
where as judges in the UK insolvency proceedings, do not typically have to ask themselves, 
whether, a company faced with financial difficulties, can or should be rescued.  
Judges in the UK do not rule on administration proposals as US bankruptcy courts do with 
Chapter 11 reorganisation plans. The UK judges do not consider economic and business 
decisions as part of their role in adjudication. They are willing to leave these matters to experts 
in these particular fields, such as insolvency practitioners and business experts.24 However, UK 
judges may be called upon to interpret contentious issues during insolvency proceedings, such 
as interpreting economic, technical and organisational reasons (ETO reasons) or the meaning 
of the term ‘wages or salary’ during insolvency proceedings which may arguably, be analogous 
to Dworkin’s hard case thesis.25 
In addition, it was a concern that Dworkin’s hard case theory was more judge-focused and UK 
insolvency law was more insolvency practitioner-focused and therefore, there was a high level 
of contrast which meant that interpretative issues would not arise in the same ways. However, 
what could be drawn from Dworkin’s hard case thesis was the ability to analyse the 
administrator’s role and capacity to discharge his duties in a manner that is analogous to that 
                                                          
23 See Crystal Palace F.C and Another v Kavanagh and Another [2014] IRLR 139, at [9] – [10] where the CA judges 
were discussing the relevance of Mummery LJ’s formulation in Spaceright and how it influenced the judgment 
of the EAT that the CA departed away from. 
24 See the House of Lords debate to this effect; Hansard, HL Deb, vol. 638, col.768 (29 July 2002). 
25 See, Re Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd and Re Ferrotech Ltd & Granville Technology Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ. 1072 
discussed below. 
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of a judge. This notion was premised on the fact that the IA 1986, Sch. B1 that deals with 
administration procedure, is about how the administrator ‘thinks’.26 The administrator 
therefore has the same level of expectation especially in deciding which rescue objective would 
serve the interests of creditors as a whole, during insolvency proceedings that is analogous to 
that of judge presiding over a case in a court of law.27  
7.3.1.1 A Hard Case Analogy: 
Re Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd and Re Ferrotech Ltd & Granville Technology Ltd 
As a form of drawing an analogy of a hard case in the UK, I identified the Court of Appeal case 
of Re Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd and Re Ferrotech Ltd & Granville Technology Ltd.28 This 
case presented interpretative challenges to the courts that would be analogous to a hard case. 
Although the case may not be categorised as a hard case per se, the level of challenges 
encountered in interpreting the legal and policy provisions around paragraph 99 of Schedule 
B1 of the IA 1986, draws it closer to what Dworkin would term as a hard case upon which an 
administrator’s and a judge’s ability to adopt a novel interpretative approach to finding a fair 
and balanced answer may be drawn.  
In that case, the Court of Appeal (CA) was tasked to determine whether liabilities for protective 
awards and payments in lieu of notice to employees of a company in administration, whose 
contracts of employment had been adopted by the administrator, would be interpreted within 
the scope of ‘wages or salary’ pursuant to paragraph 99(4) – (6) of Schedule B1 to the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  
Another practical importance of this case was that the Court of Appeal had to hear this case at 
short notice.  The administrators of the company were due to decide whether or not to adopt 
the contracts of employment of over 150 employees, as the fourteen-day period for doing so 
was due to expire and their decision would depend on the outcome of the case. 
A protective award arises under s.189 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992 (the 1992 Act), where by virtue of s.188 of this Act, an employer has failed on the 
                                                          
26 IA 1986 Sch.B1, para 3(3) (a). This provision gives the administrator power to exercise discretion in deciding 
which rescue objective would best serve the interests of creditors as a whole. 
27 Hamiisi J. Nsubuga, ‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 4(1) 
NIBLeJ 4. 
28 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1072. 
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obligation to hold consultations with employees where more than 19 employees are to be 
dismissed by reason of redundancy unless there are special circumstances that render such 
consultations not reasonably practicable.29 A payment in lieu of notice arises where, either 
with express or implied agreement,  an  employer either gives proper notice of termination of 
employment to the employee or the employer summarily dismisses the employee and tenders 
a payment in lieu of proper notice as such action would amount to a breach of contract of 
employment.30 
In Re Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd31, Peter Smith J had given judgment on 27/07/2005 that 
protective awards and payments in lieu of notice were paid in priority to administration 
expenses. However, on 09/08/2005, Etherton J, gave a judgment that both protective awards 
and payments in lieu of notice were not payable in priority to administration expenses in 
respect of two different companies in the Re Ferrotech Ltd and Granville Technology case32 
that led to two conflicting first instance decisions and led to this appeal.  
By virtue of paragraph 99(5), sub paragraph 99(4) applies priority status to liabilities arising 
under a contract of employment which was adopted by the former administrator or 
predecessor. However, paragraph 99(5) (C) states that no action is taken of a liability to make 
a payment other than for wages and salaries. Interestingly, under paragraph 99(6), wages and 
salaries include among other things, holiday pay and sick pay. However, the challenge in 
interpretation, mainly centred on the interpretation of paragraph 99(6) (d) and paragraph 
99(5) (c).   
Paragraph 99 (6) (d) states: 
“in respect of a period, a sum which would be treated as earnings for that 
period for the purposes of an enactment about social security.”  
The Court of Appeal had to consider four versions of interpreting this sub paragraph, which all 
gave different meanings which had been put forward by the legal teams and the Attorney 
General during this case. However, more interesting is the fact that the Court of Appeal was 
                                                          
29 See the reasoning in Re Hartlebury Printers Ltd [1993] BCLC 902. 
30 The four principle categories of payments in lieu of notice as set out by Lord Browne – Wilkinson in Delaney v 
Staples [1992] 1 AC 687, at 692D – H. 
31 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1682 (Ch). 
32[2005] EWCA Civ. 1072.  
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not prepared to accept the submission of the Attorney General that the problem of 
interpretation before the court was as a result of a drafting error. Therefore, it may be argued 
that this is the sort of a hard case that Dworkin would help to guide the judge to choose the 
best approach to interpreting the subsection that was the subject of interpretation. 
 Secondly, the test to ascertain whether protective awards or payments in lieu of notice are 
payable in priority to administration expenses centred on two conditions being satisfied in 
paragraph 99(5): 
• That the liability arises out of a contract of employment. 
• That the liability falls within the category of ‘wages and salaries. 
In the judgment handed down by the judges – delivered by Neuberger J, the judges allowed 
the appeal of the administrators against the decision of Peter Smith J in Re Huddersfield holding 
that protective awards and payments in lieu of notice were not payable in priority to 
administration expenses. Interestingly, they upheld the decision of Etherton J in the Re 
Ferrotech Ltd and Granville Technology which was in conflict with Peter Smith J’s decision. 
The judges opined that analysing both issues involved a gateway, that is, a consideration of 
two issues in paragraph 99(5) that gave rise to difficulties on any view and if the gateway was 
correct, protective awards would not enjoy super priority because they cannot be described 
as liabilities arising under a contract of employment, but liabilities that no doubt, arise because 
of the existence of a contract of employment.33 Notably, the judges opined that; 
“[t]he argument involved giving the  words ‘arising under’ in paragraph 99(5), 
their ordinary and natural meaning, the notion that such expression should not 
be given an artificially wide meaning…”34 
There is sense in the argument that allowing protective awards and payments in lieu of notice 
to be paid in priority over administration expenses would make adoption of employment 
contracts by administrators substantially costly and burdensome to rescue attempts. However, 
Peter Smith’s judgment would be favourable to employees.   
                                                          
33 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1072. Para.17. 
34 Ibid. 
183 
 
Therefore, this case highlighted the extent to which the courts may be prepared to analyse 
what the legislature intended in passing this legislation. This is the interpretative approach that 
carries with it, the integrity and constructiveness in exploring extant legal rules and principles 
to derive at a unique answer or approach that would balance both employees’ and employers’ 
interest during corporate insolvency. Therefore, Dworkin’s interpretative approach would fit 
the UK legislative structure and was applied to the judicial interpretative inconsistencies as a 
remedy in chapter six. 
7.3.2 Other Comparative Research Observations  
The rationale for protecting employees with some priority during bankruptcy proceedings may 
be borne from a number of justifications. For example, it was established in chapter three that 
the commencement of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan gives employees hope that their 
employer’s business may continue and that a number of future constituent interests, such as 
future employment may be attained.35 However, it was also established that where the 
protection that is inherent in the legislation that ought to safeguard such expectations, is not 
uniformly available to all employees because they are not members of labour unions or 
collective bargaining groups, the principles of fairness, equality of treatment and justice that a 
legal system and its legal structures should accord its subjects may be defeated.   
It was observed that a lack of uniform protection of federal bankruptcy laws to all employees 
in the US main-stream labour market, and the declining influence of labour union movement 
and collective bargaining movement36 was a major concern to employment protection 
imperatives. Collective bargaining and the labour union movement are arguably, seen as the 
historical bedrock to employee participation and representation in the US labour industry. 
However, the disparity in the level of legislative protection to employees, members and non-
members of labour unions, reflected a massive difference in employee protection during 
corporate insolvency between the US and the UK.   
Moreover, the presence of a federal system of government within the US reflected a different 
form of legislative protection to employees during corporate insolvency between the UK and 
                                                          
35 D R Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 4 Am Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 6. 
36 For instance, see a news release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, on 26 
January 2017 which highlighted a massive decline in labour union memberships in the US in 2016 and recent years 
at, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm> (accessed 27 March 2017). 
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the US. The federal system of government in the US meant that the diffusion of power between 
federal and state law jurisdictions impacted greatly on how employment protection laws have 
been adopted and interpreted in several US states. As analysed in chapter three, while 
bankruptcy law is the subject of the federal government, and therefore, guided at federal level, 
employment laws (save for the NLRA 1935 which is a federal statute) and contract laws, 
through which certain employment and contractual rights to employees are created, are 
subject to state control.   
The effect of this federal-state law division was that certain practices during bankruptcy, such 
as bankruptcy venue forum shopping, as discussed in chapter three at 3.5 have been practised 
with less intervention from the bankruptcy institution, yet bankruptcy venue forum shopping 
was analysed as an impediment to employee participation and involvement in the bankruptcy 
reorganisation processes of their debtor employers.  
As a contrast to the lack of uniform legislative protection to employees in the US and the 
challenges caused by the federal system of government, this research project established that 
in the UK, the impact of the EU Acquired Rights Directives (ARDs)37 which were transposed into 
the UK employment law and insolvency law in the form of TUPE Regulations38 consolidated a 
uniform approach to employee protection during transfers of businesses and undertakings. 
Although TUPE Regulations do not apply to transfers of undertakings initiated with a view to 
the liquidation of the assets of the company,39 as discussed in chapter five at 5.4, however, 
where applicable, TUPE Regulations impose a uniform and structured approach to the 
treatment of employee interests and benefits during transfers of businesses and undertakings 
in the UK. 
As discussed in chapter five at 5.3, TUPE Regulations impose automatic transfer and continuity 
of an employment relationship during a transfer of undertakings and business in the UK.40 This 
might be likened to the successorship obligations on the new owner following a business sale, 
                                                          
37 The Acquired Rights Directives that have been transposed into UK legislations are Directive 77/187/EC of 14 
February 1977, Directive 98/50/EC and Directive 2001/23/EC. These directives are discussed in chapter five above 
38 Please see TUPE Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794), TUPE Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) and TUPE Regulations 
2014 (SI 2014/16). TUPE 2014 are broadly discussed in chapters five and six above.  
39 According to Regulation 8, TUPE applies to transfers in the context of insolvency ‘if at the time of the transfer 
the transferor is subject to relevant insolvency proceedings.’ Relevant insolvency proceedings are defined under 
Regulation 8 (6) as: ‘insolvency proceedings which have been opened in relation to the transferor not with a view 
to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and which are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner.  
40 TUPE Regulations (2006), Regulation 4. 
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merger or business transfer, arising out of collective bargaining agreements in the US. 
However, there exists a difference between these two provisions.  
The difference is that TUPE Regulations are legislatively mandated. However, successorship 
obligations are not legislatively mandated in US federal statutes, such as the Bankruptcy Code 
or the National Labour Relations Act (1935) to command a uniform automatic transfer and 
continuity of the employment relationships of all employees during business transfers, 
mergers, or business sales. Successorship obligations have been developed through case law 
on a case by case basis by state courts.41  
7.3.3 Employee Participation in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Proceedings Processes 
This research project also established that there is a certain degree of disparity in terms of 
control and participation between extant stakeholders during corporate insolvency 
proceedings in the UK and the US. Although not extensively discussed, it was established in 
chapter three at 3.3 that in the US, there exists strong consensus within the bankruptcy and 
business communities that the DIP is best positioned to manage and execute rescue operations 
successfully post-petition. However, this was in contrast to the practice in the UK, where 
outside professionals, such as administrators in the form of a practitioner-in-possession model 
are preferred to oversee the business rescue operations of the debtor company on corporate 
insolvency, especially, under the administration process. 
In the US, the DIP is equipped with powers to exercise discretion on how best to implement 
the reorganisation plan successfully. In the classic Chapter 11 model, the DIP would run the 
business in an ordinary sense and where needed, may acquire post-petition finance debts42 
where doing so would boost the reorganisation prospects of the debtor’s business. The DIP 
may execute these duties with less interference from the bankruptcy courts, except where, a 
cause arising out of incompetence, dishonesty or fraud arose.43  
                                                          
41 Delaware and Massachusetts have state legislations that provide for mandatory assumption of successorship 
obligations upon corporate mergers, takeover or transfers but those obligations have to be arising out of 
collectively bargained agreements. See, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, s.706 (a) (Supp. 1992) and MASS. ANN. LAWS 
Ch.149, s.20 (E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) respectively. See also, cases such as; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 
376, U.S. 543 (1963); NLRB v Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Fall River Dyeing & Fishing Corp. v. NLRB, 
482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
42 11 U.S.C. s.341. 
43 11 U.S.C. s.1104; see also the decision in In Re Cybergenics Corp., 330, F. 3d 548; B. A . Henoch, ‘Post Petition 
Financing: Is There Life After Debt?’ (1991) 8 Bank. Dev. J. 575, 577. 
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Moreover, this research project observed that corporate failure in the US is primarily viewed 
as a result of external factors, not management failings that put the company business in 
financial difficulties which is not the practice in the UK.44 There is a social cohesion that is borne 
with a commitment to an entrepreneurship ethic of giving the current management of the 
company a chance to steer the company back to solvency.45 There is belief that the DIP model 
is cost effective, the DIP is well appraised of the business activities of the debtor company’s 
business from past dealings, and time saving in implementing reorganisation plans.46  
However, in the UK, it was observed that the attitude towards corporate failure is predicated 
on the assumption that the current management of the company had failed in their 
obligations. The general consensus within the UK is that the company becomes insolvent 
because of management failures. Therefore, the failed management are replaced with an 
external professional, such as an insolvency practitioner to oversee the rescue operations of 
the company business.47  
In addition, it was observed that the lending market culture in the UK was strongly premised 
on the notion that the price for failure is replacement.48 The lending market is comfortable in 
replacing management failures with professional outsiders, such as insolvency practitioners, 
than assuming more risks with the failed management. In fact, leaving the failed management 
in control of the rescue operations was likened to leaving an alcoholic in charge of a pub.49 
Nonetheless, the thesis observed that although both systems do not afford employees equal 
participation and control rights equivalent to those of the DIP (in the US) or administrators (in 
the UK), however, the UK system, especially, the administration procedure, provides an 
otherwise inclusive model of protection to employees during corporate insolvency in 
comparison to that available to US employees in Chapter 11 reorganisations. As analysed in 
chapter one at 17.1, the administration procedure requires the administrator to pursue rescue 
                                                          
44 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo- American Evaluation’ (2007) 56(3) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 515, 551. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Bethany C. Suhreptz, ‘Key Employee Retention Plans, Executive Compensation, and BAPCA: No Rest for 
Congress, No More for Execs’ (2009) 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1194, 1199.     
47 See, R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011) 39. 
48 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo- American Evaluation’ (2007) 56(3) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 515, 551. 
49 See particularly, G. Moss, ‘Chapter 11: An English Lawyer’s Critique’ (1998) 11 Insol. Intel. 17, 18 – 19.  
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operations in the interest of creditors as a whole,50 including employees, without cherry-
picking whether, or not, some employees are members of labour unions or parties to collective 
bargaining agreements, like it is the position in the US. 
7.4 Possible Research Implications for UK – EU Law: Brexit 
A huge part of the literature used in this thesis in relation to the UK covered the ARD, TUPE 
Regulations and CJEU case law.51 TUPE is UK law that was enacted as a form of transponsing 
the Acquired Rights Directives into the UK law.52 However, the latest political changes in the 
UK at the time of writing this thesis may affect the future impact of TUPE Regulations in the 
UK.  
On 23 June 2016, citizens of the UK voted in favour of leaving the EU via a referendum.53 The 
vote in favour of leaving the EU by the UK has since become known as ‘Brexit’.54 On 29 March 
2017, the UK government started the formal process of the UK exiting the EU by triggering 
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon which gives EU Member States a right to exit the EU.55 This 
was followed by the UK government tabling the Great Repeal Bill56 highlighting the 
government’s agenda for dealing with EU-derived legislation pre-and post-Brexit and other 
provisions to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 that took the UK into the EU. 
Therefore, once the Great Repeal Bill is passed into law all EU-derived law such as the ARD will 
be converted into UK law wherever practical.57  
                                                          
50 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 3(2). 
51 By virtue of the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972, s.3 (1), the UK at the time of writing like other Members 
States of the EU is bound by the decisions of the CJEU on all matters of EU law. This point is further analysed in 
chapter six above at 6.4. 
52 The original ARD to be transposed into UK law was Directive 77/187/EC followed by Directive 98/50/EC and 
Directive 2001/23/EC. The ARDs that were transposed into UK law via TUPE Regulations are discussed in chapter 
five at 5.1 and further analysed in chapter six at 6.1. 
53 See for example, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/uk_leaves_the_eu> (accessed August 2017).  
54 Brexit is the popular term for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). See, 
Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, ‘Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU’ BBC News, 28 August 2017 
at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887> accessed August 2017). 
55 See, ‘Brexit: Theresa May to trigger Article 50 by end of March’ available online at < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37532364> (accessed November 2017). 
56 The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill - A Bill to Repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and make other 
provisions in connection with the withdrawal of United Kingdom from the EU, available online at < 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/18005.pdf> (accessed August 2017). 
57 See, ‘Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill" - Government Briefing Paper 7793 of 17 May 2017, at [6] 
available at <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7793> (accessed 11 
November 2017).  
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In addition, the Great Repeal Bill states that case law of the CJEU existing at the time of the 
UK’s exit from the EU will continue to have effect in the UK post-Brexit to ensure continuity 
and certainty in the interpretation of EU-derived legislation post-Brexit.58 Pre-Brexit CJEU 
decisions will have the status of UK Supreme Court judgments and therefore will continue to 
have effect unless the UK Supreme Court decides otherwise. The point of concern is that the 
UK courts and tribunals have been interpreting EU-derived legislation such as TUPE Regulations 
purposively to align TUPE Regulations to the ARD.59 This has meant that the ARD’s intention of 
safeguarding and protecting employees during relevant transfers is mantained. However, the 
potential repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 may affect the UK courts’ and 
tribunals’ interpretation of TUPE regulations post-Brexit.  
Section 6 of the Great Repeal Bill Provides that: 
(1) A court or tribunal— 
(a)- is not bound by any principles laid down, or any decisions made, on or after 
exit day by the European Court, and 
(b)- cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit day. 
Moreover, the Great Repeal Bill gives flexibility to the UK Parliament to repeal, amend or 
otherwise change any law existing by virtue of the EU after the Great Repeal Bill has been 
converted into law.60 It is therefore the concern that TUPE Regulations may be subjected to 
either amendment or repeal post-Brexit and the purposive interpretation of TUPE Regulations 
may be disregarded by the UK courts and tribunals post-Brexit which may affect TUPE’s 
protection to employees during relevant business sale and transfers. Nonetheless, the Great 
                                                          
58 Ibid, at [13]. See also, Department for Exiting the European Union,   ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’ (March 2017) Cm 9446, para 2.19 online at < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-repeal-bill-white-paper> (accessed November 2017). 
59 The requirement on the UK to adopt a purposive approach to interpreting EU law was emphasised by the House 
of Lords in Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 113; [1989] IRLR 161. Per Lord 
Denning: 
     ‘…[t]he courts of the United Kingdom are under a duty to follow the 
practice of the ECJ by giving a purposive construction of Directives and 
Regulations issued with the purpose of complying with the Directives’. 
60 60 See, ‘Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill" - Government Briefing Paper 7793 of 17 May 2017, at [41] 
available at <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7793> (accessed 11 
November 2017). 
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Repeal Bill is still in its early stages and its full effect on TUPE Regulations (provided this Bill is 
passed into law) is yet to be known. 
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